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1 Introduction 
Juha Jokela, Niklas Helwig & Clara Portela 
1.1 Background 
During the past decade, the European Union (EU) has increasingly used sanctions 
(i.e. restrictive measures) within its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 
order to respond to adverse security developments in its neighbourhood and beyond. 
The restrictive measures applied have been designed to affect the behaviour of 
targeted regimes and actors, to position the EU in the wider security environment, and 
to signal disapproval as well as contain further adverse actions detrimental to both 
international and EU security. 
During the formative years of the CFSP, much of the analytical attention centred on 
questions related to the nature of the EU’s external actorness and the development of 
its military and civilian crisis management capabilities. The discussion largely 
reflected an understanding of the EU as a soft power actor in foreign policy. Yet the 
possibility to launch joint military operations to promote, uphold and potentially even 
enforce peace signified a move towards harder (military) actorness.   
The application of restrictive measures as one of the toughest and most coercive tools 
available to the EU increased substantially at the same time, however. Since the 
1990s, the international community has moved away from comprehensive trade 
embargoes towards targeted sanctions, and the EU has fully embraced this this trend. 
The most commonly used restrictive measure was a travel ban prohibiting listed 
individuals from travelling to EU territory, often denying them access to European 
financial institutions and freezing their assets in Europe. During this period, EU 
sanctions often implemented United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, 
and were connected to human rights violations and concerns. In addition, the EU 
adopted several arms embargoes against countries with clear security challenges. 
Within the previous decade, the EU has increasingly adopted sanctions regimes 
based on its own initiative, and has duly emerged as one of the most prominent 
senders of sanctions along with the United Nations (UN) and the United States (US).  
In 2010, jointly with the US, the EU adopted tough sanctions against Iran, which far 
exceeded the UN Security Council resolutions related to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. EU 
measures, such as the oil embargo and a range of financial sanctions, were aimed at 
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pressuring Iran to engage constructively in attempts to resolve the dispute through 
diplomatic negotiation led by the EU within the format consisting of Iran, the 
permanent members of the UNSC, and Germany (E3+3, or P5+1).  
Since the Iran sanctions, the EU has also imposed notable economic sanctions 
against Côte d’Ivoire, Syria and Russia. Arguably, the EU’s Russia sanctions 
represent a qualitative shift and a turning point in the EU’s sanctions policy. Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea and participation in the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine in 
2014 led to diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis in the so-called Normandy format, 
including Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany. In this environment, and in close 
coordination with the US, the EU imposed significant sanctions against Russia that 
also included targeted export bans and financial restrictions. The lifting of these 
measures was tied to the successful implementation of the Minsk Agreement, aimed 
at resolving the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. 
As the EU’s sanctions against Russia were carefully targeted, their economic impact 
was also limited, yet noteworthy. Their political weight has duly been highlighted by 
experts and policymakers alike. For the first time since the establishment of the 
CFSP, the EU had imposed significant sanctions against a neighbouring great power 
and a major trading partner. Given the divergence of views among the member states 
on Russia, the achieved consensus on these measures has been viewed as a major 
display of unity by the EU in foreign and security policy. As the implementation of the 
Minsk Agreement is still pending, the EU sanctions have now been in place for more 
than five years. Accordingly, the consensus among the member states has prevailed 
thus far, even though these measures must be renewed unanimously every six 
months.  
Developments during the past decade also imply that the EU is increasingly willing 
and able to accept the economic burden related to sanctions. In the case of Iran, the 
EU sanctions had a detrimental effect on European businesses across a number of 
sectors. In terms of the Russia sanctions, Russia’s counter-actions, including import 
bans, have had a similarly detrimental impact on certain sectors and businesses in 
the EU.  
Against this backdrop, the importance of restrictive measures for the EU’s foreign and 
security policy has increased significantly during the past decade. Given the dramatic 
changes in the European security environment and beyond, the EU has resorted to 
sanctions as one of the hardest tools in its foreign and security policy toolbox. Yet the 
recent developments related to this policy field also display some notable challenges 
for the EU sanctions policy.   
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First, as the EU’s closest ally, the US has reinstated sanctions on Iran and put in 
place new restrictions on Russia as well. The foreign policies, including the use of 
sanctions, on both sides of the Atlantic are increasingly out of step, and the lack of 
transatlantic coordination and the extraterritorial impact of the US sanctions on 
European businesses constitute a major puzzle for the EU. Second, because of the 
UK’s withdrawal, the EU has lost one of the main initiators of EU sanctions, as well as 
important resources for the design and monitoring of sanctions regimes. Third, the 
EU’s sanctions policy is enacted in an increasingly competitive international 
environment marked by great-power politics and the expanding role of geo-economic 
strategies. The shifts in economic and political power pose a further challenge for the 
EU as a sanctions sender, especially due to the current challenges related to the 
transatlantic coordination on sanctions.     
However, the need to fill any resulting vacuum left by Brexit, to counter the US 
secondary sanctions, and to secure the EU’s interests amid great-power politics also 
provides new opportunities. These developments force the EU and its member states 
to strengthen decision-making on sanctions, bolster the system of their 
implementation and enforcement, and develop the allocation of sanctions expertise 
and resources in the EU.  
1.2 Objectives of the study 
The key aim of this study is to analyze (i) the development of the EU’s sanctions 
policy in general, and (ii) the impact of new dynamics on the functioning of this policy 
tool in particular. In doing so, it aims to examine the current state of the EU’s 
sanctions policy by laying out its content, forms and structures as well as recent 
trends and drivers. These current dynamics point to some of the key challenges the 
EU facing in this policy field. Secondly, the study analyzes the economic implications 
of the EU’s Russia sanctions and the ensuing Russian counter-actions. The aim is to 
elucidate the targeted nature of the EU’s sanctions policy and the internal burden-
sharing that is important for consensus-building on sanctions within the EU.  
Finally, the study aims to assess the political and economic implications of the 
developments in EU sanctions policy for Finland, a member state that has invested 
heavily in the CFSP and which, as Russia’s neighbour, is in the frontline of the EU’s 
actions. Against this backdrop, the study also makes some observations and 
recommendations regarding the future development of the EU’s sanctions policy, and 
for Finnish foreign policymakers in particular.  
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The research project underpinning this study was conducted and funded as part of the 
implementation of the Finnish Government Plan for Analysis, Assessment and 
Research activities for 2019. The initial objectives of the research project were 
defined in the Memorandum of 2019 Government Plan for Analysis, Assessment and 
Research.1  
1.3 Methods and structure of the research 
project 
The research project was coordinated by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs 
(FIIA) and jointly implemented by FIIA and ETLA Economic Research (ETLA). The 
project was steered by a group of officials chaired by Mr Juha Rainne from the 
Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, with other members 
representing the Ministry of Defence and other departments of the Foreign Ministry. 
The views expressed in the study do not necessarily represent the views of the 
Government of Finland.   
It should be noted that the study is not an academic research paper, but primarily a 
policy-oriented publication. The report nonetheless follows a referencing system 
typical of academic studies and approaches source materials critically. In addition, it 
reflects analytically grounded research design, and aims for systematic assessment. 
The research was conducted by a group of researchers from FIIA and ETLA. The 
expertise in these institutes was supplemented by an external expert with a long-
standing expertise and publication record on EU's sanctions policy and international 
security. 
The group comprised:  
Clara Portela, University of Valencia 
Ilari Aula, FIIA 
Niklas Helwig, FIIA 
Matti Pesu, FIIA 
Ville Sinkkonen, FIIA 
Juha Jokela, FIIA 
Birgitta Berg-Andersson, ETLA 
Markku Lehmus, ETLA 
                                                     
 
1 Memorandum (in Finnish): https://tietokayttoon.fi/selvitys-ja-tutkimussuunnitelma.  
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The study builds on the application of a wide array of qualitative and quantitative 
research methods. The primary materials for the policy analysis undertaken consist of 
interviews with representatives of the EU and its member states, as well as publicly 
available policy documents. The research team conducted various semi-structured 
interviews, which served as background information rather than as a primary dataset 
for the analysis. Due to the sensitive nature of the research topic, officials were 
interviewed in confidentiality and assured complete anonymity; hence no direct 
references are made to these interviews in this study.  
The project also benefited from a brainstorming session organized during the initial 
stages of the project, which consisted of key Finnish stakeholders. In addition, salient 
topics were discussed in the informal meeting of the Working Party of Foreign 
Relations Counsellors (RELEX) of the Council of the EU in the presence of the project 
research team. Furthermore, one of the chapters was presented to RELEX’s 
sanctions formation meeting for discussion. 
The ETLA study on the economic impact of the EU’s sanctions and Russian counter-
sanctions is based on international trade data between 2001 and 2018. The 
comprehensive analysis includes data from economies worldwide. In particular, the 
study calculates the share of sanctioned goods as a percentage of the total exports to 
Russia and allows for a comparative approach between EU member states and other 
major economies with no or limited sanctions on Russia in place. The analysis also 
draws from two semi-structured interviews with representatives of the Finnish 
industrial sector.  
1.4 Structure of the report 
The study is structured as follows: following this introduction, the second chapter 
provides an overview of sanctions (i.e. restrictive measures) in the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. It defines the notion of targeted sanctions, classifies EU 
sanctions regimes according to their relationship with UN measures, and provides an 
overview of their evolution over time. The chapter then reviews the decision-making 
process leading to the adoption of sanctions in the CFSP, and discusses the 
evaluation of the efficacy of the sanctions. Finally, the chapter introduces some of the 
key challenges facing EU sanctions today, which are the subject of further elaboration 
in the reminder of the study.  
The second section of the study focuses on the key challenges in the EU’s sanctions 
policy. Chapter 3 analyzes the development of the US sanctions policy under 
President Donald Trump’s administration and related challenges for the EU, while 
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Chapter 4 focuses on the implications of Brexit and the emerging independent UK 
sanctions policy for the EU.  
The analysis of the US sanctions policy suggests that great-power competition has 
brought geo-economics to the forefront of strategic thinking in Washington D.C., and 
that the US is well positioned in the global economic and financial system to use 
coercive economic tools. Under the current US administration, this has created 
clashes with the EU over the extraterritorial application of American sanctions and 
constituted a challenge for transatlantic policy coordination.  
The chapter on the implications of Brexit for the EU’s sanctions policy argues that the 
UK has played an instrumental role in the formulation of EU sanctions and that Brexit 
requires the EU to replace the UK’s political and technical input. It is suggested that 
even if the UK has taken measures to maintain the sanctions regimes agreed as an 
EU member, divergence remains a risk of an independent UK sanctions policy. 
Coordination mechanisms between the EU and UK sanctions policies could mitigate 
some of the negative implications of Brexit.  
The third section of the study analyzes the adaptation of the EU’s sanctions policy to 
these and other developments. Chapter 5 discusses the decision-making system of 
the EU’s sanctions policy by outlining the decision-making process, and analyzing 
possible reforms and improvements to the EU’s sanctions machinery. The chapter 
also focuses on the role of national preferences and strategic cultures, as well as the 
politics between EU member states in the formation of sanctions regimes. It argues 
that despite extensive deliberations between member states and input from EU 
services, individual or small groups of member states repeatedly slow down or veto 
final decisions on sanctions regimes. While a derogation from the unanimity rule could 
speed up decision-making, it risks making member states more cautious of proactively 
using the policy instrument given the looming prospect of being outvoted.  
Chapter 6 analyzes the largely decentralized system of implementation and 
enforcement of the EU’s restrictive measures. It suggests that the current set-up does 
not guarantee the uniform implementation of EU sanctions, as it leaves individual 
member states with room for manoeuvre. While this runs the risk of discrepancies 
among member states in terms of implementation and enforcement, any attempt to 
tighten the supervision of member- state compliance might affect the readiness of 
member states to agree to CFSP sanctions in the first place.  
Chapter 7 looks into the impact of secondary sanctions on the EU. It argues that the 
EU’s ability to respond to the US measures is limited due to the importance of the US 
market for EU businesses, as well as the pivotal position of US financial institutions 
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2020:31 
 
20 
 
 
and efficient US sanctions implementation and enforcement, and calls for the EU to 
tackle the macro-level and partly structural power imbalances.  
Chapter 8 focuses on the future prospects of the EU’s sanctions policy amid an 
increasingly competitive global milieu. It suggests that given the EU-level 
competences in the field of trade and single market regulation, the EU is at first sight 
well-positioned to be a powerful actor in the geo-economic competition. However, 
other actors, such as China, Russia and the US, can use the decentralized system of 
the EU by actively undermining the EU’s internal cohesion.  
The fourth section (Chapter 9) of the study focuses on the economic implications of 
the EU’s Russia sanctions and Russia’s counter-measures and reveals some of the 
costs for EU countries. At a macro level, the impact of the EU’s sanctions and 
Russia’s counter-sanctions on the economies of EU member states appears relatively 
modest, as the share of affected products as a percentage of the total exports to 
Russia is relatively small. However, the sanctions hit certain industries such as the 
Finnish dairy and shipbuilding industries particularly hard.  
Finally, the study concludes with an assessment of the political and economic 
implications of the EU’s restrictive measures for Finland. Chapter 10 argues that the 
EU’s restrictive measures served to place the sanctions instrument among the core 
interests of Finnish foreign policy. The Russia sanctions “politicized” a tool that had 
previously been of limited significance to Finnish foreign affairs, yet after a brief period 
of adaptation to the Russia sanctions, a relatively broad domestic consensus 
emerged in support of Finland’s policy vis-à-vis the restrictive measures. The chapter 
notes that the future salience of the EU’s sanctions instrument for Finnish foreign 
policy hinges on the overall development of the CFSP, and hence the possible 
political implications of sanctions depend on the scope of sanctions and also on the 
target state. The analysis suggests that Finland should prepare for an era in which the 
principles of geo-economics prevail over the idea of positive economic 
interdependence between states.  
The concluding Chapter 11 summarizes the major findings of the study. Based on 
these findings, it formulates a number of specific recommendations for Finland. In 
particular, Finland should support EU unity in a more competitive international 
environment by advocating limited reforms of the EU’s sanctions machinery. It should 
leverage diplomacy, seek a joint diplomatic line together with its EU partners in 
Washington, and ensure that sanctions are part of a broader diplomatic approach in 
response to an international crisis or norm violation. Sanctions require Helsinki to 
foster expertise by advocating new capacities at the EU level for the preparation of 
sanctions, and by ensuring the dissemination of expert knowledge at the national 
level. 
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The study concludes that the departure of the UK and disquieting developments in the 
US sanctions policy underline the need for a broader discussion on the future 
prospects of sanctions as an EU foreign policy instrument among member states. We 
hope that this study will help to inform this debate.  
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2 Sanctions in EU foreign policy 
Clara Portela 
Summary 
• The EU has been making use of sanctions to respond to the most pressing 
security challenges in its neighbourhood in recent years – from the Syrian civil 
war to the crisis in Eastern Ukraine, and it has resorted to sanctions to address 
challenges further afield, such as Nicaragua or Myanmar. 
• The sanctions landscape witnessed a profound transformation with the 
development of the concept of targeted sanctions in the mid-nineties. They are 
designed to put pressure on those deemed responsible for the objectionable 
act. 
• From 2010 onwards, EU sanctions policy experienced a turning point. Their 
frequency of sanctions imposition remained stable, but a qualitative leap took 
place. The EU started imposing economic sanctions, incorporated new goals, 
and targeted major economic partners, most notably Russia.  
• Sanctions are not exclusively intended to compel a change in the political 
behaviour of leaders. Other functions include the desire to demonstrate the 
sender’s willingness and capacity to act, anticipating or deflecting criticism, 
maintaining certain patterns of behaviour in international affairs, deterring 
further engagement in the objectionable actions by the target and third parties, 
or promoting subversion in the target. 
• Three challenges merit particular attention: court cases resulting from lack of 
due process for designees, contestation of the legality of EU measures, the 
impending Brexit, and the divergence between EU and US sanctions policies. 
2.1 Introduction 
Sanctions currently constitute one of the principal instruments through which the EU 
addresses security challenges in the context of its Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). Legal scholar Paul Cardwell recently noted that “the extent to which 
sanctions have been imposed, or at the very least discussed in the Council, means 
that it is little exaggeration to say that the CFSP has become oriented towards 
sanctions as an appropriate response to global or regional problems”.2 By way of 
                                                     
 
2 Cardwell, P., ‘The legalisation of EU foreign policy and the use of sanctions’, Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies, vol. 17, no. 1, 2015, pp. 287-310; see also Portela, C., 
‘How the EU learned to love sanctions’, in M. Leonard ed., Connectivity Wars, European Council 
on Foreign Relations, London, 2016, pp. 36-42. 
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illustration, the latest EUISS Yearbook of European Security features the term 
“sanctions” no less than 38 times.3  
The EU has been making use of sanctions to respond to the most pressing security 
challenges in its neighbourhood in recent years – from the Syrian civil war to the crisis 
in Eastern Ukraine, and it has resorted to sanctions to address challenges further 
afield, such as Nicaragua or Myanmar. It has also been employing sanctions against 
non-traditional security threats, such as cyberattacks. Moreover, it has recently 
diversified its sanctions practice, which used to be country-based, to encompass 
horizontal sanctions regimes as well, such as the blacklist on the employment of 
chemical weapons.  A sanctions regime designed to blacklist individuals responsible 
for human rights violations worldwide is currently under consideration.4 Brussels is 
applying sanctions to address challenges of a novel nature, such as the hydrocarbon 
drilling off the coast of Cyprus, or the misappropriation of state assets in third 
countries.5 Most importantly, the EU has been wielding sanctions in order to oppose 
policies by global powers. These include China – upon which it imposed an arms 
embargo in response to state repression of the Tiananmen Square protests and, most 
recently, upon its mighty Eastern neighbour, Russia.  
The list would be even longer if one were to consider the employment of sanctions 
outside the realm of the CFSP. The EU also imposes sanctions in connection with its 
elaborate conditionality policies in the fields of development and trade.6 This includes 
the suspension of development aid under the ACP-EU Partnerships Agreement, or 
the withdrawal of trade preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences.7 
However, the present study is restricted to the CFSP sanctions practice, considered 
the main EU sanctions practice inside EU circles and beyond.  
                                                     
 
3 This count includes references in the main text only, not in graphs and footnotes, and refers to 
both EU measures implementing UN sanctions or agreed autonomously. European Union 
Institute for Security Studies, Yearbook of European Security, EUISS, Paris, 2019. 
4 Rettman, A., ‘Human rights abusers to face future EU blacklists’, EUobserver, 9 December 
2019, https://euobserver.com/foreign/146865, accessed 12 March 2020. 
5 Council of the European Union, Turkey's illegal drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean: 
Council adopts framework for sanctions [media release], 11 November 2019, 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/11/11/turkey-s-illegal-drilling-
activities-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-council-adopts-framework-for-sanctions/, accessed 12 
March 2020. 
6 Bartels, L., Human Rights Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements, OUP, Oxford, 
2005.   
7 Fürrutter, M., ‘The transnationalised reality of EU sanctioning: a new research agenda beyond 
the study of effective economic sanctions’, Journal of European Public Policy [online], 17 
October 2019, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2019.1678661, accessed 
6 May 2020, pp. 1-13; Koch, S., ‘A Typology of Political Conditionality Beyond Aid: Conceptual 
Horizons Based on Lessons from the European Union’, World Development, vol. 75, 2015, pp. 
97-108. 
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One of the reasons why this phenomenon has received so little attention relates to its 
relatively low visibility. While sanctions have increased their presence in EU policy 
documents since it adopted its first European Security Strategy in 2003, their 
centrality as a tool in the EU’s management of external challenges is not yet reflected 
in EU strategy. The European Security Strategy (ESS) refers to sanctions tangentially: 
It claims that countries which “have placed themselves outside the bounds of 
international society”, have “sought isolation” or “persistently violate international 
norms” “should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their 
relationship with the European Union”.8 The ESS asserts that “proliferation may 
be…attacked through political, economic and other pressures”, and that “conditionality 
and targeted trade measures remains an important feature in our policy that we 
should further reinforce”.9 It can be presumed that sanctions are implied in terms of 
“economic pressures” or “targeted trade measures”.  
The “Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)” from 
the same year states that when political dialogue and diplomatic pressure have failed, 
“coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law 
(sanctions, selective or global, interceptions of shipments and, as appropriate, the use 
of force) could be envisioned”.10 Similarly, the Global Strategy of June 2016 claims: “A 
stronger Union requires investing in all dimensions of foreign policy…from trade and 
sanctions to diplomacy and development”. It adds that “long-term work on pre-emptive 
peace, resilience and human rights must be tied to crisis response 
through…sanctions and diplomacy”.11  
The Global Strategy portrays sanctions as instruments in the service of peace, 
obviating any hint of coercive employment: “Restrictive measures, coupled with 
diplomacy, are key tools to bring about peaceful change”.12 The Global Strategy never 
refers explicitly to sanctions in connection with nuclear proliferation: “We will use 
every means at our disposal to assist in resolving proliferation crises, as we 
successfully did on the Iranian nuclear programme”.13 No mention is made of the key 
                                                     
 
8 Council of the European Union, A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy, 
Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 10, 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/78367.pdf, 
accessed 12 March 2020. 
9 ibid., p. 7, p. 10. 
10 ibid., p. 5. 
11 ibid., p. 47, p. 51. 
12 ibid., p. 32. 
13 ibid., pp. 41-42. 
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role of sanctions in promoting the Iran nuclear deal, thanks to which the EU is now 
recognized as a non-proliferation actor.14  
Documents dealing with EU sanctions show an interest in optimizing implementation: 
“Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures (sanctions) in 
the framework of the EU”,15 as well as “Best Practices on Effective Implementation of 
Financial Restrictive Measures”.16 Yet owing to their focus on implementation, they do 
not reveal much about the place that sanctions occupy in the EU’s broader strategy. 
The key policy document is the two-page “Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive 
Measures” of 2004, where the Council announces that it “will impose autonomous EU 
sanctions in support of efforts to fight terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and…to uphold respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law 
and good governance”.17 
The present chapter provides an overview of the use made by the EU of sanctions in 
its foreign policy. It is organized as follows: The first section defines the notion of 
targeted sanctions and classifies EU sanctions regimes according to their relationship 
with UN measures, while the second section provides an overview of their evolution 
over time. The third section reviews the decision-making process leading to the 
adoption of sanctions in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This is 
followed by a fourth section that looks at the evaluation of sanctions, including an 
overview of their operation, elucidating the mechanisms through which sanctions are 
expected to achieve their objectives. A concluding part introduces some of the key 
                                                     
 
14 Alcaro, R. & Bassiri Tabrizi, A., ‘European and Iran’s nuclear issue: The labours and sorrows 
of a supporting actor’, International Spectator, vol. 49, no. 3, 2014, pp. 14-20; Portela, C., ‘The 
EU’s evolving responses to nuclear proliferation crises’, SIPRI Non-Proliferation Papers, no. 46, 
July 2015, https://www.sipri.org/publications/2015/eu-non-proliferation-papers/eus-evolving-
responses-nuclear-proliferation-crises-incentives-sanctions, accessed 18 March 2020. 
15 Council of the European Union, Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive 
measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
(15579/03), Brussels, 3 December 2003, 
https://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015579%202003%20INIT, accessed 
12 March 2020; Council of the European Union, Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of 
restrictive measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, (5664/18), Brussels, 4 May 2018, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
5664-2018-INIT/en/pdf, accessed 12 March 2020. 
16 Council of the European Union, Restrictive measures (Sanctions): Update of the EU Best 
Practices for the effective implementation of restrictive measures, (10254/15), Brussels, 24 June 
2015, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10254-2015-INIT/en/pdf, accessed 17 
March 2020. 
17 Council of the European Union, Basic principles on the use of restrictive measures 
(Sanctions), (10198/1/04), Brussels, 7 June 2004, p. 2, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010198%202004%20REV%201, 
accessed 12 March 2020. 
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challenges facing EU sanctions today, which are the subject of further elaboration in 
the remainder of the study.   
2.2 Introducing EU targeted sanctions 
The EU has traditionally referred to the sanctions it adopts in the framework of its 
CFSP as “restrictive measures”. The term “sanctions” does not have any commonly 
agreed definition under public international law. The United Nations Charter does not 
offer a definition either: the term sanctions does not appear in its text. UN sanctions 
are adopted under Article 41, which refers to “measures not involving the use of 
armed force”.18 In the specialized literature, it is sometimes defined as the “deliberate, 
government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or 
financial relations”.19 However, sanctions are not limited to the interruption of 
economic relations, but encompass measures deprived of economic significance, 
such as diplomatic sanctions.20 Thus, sanctions can be broadly defined as the 
politically-motivated withdrawal of a benefit that would otherwise be granted, and 
whose restoration is made dependent on the fulfilment of a series of conditions 
defined by the sender.21 
The EU sanctions practice features three distinct strands:  
Firstly, it implements sanctions regimes decided by the UNSC, which are mandatory 
for all states in the world. Here, the EU acts virtually as an “implementing agency” of 
the UNSC.22 The competence of the EU to implement sanctions mandated by the 
UNSC derives from the duty, which rests upon EU member states as members of the 
UN, and is justified on the basis of a preference for uniform implementation.  
Secondly, the EU determines and implements its own sanctions in the absence of a 
mandate. This is referred to as “autonomous practice”. The EU has agreed a number 
of sanctions regimes in the absence of a pre-existing UNSC Resolution, thus 
developing a rich autonomous sanctions practice which has gained in sophistication 
over the years.   
                                                     
 
18 Charron, A., United Nations Sanctions and Conflict, Routledge, Abingdon, 2011. 
19 Hufbauer, G. et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edn, Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, Washington D.C., 2007, p. 3. 
20 Doxey, M., ‘Reflections on the sanctions decade and beyond’, International Journal, vol. 64, 
no. 2, 2009, pp. 539-549. 
21 Portela, C., European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy, Routledge, Abingdon, 2010.  
22 Portela, C., ‘National implementation of United Nations Security Council sanctions: Towards 
fragmentation’, International Journal, vol. 65, no. 1, 2009, pp. 13-30. 
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Thirdly, the EU often supplements UNSC regimes with additional sanctions that go 
beyond the letter of the UNSC resolutions, a phenomenon sometimes labelled “gold-
plating”23 that has almost gone unnoticed. In the case of Iran and North Korea, UN 
sanctions resolutions provided a basis for more extensive unilateral sanctions.24 
The EU has embraced the notion of targeted sanctions, adopting a policy to enact 
measures that fall under this term only.25 The sanctions landscape witnessed a 
profound transformation with the development of the concept of targeted sanctions in 
the mid-nineties. Targeted sanctions emerged in the 1990s in reaction to the severe 
humanitarian impact of the UN embargo on Iraq. They are designed to put pressure 
on those deemed responsible for the objectionable act. Thus, targeted sanctions 
purport to canalize harm towards specific leaders and elites, while the population at 
large should be spared. Targeted sanctions are conceived to affect certain individuals, 
elites or economic sectors, rather than an economy as a whole.  
The notion of targeted sanctions therefore excludes comprehensive trade embargoes 
due to their indiscriminate effects. Under “targeted sanctions” we understand every 
measure that falls short of a blanket economic embargo. The catalogue of “targeted 
sanctions” is open-ended, with measures often tailored to specific situations or target 
groups. New forms of targeted sanctions keep being devised, as documented in the 
well-known case of Iran.26 Nevertheless, the types of measures considered targeted 
actually feature different degrees of discrimination, with oil embargoes affecting the 
population far more than arms embargoes, for example. Understood as measures that 
can be located in a continuum, visa bans constitute the most discriminating measures, 
while sanctions affecting transportation or the financial sector would be at the least 
discriminating end.27 
2.3 Evolution of EU sanctions 
When the UNSC mandated sanctions against Rhodesia in the 1960s, the member 
states of the then EC implemented them via national legislation rather than through a 
Community instrument. However, national acts implementing the UNSC Resolution 
                                                     
 
23 Taylor, B., Sanctions as Grand Strategy, IISS, London, 2010. 
24 Biersteker, T. & Portela, C., ‘EU sanctions in context: three types’, EUISS Brief, no. 26, 2015, 
https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_26_EU_sanctions.pdf, accessed 3 
April 2020. 
25 Council of the European Union, 2004, loc. cit. 
26 Nephew, R., The Art of Sanctions: A view from the field, Columbia University Press, New 
York, 2018. 
27 Biersteker, T., Eckert, S. & Tourinho, M., Targeted Sanctions. The effectiveness of UN Action, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016. 
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differed in coverage. A preference for uniform implementation compelled member 
states to switch to the implementation of sanctions through the Community. They first 
agreed on the imposition of measures within the intergovernmental framework of 
European Political Cooperation (EPC), and subsequently adopted a Community 
Regulation for their implementation. Initial examples of sanctions regimes 
implemented according to this method included those against the USSR in 1980 in 
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and against Argentina in 1982 
following the invasion of the Falkland Islands. This autonomous EU practice was 
facilitated by the progressive enhancement of foreign policy co-ordination in the EPC, 
which evolved into the CFSP.28 The CFSP sanctions practice witnessed increased 
coordination with the sanctions practice of other actors, particularly the US.29   
The 1980s were a formative period in which the sanctions practice under the EPC 
was characterized by weak compliance and, occasionally, instances of member states 
that withdrew from the sanctions effort (Falklands crisis) or excluded themselves from 
the sanctions when they were agreed. During the 1990s, and due to the end of the 
Cold War, sanctions activity increased sharply, transforming them into one of the 
principal EU foreign policy tools. The CFSP, launched at that time, saw their 
formalization as the legally binding instruments we know today. Sanctions usually 
responded to democratic backsliding, human rights breaches, and sometimes armed 
conflicts such as the Yugoslav wars. Most measures did not affect the economy as a 
whole – neither that of the EU nor those of the target countries. They mainly consisted 
of arms embargoes, visa bans and asset freezes on a few individuals, a combination 
of measures that replicates UN sanctions habits. Economic bans, such as the flight 
ban on the former Yugoslavia or the gems embargo on Myanmar, remained rarities.30 
EU sanctions have traditionally been targeted measures, although the EU did not 
officially commit to this notion until 2004, with the publication of the Basic Principles 
on the Use of Restrictive Measures.31      
From 2010 onwards, EU sanctions policy experienced a turning point. Their frequency 
of sanctions imposition remained stable, but a qualitative leap took place. Firstly, the 
EU started imposing economic sanctions. The EU agreed sanctions on Iran that 
supplemented UN Security Council measures, including an oil embargo and far-
reaching financial restrictions replicating US sanctions. This constituted a novelty in 
that, for the first time, they adversely affected European enterprises, hitting some 
sectors badly. This was followed by sanctions against Côte d’Ivoire, in a bid to 
                                                     
 
28 Portela, 2010, loc. cit. 
29 Borzyskowski, I. v. & Portela, C., ‘Sanctions cooperation and regional organisations’, in S. Aris 
et al. eds., Inter-organisational Relations in International Security: Cooperation and Competition, 
Routledge, Abingdon, 2018, pp. 240-261. 
30 Portela, 2010, loc. cit. 
31 Council of the European Union, 2004, loc. cit. 
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overcome the political impasse that followed the presidential elections of November 
2010. Unprecedented measures such as a ban on the import of cocoa and a 
prohibition for European companies to trade through the harbours of Abidjan and San 
Pedro were enacted.32 In Libya, the EU supplemented UNSC measures with 
additional designations as well as an autonomous ban on equipment for internal 
repression. Subsequently, it prohibited dealings with Libyan financial entities, the 
Libyan National Oil Corporation and five of its subsidiaries as well as energy firms, 
and eventually blacklisted six Libyan harbours.33 In Syria, the EU imposed its entire 
sanctions toolbox in just a few months, including a ban on the import of Syrian oil and 
gas.34 In 2014, the EU responded to the annexation of Crimea with the complete 
isolation of the peninsula, and to Russian military support for the destabilization 
activities of the separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine with a varied sanctions package, 
representing the first serious instance of economic restrictions against its powerful 
Eastern neighbour since the end of the Cold War. Short, economic sanctions are 
becoming the usual practice. Whereas the EU initially interpreted the concept of 
sanctions rather narrowly during the 1990s, it is increasingly enacting sanctions with 
“bite”. This implies an acceptance that groups not directly targeted may suffer 
collateral damage, both in the target and sender societies.35 
In addition, EU sanctions policy has also seen the incorporation of new goals. In the 
2000s, the measures it imposed on Iran and North Korea constitute the first instances 
of EU sanctions addressing the proliferation of WMD. In the present decade, the asset 
freezes imposed on Egypt, Tunisia and Ukraine after their revolutionary transitions are 
the first EU blacklists to address the misappropriation of state assets, and the only 
sanctions imposed upon deposed leaders after they left office. In addition, it has made 
increased use of supplementary sanctions complementing measures by the UNSC. 
Most recently, the EU has adopted a new sanctions method: horizontal sanctions 
regimes. Partly modelled on US sanctions practice, thematic sanctions regimes allow 
for the listing of entities and individuals even in the absence of an international crisis 
or a specific dispute with the country to which it is linked. While horizontal sanctions 
regimes coexist with, rather than substitute for, country regimes, they allow for the 
blacklisting of private entities disconnected from state authorities. So far, horizontal 
sanctions regimes have been enacted to respond to cyber-attacks and the use of 
                                                     
 
32 Vines, A., ‘The effectiveness of UN and EU sanctions: Lessons for the twenty-first century’, 
International Affairs, vol. 88, no. 4, 2012, pp. 867-877. 
33 Koenig, N., ‘The EU and the Libyan crisis: In quest of coherence?’, International Spectator, 
vol. 46, no. 4, 2011, pp. 11-30. 
34 Portela, C., ‘The EU Sanctions Operation against Syria: Conflict management by other 
means?’, Egmont Security Brief 36, 4 September 2012, http://www.egmontinstitute.be/the-eus-
sanctions-against-syria-conflict-management-by-other-means/, accessed 18 March 2020. 
35 Portela, C., ‘Are EU sanctions “targeted”?’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 29, 
no. 3, 2016, pp. 912-929. 
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chemical weapons, while a regime on human rights violations is currently under 
discussion.36 
BOX 1:  EVOLUTION OF  EU SANCTIONS PRACTICE     
1980s: Formative period under ECP 
1990s: Surge and consolidation 
• Goals: Adoption of sanctions in response to democratic backsliding, sometimes to 
armed conflict 
• Tools: Routine employment of arms embargoes, visa bans and asset freezes  
2000: The ”Iran-sanctions decade” 
• New goals: Adoption of sanctions against nuclear proliferation 
• New tools: Increase in sanctions supplementing UNSC bans 
2010: Economic ”turning point” 
• New goals: Misappropriation, cyberattacks 
• New tools: commodity  and energy bans, blacklisting of harbours, financial sanctions 
• New targets: Targeting of a major economic partner and global power, Russia, as 
well as some targets in Latin America, previously untouched by CFSP sanctions 
 
 
2.4 Decision-making, implementation and 
enforcement 
Decision-making 
The decision-making process leading to the enactment of sanctions features two 
stages, constituting a cross-pillar mechanism unique in the EU machinery. This “two-
step procedure” consists of the adoption of a political decision in the 
intergovernmental framework of the CFSP. It has its origins in an early phase of EU 
sanction practice, in which EC member states were confronted with the choice 
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between implementing UN sanctions via EC legislation or national legislation. While 
they initially attempted the latter, they subsequently switched to joint EC 
implementation in the interest of uniformity.37 
Currently, proposals for sanctions enactment are tabled by the High Representative, 
although member states may also put them forward. Normally, the impulse originates 
from the Council Working Group dealing with the geographical area where the crisis 
unfolds (COLAC for Latin America, MaMa for Middle East, COEST for the post-Soviet 
space, COAFR for Sub-Saharan Africa etc.). Once the geographical Working Group 
has decided that sanctions are to be imposed, the file is transferred to the Council 
Working Party on External Relations, or RELEX working group, which is in charge of 
agreeing the relevant legislation. In some cases, the impulse has emanated from the 
European Council, especially after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.38 This 
was notably the case with the sanctions imposed on Russia, but also with the 
horizontal regime against cyberattacks and against the employment of chemical 
weapons.  
Once adopted, the text becomes a Council Decision under the CFSP. In cases where 
the measures agreed are economic or financial in nature, this act must be followed by 
a Regulation. The draft regulation, which is tabled by the High Representative jointly 
with the Commission,39 must be agreed by qualified majority. Absent economic or 
financial implications, the CFSP decision suffices. Both acts are agreed by the 
Council RELEX working group. The addition or deletion of designations generally 
requires the adoption of new legislation via the activation of the exact same process, 
albeit in some cases blacklists have been modified employing qualified majority 
voting. 
The two-step procedure was put in place in order to bridge the division between the 
competence for external trade of the Community and the member states’ prerogative 
in the foreign policy realm. This peculiar procedure may generate an anomalous time 
gap between both pieces of legislation, with the implementing regulation sometimes 
being adopted several weeks after the CFSP decision. In the past, some member 
states reportedly took advantage of the separate negotiation of the regulation to 
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weaken the measures agreed in the previous CFSP decision.40 Nowadays there is 
little evidence that the negotiation of the regulation is used to undermine measures 
agreed during the CFSP stage. By contrast, member states devoted their efforts to 
specifying the measures as much as possible in the CFSP document rather than 
waiting for the negotiation of the regulation.41 This approach speeded up the process, 
but it also had the effect of reducing the leeway of the Commission, which remains in 
charge of drafting the regulation, and in concretising the coverage of the restrictions. 
Nowadays, in line with the recommendation of the Guidelines,42 both legal acts are 
adopted simultaneously. This approach has effectively transformed the original two-
step procedure into a single step encompassing two parallel adoption processes. As a 
result, the potentially problematic time gap between the releases of the two acts has 
disappeared. At the same time, it also has implications for the decision-making 
process of the regulation: member states may not agree to the Decision until the text 
of the Regulation is settled. In sum, a modification in adoption practice has corrected 
the deficits of the unusual sanctions decision-making process, and at the same time 
rendered the adoption of the regulation an exercise requiring unanimity.        
Implementation 
While sanctions legislation is adopted in Brussels, the system for granting exemptions 
is de-centralized. Every piece of sanctions legislation contains provisions for 
exemptions and features a list of national agencies entitled to grant authorizations to 
conduct transfers forbidden under the sanctions for humanitarian purposes. Thus, 
even if the provisions are common to all EU states, every member state enjoys 
discretion in clearing requests for exemptions. Due to the unilateral granting of 
exemptions to travel bans that were not well received by certain member states, a 
system was instituted whereby the Council must be notified in writing when any 
member state wishes to grant an exemption. The exemption shall be deemed to be 
granted unless another member raises an objection within 48 hours of receiving 
notification of the proposed exemption – the so-called “no-objection procedure”. The 
exemption shall not be granted if objections are raised. Only when a member state 
wishes to grant it on urgent and imperative humanitarian grounds may the Council 
decide to grant the proposed exemption acting by qualified majority. Other than that 
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mechanism, national authorities are required to report to the Commission on their 
activities.43 
Concerns exist regarding possible inconsistencies in the management of exemptions 
by the authorities of different member states.44 Such inconsistencies could arise from 
different levels of administrative capacity in the member states, but also from different 
political approaches. NGOs operating in Syria report that separate national authorities 
offer diverging messages as to what sort of requests would be approved. A major 
European NGO complained that “there appears to be no internal procedures within 
government as to what criteria should be applied when considering a licence 
application. The result is that each department pursues its own … interest and they 
often run counter to each other”.45 Similarly, another NGO claims that due to a 
shortage of staff within government licencing teams, processing times can take 
weeks.46      
While proposals for a centralized licensing agency modelled on the US Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) have been floated,47 they are hardly compatible with 
member states’ reluctance to renounce their competence in the field.48 To some 
extent, the situation is replicated with the adoption of implementing legislation at the 
national level, where discrepancies have also been detected.49 However, if a member 
state fails to adopt the necessary implementing legislation laying down penalties for 
sanctions violations, the Commission could initiate an infringement procedure.50 Be 
that as it may, the problem does not seem to lie with European firms’ failure to comply 
with EU sanctions legislation. Instead, their readiness to comply often exceeds the 
requirements of EU legislation, which is due to the phenomenon of overcompliance 
discussed next.  
  
                                                     
 
43 Gestri op. cit., p. 92. 
44 Golumbic, C. & Ruff, R., ‘Who do I call for an EU sanctions exception? Why the EU economic 
sanctions regime should centralize licensing’, Georgetown Journal of International Law, vol. 44, 
2013, pp. 1007-1053. 
45 Cited in Walker, J., Study on humanitarian impact of Syria-related unilateral coercive 
measures, UNESCWA, Beirut, 2016, p. 14. 
46 ibid. 
47 France24, ‘France urges Europe to push back against “unacceptable” US sanctions on Iran’, 
France24, 11 May 2018, https://www.france24.com/en/20180511-iran-france-usa-europe-
business-push-back-against-unacceptable-sanctions-nuclear-trump, accessed 17 March 2020. 
48 Gestri, op. cit. p. 93. 
49 Drulakova, R. & Prikryl, P., ‘The implementation of sanctions imposed by the European Union’, 
Central European Journal of International and Security Studies, vol. 10, no. 1, 2016, pp. 134-
160. 
50 Gestri op. cit., p. 94. 
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2020:31 
 
34 
 
 
Over-compliance 
“Over-compliance” refers to a situation in which private firms refrain from conducting 
commercial operations permitted under the sanctions regime. This behaviour comes 
about for various reasons. Firstly, sanctions legislation obliges financial institutions 
and commercial firms to apply due diligence and expend resources finding out which 
transactions are allowed and with whom. Not all firms are sufficiently staffed to 
investigate the nature of a client or beneficiary in the target country. Secondly, even 
exhaustive scrutiny might be unable to uncover a connection to one of the blacklisted 
persons or entities, the targeted government or its supporters. Firms and banks often 
hold back because they cannot be certain that the client is neither linked to 
designated bodies or persons, nor that it will not be blacklisted in the near future.  
Secondly, the terms under which the prohibitions are formulated in the relevant 
legislation are not always unequivocal. Clarification from the Court of Justice of the 
EU has been sought on the interpretation of the bans on Iran.51 The Commission 
briefed the private sector and published non-binding “information notes” on the 
measures adopted at the EU level to meet commitments contained in the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) providing for sanctions relief for Iran. The first 
version of the restrictions on extraction equipment and financial sanctions imposed on 
Russia in 2014 in response to the destabilization of Eastern Ukraine did not prove 
sufficiently precise to provide guidance to the industries affected. Recognising the 
need for further specification, the Council promulgated revised legislation to provide 
clarity for the private sector. However, the lack of specificity sometimes found in 
sanctions legislation incentivizes overly extensive interpretations of the prohibitions by 
the private sector, particularly given that, if found in breach of the restrictions, 
important penalties may ensue.  
In sum, the EU devotes much effort to designing sanctions in order to affect 
exclusively specified individuals, the elites that constitute their power base and the 
entities and/or sectors that supply them with funds. However, implementation through 
a private sector weary of fines compromises the targeted nature of the measures, 
broadening their impact. Instances of over-compliance hindering the procurement of 
items required by NGOs operating in Syria have been amply documented.52 This 
circumstance mirrors a trend that has also been identified in UN targeted sanctions.53  
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Extraterritoriality 
Extraterritoriality describes a situation where a state seeks to control elements that 
are situated outside its territory through its domestic legal order. In other words, the 
sender seeks to impose an obligation on third states and their nationals to abide by its 
unilateral sanctions.54 The European private sector’s tendency to “over-comply” with 
sanction measures is exacerbated by the role of US restrictions, which are applied 
extraterritorially. As Washington devotes considerable effort to monitoring compliance, 
European firms often ensure adherence to US measures in addition to EU bans. This 
situation encourages firms to interpret the restrictions broadly for fear of getting fined 
for unknowingly breaking the law, or to forego businesses in targeted countries 
altogether. Faced with a choice, very few firms (and virtually no bank) are prepared to 
lose access to the US market in favour of that of the target state. Thus, the 
extraterritorial effects of US sanctions contribute to the broadening of initially targeted 
measures. 
European measures do not display extraterritorial effects on third countries as EU 
bans only bind European and Europe-based operators.55 By contrast, the EU has a 
record of vocal opposition to the extraterritorial effects of US bans, both during the 
Cold War and in its aftermath.56 European resistance peaked with the passing of new 
US legislation tightening sanctions on Cuba in 1992, and subsequently on Iran and 
Libya in 1996, which led the European Commission to threaten with a complaint under 
the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the World Trade Organization against US 
legislation containing secondary sanctions. The EU went so far as to adopt a 
“Blocking Statute” to protect EU persons and companies from the application of US 
law, making compliance with US secondary sanctions illegal. In the event, the crisis 
was resolved thanks to an agreement reached in 1997 whereby the US administration 
promised to grant waivers to European companies and to oppose future 
extraterritorial congressional legislation.57  
The EU maintained its stance on the issue. EU guidelines stipulate that the EU “will 
refrain from adopting legislative instruments having extra-territorial application in 
breach of international law”.58 Speaking on behalf of the EU in the explanation of the 
vote on the UNGA Resolution on the US unilateral embargo on Cuba in 2013, the 
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Lithuanian representative condemned US extraterritorial measures as “contrary to 
commonly accepted rules of international trade”, claiming that the EU “could not 
accept that unilaterally imposed measures impeded its economic and commercial 
relations with Cuba”.59  
Initially, the extraterritorial effects of US sanctions on Iran did not give rise to similar 
tensions. On the contrary, transatlantic sanctions policy against Iran converged after 
2006, with the EU gradually enacting legislation mirroring many US measures.60 The 
fact that the EU muted its resistance during the Iran sanctions is due to the 
commonality of goals that characterizes this episode, which contrasts with the 
transatlantic partners’ diverging policies vis-à-vis Cuba.61 Tensions surfaced 
occasionally as certain European banks have sometimes been found in breach of US 
sanctions and been fined by US authorities. This was notably the case with the bank 
BNP Paribas, which received a US$8.9 billion fine in 2014, which constitutes a record 
amount. BNP Paribas admitted having transferred large sums on behalf of Sudanese 
and Iranian clients blacklisted by the US while hiding their names when sending 
transactions through the American financial system.62 The extraterritorial application 
of US sanctions sparked protests by the French government.63 The persistence of 
certain US sanctions after the Iran deal limited business opportunities with Iran for 
European firms, particularly on account of their extraterritorial reach.64 
The US withdrawal from the Iran deal under the Trump administration put an end to 
collaboration, prompting the EU to revive the Blocking Statute.65 This legislation 
attempts to nullify the effects of US sanctions by allowing EU operators to recover 
damages arising from US extraterritorial sanctions. This was accompanied by the 
establishment by France, Germany and the UK, the same countries that had 
negotiated the nuclear deal with Iran in the P5+1 context, of the Instrument in Support 
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of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX). INSTEX works as a euro-denominated “clearing 
house” facilitating transactions between European firms and Iranian actors, for the 
time being covering only humanitarian goods, which are permitted under US 
sanctions.66 Although it is not an EU initiative, it is open to the participation of EU 
members and even non-EU member states. Since it became operational in summer 
2019, several EU member states including Finland have announced their intention to 
join this vehicle and avail themselves of it.67 While observers anticipate meagre 
prospects of success for INSTEX,68 its establishment constitutes the first time that key 
members of the EU have taken measures in open contradiction to Washington’s 
policy since the late 1990s, when the US Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act, 
legislation threatening to penalize EU companies conducting business with Cuba, 
which met with resolute opposition from Brussels.   
2.5 Evaluating the effectiveness of sanctions 
A discussion on the evaluation of the effectiveness of sanctions must be preceded by 
an overview of the expected operation of sanctions (or sanctions theory), as well as a 
determination of the functions they fulfil in international relations.   
Theory of sanctions and their functions  
The standard mechanism for the operation of sanctions was formulated by peace 
scholar Johan Galtung in a seminal study on sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in 
the 1960s. Galtung delineated the expected operation of sanctions, which implied that 
the economic harm produced by sanctions generates popular discontent, which 
pressures the rulers to conform to the sender’s demands in order to revert to the 
previous level of wealth. Thus, the leadership faces a choice between giving in to the 
sender and being unseated. According to Galtung, the theory foresees that “there is a 
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limit to how much value deprivation the system can stand, and that once this limit is 
reached (resulting in a split in leadership or between leadership and people), then 
political disintegration will proceed very rapidly and will lead to surrender or 
willingness to negotiate”.69 Galtung criticized the “naive theory” of sanctions on 
account of its flawed assumptions, in view of the frequent failure of sanctions to 
compel leaderships to change course. Sanctions have not always led to economic 
downfall as the economy of the targeted country often adapted to new circumstances 
by finding alternative sources of income or resorting to the black market. Popular 
discontent with sanctions sometimes translates into animosity towards the sender 
rather than the domestic leadership, producing the so-called “rally-around-the-flag 
effect”.70 Comprehensive sanctions can also display counterproductive or “perverse” 
effects.71 Examples of perverse effects include an increase in corruption in societies 
under sanctions as they promote public tolerance for lawbreaking, as witnessed in the 
former Yugoslavia. Another effect can be the tightening of governmental control over 
essential supplies in the form of rationing, as documented in the Iraqi case.72  
While scholars have attempted to spell out the expected mode of operation of 
sanctions, decision-makers have never validated or disconfirmed their claims.73 
Nevertheless, the advent of targeted sanctions hardly heralds a departure from the 
causal logic explained above. The harm produced by sanctions focuses on the 
leaderships or the elites that support them, but the method remains identical. 
Targeted sanctions transpose the logic of the naive theory to the individual or elite 
level.74 The naive theory is not the only possible way in which sanctions can bring 
about compliance by the target. Sanctions can accomplish their aims, or contribute to 
bringing about the target’s compliance, in ways which have not yet been fully 
catalogued. As Baldwin observes, “there are many causal logics that could be used to 
construct a variety of theories” of sanctions.75  
The mode of operation of sanctions is closely linked to the question of the purpose or 
functions of sanctions. Sanctions are not exclusively intended to compel a change in 
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the political behaviour of leaders. Scholarship has long established that compliance is 
not the only, and not even the primary aim of sanctions, but that they fulfil other 
functions. These include the desire to demonstrate the sender’s willingness and 
capacity to act, anticipating or deflecting criticism, maintaining certain patterns of 
behaviour in international affairs, deterring further engagement in the objectionable 
actions by the target and third parties, or promoting subversion in the target.76 They 
can serve to weaken the economic and military potential of the targeted state – along 
the lines of the notion of containment in strategic studies. Sanctions have a strong 
stigmatising value in that they express maximum disapproval of the target’s policies.77 
They also serve to assuage domestic audiences.78 Their imposition is often driven by 
a desire to demonstrate “a willingness and capacity to act”.79 At the same time, they 
serve to uphold international norms and to support international structures like the 
UN.80 They also serve the purpose of positioning actors in strategic terms with regard 
to a dispute,81 and that of strengthening the international profile of an international 
actor.82   
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BOX 2:  ROLES OF  SANCTIONS 
Vis-à-vis targets: 
• promoting compliance 
• weakening military/economic potential 
• deterring further violations 
• strengthening opposition/ protecting civil society actors 
Vis-à-vis domestic audiences: 
• demonstrate willingness to act 
• assuage domestic audiences 
• deflect criticism 
• profiling sender’s international identity 
Vis-à-vis third countries and external observers: 
• uphold international norms  
• deter similar actions by third states 
• endorse international structures 
• stigmatize objectionable behaviour 
• support allies 
• strengthen international presence 
 
 
While there is increasing scholarly recognition of the multiplicity of sanction 
purposes,83 most of the specialized literature continues to evaluate sanctions on the 
basis of their ability to coerce targets only. At the risk of painting an incomplete 
picture, most studies continue to adopt the conventional “standard of success” as it 
constitutes standard practice. Nevertheless, the ability of sanctions to bring about 
compliance continues to be a highly contentious matter, both in the scholarly and the 
policy debate.  
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Evaluating the success of sanctions 
Standard analyses of sanctions distinguish between “economic” and “political” 
effectiveness. The former refers to the effectiveness in inflicting disutility on the target 
while the latter refers to efficacy in compelling policy changes. There is no unified 
terminology: Bergeijk distinguishes “effectiveness” from “success”,84 whereas 
Cortright and Lopez speak of “economic” and “political” success.85 Sanctions 
“success” is routinely assessed on the basis of whether or not sanctions contribute to 
the achievement of stated policy objectives. The yardstick of a successful sanctions 
regime is an “observable change in behaviour”. Policy outcomes are judged “against 
the stated policy goal of the sender country".86  
The measurement of changes in behaviour against stated policy goals is fraught with 
difficulties, and is subject to a lively debate among experts. Sender countries do not 
always announce their goals in a clear manner.87 Until the late 1990s, EU sanctions 
were imposed without spelling out the policy goals pursued. Instead, documents 
typically included a description of the situation giving rise to the imposition of 
sanctions, while remaining silent on the policy changes that are expected from the 
target. Arguably, the condemnation of certain policies can also be interpreted as the 
demand to reverse such policies. If sanctions were triggered by the imprisonment of 
political opponents, it can be presumed that the policy goal pursued by the sender is 
their release. However, it is often unclear exactly what the sender expects of the 
target. EU sanctions against the Transnistrian leadership were imposed due to its 
“obstructionism of the peace process”.88 From this formulation, we can infer that the 
sender’s intention is to compel the target to cooperate in the peace process; however, 
no concrete output is specified. Since the goals of sanctions regimes are often vague, 
it is presumed that they are imposed with a view to re-establishing the status quo that 
prevailed prior to the act that brought the sanctions about. 
A further distinction is drawn between the attainment of the policy goal and the 
contribution that sanctions made towards it, captured in the notions of “policy 
outcome’ and ‘sanctions contribution”.89 The determination as to whether a policy 
change is related to the imposition of sanctions is made based on public statements 
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by officials from the sender country, supplemented by the assessment of country 
analysts.90 Statements by decision-makers cannot be considered completely reliable 
sources, as both sides may have an interest in delivering a politically convenient 
version of events or even in distorting data. Nevertheless, they are often taken into 
account in the absence of any further evidence. 
A final methodological challenge concerns the possibility of controlling for concurrent 
policy tools. Some experts have voiced reservations about the feasibility of 
determining that sanctions were responsible for a specific outcome given that they are 
often used in conjunction with diplomacy and military threats. Robert Pape therefore 
suggests three criteria for crediting sanctions with success even in the presence of 
concurrent policy tools: the target state concedes to a significant proportion of the 
coercer’s demands; sanctions are threatened or applied before the target changes its 
behaviour; and no explanation with greater credibility exists for the target’s change of 
behaviour.91 
Evaluating EU sanctions 
Despite the formidable challenges involved in measuring the effectiveness of 
sanctions, attempts have been made at assessing their success. Various analyses 
found success rates are comparable to those of other senders, which are generally 
low and oscillate between 10 and 30% of the total number of attempts.92 A 
comparative evaluation concluded that CFSP sanctions tend to be less successful 
than aid suspensions in the context of the EU’s development policy.93 Recent 
analyses have attempted to evaluate two functions of sanctions in addition to their 
coercive intent, suggesting that their containment and signalling capacity displays a 
higher level of effectiveness.94 Preliminary assessments of EU sanctions do not 
suggest that they are more than moderately successful.95 However, existing 
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assessments are still preliminary, and their diverging outcomes largely result from the 
different methodologies they follow.    
Routinely, EU institutions do not have a mandate to monitor the effects of EU 
sanctions beyond the duties of the relevant desk officers and the geographical 
working groups.96 No agreed metrics exist for such monitoring, and evaluations have 
been conducted on an ad-hoc basis.97 Illustratively, when asked about the impact of 
the sanctions on Myanmar during a hearing at the UK House of Lords, a high-ranking 
EU official conceded that while “there may be some unintended and 
incidental…collateral impact on ordinary people”, “[they were] not aware of this being 
a significant problem”.98  
The sanctions against Russia marked a departure from regular practice: Following the 
enactment of the measures, the Commission started to evaluate their impact on the 
Russian economy and their effects on the economies of its own member states. At 
this stage, it is unknown whether the case of Russia has introduced a trend or 
whether it will remain a one-off exception. In addition, monitoring efforts are limited to 
the economic effects and do not cover other sorts of impacts or the extent to which 
the bans are helping the EU to achieve its policy goals. Importantly, no monitoring of 
possible unintended consequences, including humanitarian effects is conducted. 
Nevertheless, the monitoring exercise taking place under the Russia sanctions regime 
is conceived as an additional task to be added to the general duties of the desk 
officers rather than as the core mission of dedicated staff. The sanctions units at the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission lack a mandate to 
monitor impacts. 
2.6 Challenges ahead  
The challenges currently confronting EU sanctions do not end here. Three issues 
merit particular attention: court cases resulting from lack of due process for 
designees, contestation of the legality of EU measures, and the impending Brexit.   
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Due process  
The principal vulnerability of sanctions against individuals is the lack of due process 
guarantees. Saudi citizen Kadi challenged its designation in the EU terrorism blacklist 
at the Court of Justice of the EU. The court found Council listings to be in violation of 
the right to effective judicial remedy and ruled in favour of the claimant. With this 
ruling, the Court established that the EU must provide due process guarantees to 
designees, even if their designations originate from the UNSC.99 After the landmark 
“Kadi’ judgement in 2008, numerous individuals challenged their designations in front 
of the ECJ, which often annulled their listings.100 The lack of evidential bases is 
attributable to the (often foreign) intelligence services” reluctance to disclose 
confidential information unless they are assured that it will not be made public. 
However, this is incompatible with the requirement for the classified material to be 
made available to the claimant. As a result, the ECJ has often considered that 
designations have been adopted on insufficient evidence. Litigation revealed that EU 
institutions had often failed to request supporting documentation before the 
designations were challenged.101   
Interestingly, Kadi was not originally an EU listing, but a UN designation implemented 
by the EU. As a consequence, the due process crisis has affected the UN level, 
causing a crisis of confidence whose magnitude has been equated with that caused 
by the 1990 Iraqi embargo.102 In the period from 2010 to 2014, sanctions cases 
became the third most recurrent issue area among the cases heard by EU Courts, 
with only intellectual property rights and competition disputes being more prevalent. 
By 2017, cases regarding restrictive measures had displaced competition cases, 
becoming the second most frequent issue heard by the Court.103 
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By 2014, as many as 110 challenges to listings concerning 290 individuals or entities 
had been brought before the Court of Justice of the EU.104 In the decade that elapsed 
between 2005 and 2015, a researcher counted 132 judgements on sanctions 
contestation. A significant increase was recorded around 2012, and a peak was 
reached in 2014 with 33 cases, largely related to the Iran sanctions.105 Interestingly, 
the same author found that the ECJ had ruled in favour of the claimants in 65% of the 
cases, while the success rate of the Council was only 35%.106 According to Michael 
Bishop (whose calculations followed a slightly different method), an official from the 
Council legal service, in the years that followed the Kadi case, the Council lost around 
two-thirds of the cases, for which the Courts ruled in favour of claimants. This trend 
changed in 2015: “In 2012, 2013 and 2014 the Council was still losing twice as many 
cases as it won, while in 2015 that trend was reversed; the Council then won more 
than twice as many cases as it lost. The same applies for 2016”.107  
Two reasons account for this. One of them relates to improvements in the Council’s 
substantiation of listings, as well as the gathering of evidence to support individual 
designations. Firstly, as explained by Michael Bishop, “[i]n the early days of EU 
targeted sanctions individuals and companies were regularly listed on the basis of no 
reasons. The Council now gave reasons for sanctions listings. The General Court 
sometimes found those reasons to be insufficiently precise, detailed and specific”.108 
Secondly, a broadening in the definition of the listing criteria, which potentially 
accommodates a larger population of targets based on their status, makes it easier to 
justify designations in the event of a court challenge.109 Although the EU has pledged 
to “respect due process and the right to an effective remedy in full conformity with the 
jurisprudence of the EU Courts”,110 the Council’s restoration of certain designations 
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annulled by the Court illustrates the level of controversy associated with these 
rulings.111 
Legitimacy  
A campaign to de-legitimize the use of unilateral sanctions is currently underway in 
United Nations fora. Besides the classic UN General Assembly resolution demanding 
an end to the Cuban blockade (UNGA), a campaign condemning unilateral sanctions 
as contrary to human rights has recently gathered steam at the UN Human Rights 
Council. This process culminated with the 2015 appointment by the Human Rights 
Council of a Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of the unilateral coercive 
measures on the enjoyment of human rights.112 Similarly, the imposition of unilateral 
sanctions supplementing UNSC measures has generated some resistance. While EU 
members and other Western countries regard the measures imposed by the UN as 
the foundation upon which they can introduce more stringent measures, China and 
Russia see them as reflecting an international consensus that should not be 
surpassed.113 The EU has remained silent on these issues thus far. However, the 
gradual broadening of sanctions outlined above makes the measures more vulnerable 
to attacks. As demonstrated by the Iraqi embargo which provoked the move to 
targeted measures, de-legitimation attempts can lead to a decline in the popularity of 
sanctions, whose sustainability requires broad support. The EU’s concern with 
legitimacy is illustrated by its preference for action under the aegis of the UN, visible 
in the strategic outlook reflected in the ESS.  
The UK’s withdrawal from the EU 
The withdrawal of the UK from the EU is expected to leave a vacuum in two respects: 
leadership in sanctions imposition and expertise in sanctions design. EU member 
states have traditionally been divided on their attitudes to sanctions.114 As reported by 
a member state diplomat, “Sanctions are a very sensitive issue … some believe they 
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are very useful, some [view their] utility [as] doubtful”.115 The UK has traditionally been 
a  champion of this tool, responsible for the initiation of most sanctions regimes116 and 
an active proponent of individual designations.117 The British origin of many EU 
sanctions regimes since 1991 has been documented.118 Illustratively, when the UK 
imposed restrictions on Zimbabwe in 2001, the sanctions regime was quickly adopted 
by the entire EU, which sustained it for over a decade. After Brexit, we are likely to 
witness a general decline in EU sanctions activity. After the June 2016 referendum, 
the prospect of the UK withdrawal already led many to believe that EU sanctions 
practice would lose impetus. Observing a declining cohesion behind the sanctions 
against Russia, another EU member state diplomat lamented that the UK’s decision to 
leave the EU had weakened the internal push for renewal: “That leaves Poland, the 
Baltic states, Sweden and, to an extent, Denmark, without a major ally on Russia”.119 
The future shape of EU sanctions policy will largely depend on concertation between 
France and Germany, two powers with diverging foreign policy outlooks, in the 
absence of London’s balancing role as a “third wheel”.120 In addition, observers 
lament that British withdrawal deprives the EU from a privileged source of expertise in 
sanctions matters, leaving a gap that can hardly be filled by any other member 
state.121    
Divergence between EU and US sanctions policies  
Finally, the increasing divergence between EU and US sanctions practices constitutes 
a further challenge. While Brussels’ sanctions practice has traditionally been more 
modest than Washington’s, the current administration’s use of sanctions is posing 
unprecedented difficulties. In the past, Washington often led the way, and the EU 
followed many of the sanctions regimes wielded by the US. However, it refrained from 
replicating US sanctions regimes in specific geographic regions, particularly in Latin 
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America. Moreover, EU sanctions were invariably more modest in scope than those of 
their US counterparts.122 In some respects, Brussels is still approximating its 
sanctions policies to a US model: it is currently targeting two leaderships in Latin 
America (Nicaragua and Venezuela), while it is acquiring a habit of adopting 
horizontal blacklists, such as that on cyberattacks.  
Still, current US practices are aggravating the transatlantic divide on sanctions. Firstly, 
while the EU has increased the frequency of its sanctions adoption, the US 
administration is rolling out sanctions more aggressively than before.123 According to 
law firm Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, in 2018 the United States added nearly 1,500 
people, companies, and entities to Treasury Department-managed sanctions, nearly 
50 per cent more than in the preceding year.124 Alongside 2018, the preceding and 
following years of 2017 and 2019 recorded peaks in the number of designations.125 
Most importantly, the US is making increasing use of secondary sanctions, which 
target third-country companies conducting businesses with entities under US 
sanctions, which has major consequences for European firms. In December 2019, 
barely a few days after US Congress passed legislation allowing for secondary 
sanctions on actors dealing with Russia, the Swiss engineering firm laying the North 
Stream pipeline immediately stopped operations.126 Transatlantic divergence in 
sanctions policy towards Russia has widened since the adoption of US legislation 
tightening measures on Moscow, the Countering America’s Adversaries through 
Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in 2017, and threatens to become increasingly acute in 
future.127  
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KEY CHALLENGES FOR THE EU’S 
SANCTIONS POLICY 
3 The United States in the Trump era 
Ville Sinkkonen 
Summary 
• Great-power competition has brought geoeconomics to the forefront of 
strategic thinking in Washington D.C. The United States is well positioned to 
use coercive economic tools – particularly unilateral sanctions – in this power 
play because of its structural advantages in the global economy and financial 
system. 
• President Donald Trump and his administration have signalled a preference for 
the unilateral use of sanctions to excel in the competitive international 
geostrategic environment, creating clashes with the EU over the extraterritorial 
application of American sanctions and policy coordination. 
• Wrangling between Congress and the White House over sanctions policy has 
also intensified since the 2016 presidential election, rendering American 
sanctions policy less predictable and cooperation with allies and partners more 
difficult. 
 
Recommendations 
• The EU and the member states should strive for unified positions in the face of 
pressure from unilateral US sanctions to guard against the adverse effects of 
“wedging” by the Americans. This necessitates clarity in both formulating what 
the common European interest is, and in laying out which values the Union 
ultimately wishes to uphold with its sanctions policies.  
• The EU and the member states need to step up their game in engaging with 
US policymakers and officials on multiple levels. In particular, added emphasis 
should be placed on bringing European concerns to the attention of 
congressional representatives and senators, whose role in US sanctions policy 
has been amplified in recent years. 
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3.1 Introduction: American unilateral 
sanctions in context 
The United States has been a key driver behind multilateral sanctions regimes, and 
traditionally the most important ally of the EU in this respect. However, the US has 
also become increasingly adept at utilizing sanctions in a unilateral manner to pursue 
its interests in recent years – posing challenges for its European allies and partners in 
the process.  
As an economic behemoth, the US remains extraordinarily positioned for the use of 
economic coercion. This is due to the sheer size of its economy, its centrality as a hub 
of economic activity and global finance, as well as the predominance of the US dollar 
in the global financial system.128 The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the 
US Department of the Treasury, tasked with administering, overseeing and enforcing 
US sanctions, also enjoys incomparable resources to carry out its tasks.129 This 
confluence of structural comparative advantages and resources allows the US to 
employ secondary sanctions “to inhibit non-US citizens and companies abroad from 
doing business with a target of primary US sanctions”.130 Although such measures do 
not (always) enjoy widespread backing within the broader international community, 
they can still have tangible effects on third countries, their businesses and nationals. 
The extraterritorial application of US secondary sanctions has placed it at 
loggerheads with its allies and partners from time to time. Even in the early 1980s, US 
sanctions against the Soviet Union left European companies involved in a gas 
pipeline project in a precarious situation, but the Reagan administration backed down 
after an outcry and countermeasures from the Europeans.131 In 1996 two pieces of 
legislation, the Helms-Burton Act dealing with Cuba and the Iran and Libya Sanctions 
Act (ILSA), threatened foreign individuals and companies with criminal liability and 
loss of access to the US market if found to be in violation of US sanctions. The EU 
                                                     
 
128 See e.g. Norrlof, C., America’s Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International 
Cooperation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010; Zoffer, J.P., ‘The Dollar and the 
United States’ Exorbitant Power to Sanction’, AJIL Unbound, vol. 113, 2019, pp. 152-156. 
129 US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), 2019, 
https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/pages/office-of-foreign-assets-
control.aspx, accessed 13 March 2020; Geranmayeh, E. & Rapnouil, M.L., ‘Meeting the 
Challenge of Secondary Sanctions’, in M. Leonard & J. Shapiro eds., Strategic Sovereignty: How 
Europe Can Regain the Capacity to Act, European Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin, 2019, p. 
65. 
130 Meyer, J.A., ‘Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions’, Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Law, vol. 30, no. 3, 2009, p. 905. 
131 Nephew, R., ‘Transatlantic Sanctions Policy: From the 1982 Soviet Gas Pipeline Episode to 
Today’, Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy, 22 March 2019, 
https://energypolicy.columbia.edu/research/report/transatlantic-sanctions-policy-1982-soviet-gas-
pipeline-episode-today, accessed 13 March 2020. 
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2020:31 
 
51 
 
 
responded with a “blocking statute”, which effectively prohibits European companies 
from complying with American extraterritorial sanctions, but a compromise with the 
Clinton administration rendered the statute redundant for two decades. 132  
More recently, during Barack Obama’s tenure, OFAC imposed hundreds of millions of 
dollars in penalties on notable foreign banks for sanctions violations. This was 
indicative of a shift in the agency’s strategy from imposing less prominent penalties on 
smaller players towards creating a demonstrable deterrent effect by going after larger 
ones.133 There was also a substantial quantitative increase in the use of sanctions, 
when measured in terms of individuals and entities added to the Specially Designated 
Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN).134  
In the early years of its tenure, the Obama administration also set new precedents by 
utilizing US influence over global financial institutions in its efforts to sanction Iran. 
This included legislation that would prohibit access to the US for any foreign banks 
found to have been dealing with Iranian financial institutions blacklisted by the US.135 
It also used leverage over the Belgium-based Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) to shut out certain Iranian banks from the 
financial messaging service.136 At the time, the US approach enjoyed international 
support, especially from America’s European and global allies. Yet by employing such 
tools, the Obama administration created a template that could be utilized by a future 
US administration in a situation where international backing for US-imposed sanctions 
was not forthcoming. 
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3.2 Systemic drivers: Economic coercion in a 
world of competition 
Of course, the recent uptick in the use of sanctions by the US should not be 
dissociated from the broader shift in the dynamics of the international order. It has 
become commonplace to argue that after a post-Cold War interregnum, the world is 
witnessing a “return of geopolitics” and an era of “great-power competition”.137 On the 
one hand, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, subsequent actions in Eastern Ukraine, 
and meddling in the 2016 US presidential election have ushered in a new era of 
geostrategic wrangling between Moscow and the West. Concurrently, a hardening 
bipartisan consensus on confronting China as a rising near-peer competitor has 
emerged in Washington, as a result of Beijing’s perceived increase of influence in its 
near abroad, trade-distorting practices as well as a deteriorating human rights 
situation. 
This newfound focus on great-power competition has brought “the geostrategic use of 
economic power”,138 or geoeconomics, to the forefront of strategic thinking in 
Washington. It is broadly viewed as a less risky way of conducting power politics, 
without having to resort to military instruments. America’s great-power rivals have also 
become more adept at using such economic tools as a means of challenging the 
incumbent hegemon. Examples abound, whether one looks at Russia wielding its 
“energy weapon” against former Soviet Republics, or China acquiring strategic ports 
as debt payment in its neighbourhood.  
For the duration of its tenure, the Trump administration has thus maintained that the 
international arena should not be viewed as a global community defined by positive-
sum interactions, but as a realm of intensifying interstate competition. The pursuit of 
America’s national interests in such an environment necessitates excelling in the face 
of different competitive scenarios. For the Trump administration, this means 
harnessing America’s military and especially economic capabilities to check great-
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power challengers and so-called “rogue regimes”.139 Sanctions are a key component 
of this toolbox moving forward. 
3.3 The Trump factor: Proliferation of 
unilateral sanctions 
During Donald Trump’s tenure, the proliferation of economic coercion has been on 
display in the trade and financial restrictions that the administration has used against 
great-power challengers and rogue actors, as well as in import tariffs levied against 
both allies and adversaries.140 The President’s rhetoric has also revealed his staunch 
belief in economic strong-arming, whether in the form of sanctions or tariffs. In fact, 
Trump appears to adhere to such beliefs on both an instrumental and an ideological 
level. He regards the United States as well positioned for the successful use of 
economic coercion, and has no moral qualms about using such tools.141 Trump also 
thinks about winning in profoundly zero-sum terms, while sanctions also fit remarkably 
well with his penchant for operating disruptively and spontaneously. As the American 
sanctions enterprise provides the executive with considerable freedom of manoeuvre, 
the President can impose such measures swiftly, without having to worry about 
advance notification or judicial review.142  
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Moreover – despite manifold reports of dysfunction inside the current administration – 
a shared approach to the use of coercive economic tools has emerged amongst other 
key players on Trump’s trade and foreign-policy teams. In its first year in office, the 
Trump administration added over 1,000 entities and individuals to the SDN list. 
Thismarks a 30% increase in designations when compared with Obama’s final year in 
office.143 There is a concomitant qualitative change afoot as well. The Trump 
administration has pursued forceful comprehensive sanctions when dealing with 
intransigent actors, the most potent example being a near economic embargo of 
Venezuela.144  
Perhaps nowhere has the Trump administration’s willingness to utilize economic 
sanctions unilaterally been clearer than in the case of Iran. Since announcing the US 
exit from the Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; JCPOA) in May 
2018, the President has authorized increasingly stringent sanctions as part of a 
“maximum pressure” campaign to thwart the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme 
and destabilizing regional behaviour. The US sanctions have gone beyond the 
sanctions that were in place prior to the successful negotiation of the JCPOA in 2015, 
and include restrictions on inter alia Iran’s banking and financial sectors as well as 
petroleum, petrochemical and metal industries. The sanctions are also designed to 
allow the US authorities to take a range of measures against non-US persons and 
financial institutions found to be in violation. Potential measures include fines, 
restrictions on market access, blocks on financial services, and denial of visas.145 
Unlike prior to the negotiation of the JCPOA, America’s maximum pressure campaign 
lacks broad international support. The Europeans have sought to save the agreement 
as a lowest-common-denominator compromise with Iran, and maintain that prior to the 
US withdrawal the deal had been working as intended. Alongside amplified regional 
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instability in the Gulf, of particular concern for the EU and its member states has been 
the threat that secondary US sanctions pose for European companies and individuals.  
Beyond seeking to keep diplomatic lines of communication open to de-escalate the 
situation, Europe has responded to US secondary sanctions on two fronts. On the one 
hand, the EU has rejuvenated the 1996 Blocking Statute, prohibiting European 
companies from complying with US secondary sanctions and allowing them to recover 
damages caused by extraterritorial application.146 On the other hand, the three 
European state parties to the nuclear agreement – France, Germany and the UK – 
have set up a special purpose vehicle (SPV) designed to facilitate trade with Iran. This 
mechanism – called the Instrument for Supporting Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) – has 
been declared operational,147 but it has run into teething troubles and, at least initially, 
will be used to facilitate trade in humanitarian goods like food and medicine.  
So far, the European measures have been insufficient to persuade companies to 
continue trade with and operations in Iran. Firms are concerned about their access to 
US markets and the financial system, not to mention the prospect of substantial 
penalties. Over the past year, many major European companies have wound down 
their operations, and EU-Iran trade has fallen sharply.148 The climate of uncertainty 
created by US sanctions makes them doubly problematic for European companies. 
Navigating the complexity of American sanctions regulations remains a challenge, 
and the prospect of fluctuation in sanctions makes predicting future business 
prospects extremely tricky. In addition, OFAC has considerable discretion when 
dealing with sanctions violations, so doubt remains over exactly how it will ultimately 
enforce the sanctions.149 However, the Trump administration has signalled that it 
would pursue an aggressive line in the future.150 The US has therefore managed to 
erect a viable deterrent that dissuades firms from doing business with Iran, indicative 
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of how the US may weaponize its financial and economic might in other cases in the 
future.151  
3.4 Domestic politics meets sanctions: 
Congressional sanctions activism  
To further complicate matters, during Trump’s tenure in the White House inter-branch 
tensions over sanctions have assumed increased relevance, although such 
contestation between Capitol Hill and the White House over sanctions does have a 
long history. This can be attributed to the differing foreign-policy-related incentives of 
the legislative and executive branches. Members of Congress are less attuned to the 
negative side effects that sanctions may unleash on the international scene, and have 
utilized sanctions legislation for scoring points with domestic constituents. The White 
House, in contrast, has been wary of problems that rigid sanctions legislation can 
create for US foreign and economic policy in an interconnected world, and the limits 
they can place on diplomatic wiggle room. These concerns animated, for instance, the 
battles between President Obama and Congress on Iran sanctions, as well as inter-
branch differences over the design of Russia sanctions in the aftermath of the 2014 
annexation of Crimea.152  
In a rare show of bipartisanship in a polarized age, Congress passed the Countering 
America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in June 2017 with 
overwhelming (and veto-proof) majorities in both the House of Representatives and 
the Senate. This forced President Trump to grudgingly sign the bill into law in August 
of that year. CAATSA also lays out sanctions on Iran and North Korea, but the 
secondary sanctions with respect to Russia, pertaining to the country’s intelligence, 
defence and energy sectors, have drawn most public attention. CAATSA also makes 
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it more difficult for the President to waive sanctions on national security grounds by 
mandating a Congressional review of such decisions.153   
Although driven in part by doubts regarding President Trump’s willingness to stand up 
to the Kremlin, this partial sidelining of the executive poses potential problems for US 
sanctions policy and America’s allies and partners. A more activist Congress makes it 
more difficult for the executive to coordinate with international partners, and there 
have already been episodes where European anxieties over implementation of 
CAATSA have caused cracks in transatlantic cooperation. One pertinent illustration is 
the lingering threat of sanctions against European companies involved in the 
Nordstream II pipeline project. In late December 2019, Donald Trump signed into law 
the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). It includes provisions for the US 
to sanction companies involved in the installation of the pipeline after a wind-down 
period of 30 days, and has already led to delays in completion of the project.154 A yet-
to-pass bill called the Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act 
(DASKA) would further threaten new large-scale energy forays with mandatory US 
secondary sanctions.155 Another example was the ill-fated US decision to sanction 
Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska – and companies he controlled. The measure was 
initially undertaken with little transatlantic consultation, and threatened a profound 
impact on metal industries in Europe and globally.156 
3.5 Conclusion: An array of challenges for 
Europe 
A perfect storm of sorts is currently brewing in US foreign policy when it comes to the 
unilateral use of economic sanctions. This tempest is the result of a peculiar collision 
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of three proverbial weather fronts described above: systemic factors emanating from 
the increasingly competitive international arena, the worldviews of President Trump 
and key players in his administration, as well as the increased role assumed by 
Congress in sanctions matters after the 2016 presidential election. In the process, the 
commonality of purpose that still existed between the US and the EU during Barack 
Obama’s tenure on key sanctions regimes has been seriously undermined. The 
sanctions storm in Washington thus poses significant challenges for the European 
Union. 
Firstly, the Iran case in particular has illustrated that at least in the short term the EU 
has little bargaining power vis-à-vis Washington in situations where the current 
administration is intent upon pursuing a unilateral course. This reflects the animosity 
of Trump and some key members of his team towards Europe. Beyond being 
frequently critical of America’s European allies – Germany especially – the Trump 
administration has also exhibited a profoundly negative bent towards the EU per se. 
The President has gone as far as to call the Union a “foe” when it comes to issues of 
trade.157 The tariffs that the US has in place on European steel and aluminium, not to 
mention the hanging threat of levies on automobiles, coupled with the still stalling 
transatlantic trade talks are further indications that relations between Brussels and 
Washington are likely to remain antagonistic at least until the 2020 presidential 
election.  
Secondly, Europe’s response to US unilateral sanctions with respect to Iran has 
exposed the inability of the Union and its leading member states to provide viable 
mechanisms for combatting and circumventing Washington’s extraterritorial 
measures. The oft-rehearsed quip that the Union remains a military dwarf but is an 
economic giant does not seem to hold when it comes to playing the geoeconomic 
game in a newfound era of great-power competition, at least not in the face of 
America’s still enviable structural advantages in the financial and economic domains. 
Such signs of weakness have potentially dire consequences for the Union’s credibility 
as an international actor in the eyes of other international players, not to mention the 
European business community. Given the considerable political capital that the EU 
and its member states have invested in the JCPOA, the impending unravelling of the 
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agreement would provide further evidence that in the absence of US backing Europe’s 
ability to shape the international milieu remains circumscribed.158 
Thirdly, the sanctions storm in Washington poses considerable risks when it comes to 
the EU’s internal cohesion. Through the transactionalist policies adopted by the 
Trump administration and evolving sanctions legislation in Congress, the US can drive 
“wedges” and exploit already existing divisions between EU member states.159 The 
temptation to resort to bilateral bargaining with the US can be hard to resist, as 
illustrated by Greece’s and Italy’s decisions to negotiate waivers from US sanctions 
that allowed them to (initially) continue purchases of Iranian oil.160 The case of 
Nordstream II is an even more pertinent example. Not only is the German-Russian 
pipeline project in the crosshairs of both the White House and Capitol Hill,161 the 
project has been consistently viewed in a negative light by some EU member states – 
particularly Poland, Romania, Slovakia and the Baltic states – for both economic and 
security reasons.162 These countries are not only vulnerable to Russian forays, but 
also dependent on US security guarantees and, by implication, potentially susceptible 
to American pressure.163 Moreover, as the geoeconomic aspects of great-power 
competition push to the fore, it is becoming increasingly likely that US measures 
against Chinese companies (Huawei being the most high profile case) will ultimately 
force Europe to make painful and potentially divisive choices between Washington 
and Beijing.164 
Finally, the above-described state of affairs has led to newfound calls for Europe to 
(re)assert its economic sovereignty, to develop geoeconomic sensibility to excel in the 
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era of great-power competition.165 From this standpoint, perhaps the key point to 
appreciate regarding INSTEX is not the difficulty the Europeans have encountered in 
making it operational, but the fact that it presents a first-cut attempt by Europe to 
contest American dominance over the global financial infrastructure. It may thus be a 
harbinger of increased hedging measures against Washington, with potentially global 
implications.166 The EU and other global players may start looking harder than 
previously for alternatives to the US dollar and envisage more mechanisms in the vein 
of the SPV to circumvent secondary sanctions. Some may even gradually decouple 
themselves from global supply and value chains to decrease their vulnerability to 
American economic strong-arming.  
The unilateral overuse of sanctions by the US may thus have long-term systemic 
implications, and in the process erode the very structural advantages that the 
American sanctions enterprise has been built on.167 Like other controversial aspects 
of President Trump’s foreign policy, whether climate policies or verbal tirades against 
allies and multilateral institutions, overreliance on economic coercion threatens a key 
building block of US power, namely America’s trustworthiness as an ally and its 
legitimacy as a custodian of the international order writ large. For the future, in terms 
of both transatlantic sanctions coordination and the longevity of the liberal rules-based 
order, the key question is how judiciously the current presidential administration in the 
year(s) to come – not to mention the administrations of the future – will utilize 
sanctions. 
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4 Brexit and an independent UK 
sanctions policy 
Juha Jokela & Ilari Aula 
Summary  
• The UK has been the most active and influential member state in formulating 
the EU’s sanctions policy and in setting up EU sanctions regimes. 
• While the EU can replace the technical expertise provided by the UK, the level 
of ambition of the EU’s sanctions policy could decrease after the UK’s 
departure. 
• Even if the UK has taken measures to maintain the sanctions regimes agreed 
as an EU member, divergence remains a risk of an independent UK sanctions 
policy. 
• The envisaged coordination mechanisms of EU and UK sanctions policies can 
mitigate some of the negative implications of Brexit, yet they cannot replace 
the UK’s EU membership. 
 
Recommendations  
• The EU and its member states should build up their technical expertise to 
facilitate decision-making on sanctions. In particular, this includes expertise in 
targeted financial sanctions and the substantiation of individual listings.   
• The EU and the UK should aim for the closest possible coordination 
mechanism on sanctions as a part of the negotiations on EU-UK future 
relations. During the transition period, they should aim for close case-by-case 
coordination enabled by the Withdrawal Agreement.    
• While respecting the autonomy of EU decision-making and the sovereignty of 
the UK, the UK’s observer status in the EU sanctions decision-making process 
could turn out to be valuable. The UK should consider granting the EU 
reciprocal access to its sanctions policy-making.  
4.1 Introduction 
The United Kingdom (UK) has played an important role in advocating, designing and 
targeting sanctions as a component of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). In this context, the UK is often described as the most active and influential 
EU member state. It has provided political steering and leadership for the EU’s 
sanctions decision-making as well as technical expertise for the setup of EU sanctions 
regimes. Consequently, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU has potentially significant 
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implications for the political ambition and technical capacity of the EU’s sanctions 
policy. The recognized shared foreign and security policy interests of the EU and the 
UK might lead to close coordination between the two sanctions senders, yet the depth 
and practicalities of the coordination are still largely unknown, and linked to the 
negotiations of the post-Brexit EU-UK relationship. Relatedly, an autonomous UK 
sanctions policy could also present some challenges for the EU. During the transition 
period of the UK’s withdrawal, the UK should continue to implement the CFSP 
decisions including restrictive measures. However, some uncertainty remains as to 
whether the strategies of the two notable sanctions senders will converge in the 
longer run. 
This chapter focuses on the implications of Brexit for the EU’s sanctions policy. It will 
first discuss the role of the UK in the formulation of EU sanctions and the EU’s 
preparedness to replace the UK’s political and technical input. It will then turn to the 
emergent independent sanctions policy of the UK, and its potential alignment with the 
EU. Finally, the chapter concludes with an assessment of the challenges posed by 
Brexit for the EU.  
4.2 EU sanctions without the UK 
In a progressively turbulent neighbourhood and world, the EU has increasingly 
resorted to sanctions as one of the toughest foreign and security policy tools at its 
disposal. Importantly, the UK has traditionally been one of the member states 
promoting the use of sanctions within the EU. It has contributed to their design and 
implementation, and has played a key role in intelligence-sharing and consensus-
building among EU member states in sanctions decision-making.168 The UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU poses some notable challenges for the EU’s sanctions policy. 
At the same time, Brexit negotiators on the UK side have reiterated the benefits of 
maintaining close connections with the EU sanctions policy and of striving for a 
                                                     
 
168 Due to the sensitive and confidential nature of EU decision-making on sanctions, there is very 
little material in the public domain on the roles and influence of different member states in EU 
sanction formulation. Some estimates, however, suggest that the UK has been able to secure 
support for almost 80% of its sanctions proposals in the EU. See  
Moret, E. & Pothier, F., ‘Sanctions after Brexit’, Survival, vol. 60, no. 2, 2018, pp. 179-180, 183. 
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continued partnership.169 Equally, the Union has voiced its hope for continued 
cooperation, recognizing the benefits of mutually reinforcing sanctions.170 
The UK’s role in EU consensus-building on sanctions 
The role of the three biggest EU member states – Germany, France and the UK (EU3) 
– cannot be overlooked in the EU’s foreign policy in general and its sanctions policy in 
particular. The alignment of these three countries in Iran’s nuclear programme and 
Russia’s unlawful actions in Ukraine have been imperative for the set-up of the most 
prominent EU sanctions regimes in recent years. 
In the case of Iran, the EU3 played a key role in the negotiations between Iran and the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (P5+1), which led to 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement and temporarily resolved 
the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme. While the EU’s High Representative for 
Foreign and Security Policy (HR/VP) led the diplomatic efforts and the negotiation 
process, the EU and the US increased pressure on Iran by implementing unilateral 
sanctions along with the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. The UK’s role 
in forging tougher EU sanctions and transatlantic coordination over the Iran sanctions 
has been seen as imperative.171 Yet in terms of the latter, the US withdrawal from the 
JCPOA and unitary re-imposition of sanctions have cast a shadow over the close US-
EU coordination on sanctions under the current US administration (see Chapter 4).  
                                                     
 
169 ‘We will continue to act in concert with our allies through partnerships and in multilateral 
settings where our objectives align. Where this is not the case, the UK is now capable of 
implementing its own autonomous sanctions regimes to combat threats and project our values, 
as demonstrated by our intention to establish an autonomous UK human rights sanctions 
regime.’ UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Fragmented and incoherent: the 
UK’s sanctions policy: Government Response to the Committee’s Seventeenth Report, 9 
September 2019, 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/2642/2642.pdf, accessed 16 
March 2020. 
170 ‘While pursuing independent sanctions policies driven by their respective foreign policies, the 
Parties recognise sanctions as a multilateral foreign policy tool and the benefits of close 
consultation and cooperation.’ European Commission, Task Force for the Preparation and 
Conduct of the Negotiations with the United Kingdom under Article 50 TEU, Political declaration 
setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United 
Kingdom, 17 October 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/revised_political_declaration.pdf, accessed 16 March 2020. 
171 Tabrizi, A.B. & Santini, R.H., ‘EU Sanctions against Iran: new wine in old bottles?’, ISPI 
Analysis 97, March 2012, https://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/Analysis_97_2012.pdf, accessed 
10 December 2019; UK House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: Sanctions policy, 17 
December 2017, p. 11, paragraph 29, p. 21, paragraph 67, 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/50/50.pdf, accessed 16 March 
2020.   
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The EU’s sanctions against Russia resulted from the illegal annexation of Crimea and 
violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine in its eastern parts. In terms of the latter, 
the EU also issued targeted economic sanctions such as financial sanctions and 
export bans in addition to more widespread blacklisting of persons and entities, 
resulting in asset freezes and travel bans. These measures were adopted in 
conjunction with the Minsk agreement, and their lifting was tied to the successful 
implementation of this agreement negotiated in the Normandy format (including 
Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia). Even though the UK was not part of the 
Normandy format, its role in the consensus-building among EU member states on 
Russia sanctions has been acknowledged, and at times underlined.172  
Against this background, the fact that the UK has left the EU’s institutional structures 
represents a major change in terms of the political dynamics at the highest levels of 
EU sanctions decision-making – namely the European Council and the Foreign Affairs 
Council – as well as in their preparatory consensus-seeking bodies such as Coreper 
and the Council Working Groups.  
This is an important development as the EU has to continuously work for consensus 
in its sanctions policy (see Chapter 5). Restrictive measures agreed under the CFSP 
predominantly include a so-called sunset clause. In other words, they cease to apply 
unless they are renewed, or amended as appropriate after twelve months (or six 
months in the case of Russia sanctions). This means that the EU has to work firstly to 
establish and then often to retain the consensus on sanctions decisions. The UK’s 
role to this end has been widely recognized. Indeed, while the UK is often seen to 
have marginalized itself in EU decision-making in general due to Brexit, it has 
continued to play a notable role in the EU sanctions policy. Furthermore, over time, a 
development in which the fifth largest economy in the world is no longer around the 
EU decision-making table(s) can potentially weaken the possibilities to aim for equal 
European burden-sharing of the costs of sanctions within the EU decision-making 
process.173  
These potential developments related to Brexit have highlighted the role of Franco-
German cooperation in the CFSP and the EU’s sanctions policy. If the two biggest 
member states agree on a joint policy, for example to maintain EU sanctions against 
Russia, it is difficult for sceptical member states to deviate from this position. 
However, the Franco-German cooperation is often marked by differences in their 
foreign policy postures and strategic cultures. These surfaced recently when French 
                                                     
 
172 UK House of Lords European Union Committee, op. cit., p. 21, paragraphs 65-66. 
173 Moret and Pothier note that a compromise can sometimes be reached if the costs of 
sanctions are seen to be spread as evenly as possible across a given alliance of countries, and 
this prospect could potentially be diminished by Brexit. Moret & Pothier, op. cit. p. 184. 
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President Macron signalled his willingness to engage Russia more closely on 
questions of regional security, while at the same time criticizing the political stalemate 
in NATO. Germany has adopted a more careful position on both issues. Berlin is 
cautious about re-engaging with Russia without progress in Eastern Ukraine, and 
fears that a deepening of transatlantic divisions might pit Central against Western EU 
member states. The UK’s departure represents a change for the dynamics of the 
“Franco-German couple” as they have to arrive at a consensus without the balancing 
factor of a “third wheel” in the form of the UK. Thus far, no other EU member state 
seems to be able to match the role played by the UK in the EU3. Relatedly, the UK’s 
exit is likely to result in some concerns related to the future of the transatlantic 
cooperation in general and the coordination in sanctions policy.  
The EU’s dependence on the UK’s expertise in sanctions 
Reflecting its robust posture in the field of sanctions, the UK is an internationally 
recognized source of expertise in setting up sanctions regimes. To this end, it has 
also contributed extensively to the EU’s capacity to act as a sanctions sender.174 First, 
the UK has provided expertise in the form of highly qualified seconded officials to the 
EU institutions (most notably the EEAS and the Commission). Second, UK 
representatives in the EU have assumed a key role in framing and identifying the 
targets of EU measures, including the substantiation of the individual listings.175 This 
has been based on UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) personnel with 
expertise in sanctions unmatched in other EU member states,176 as well as the UK’s 
strong intelligence assets, including its national services and international cooperation 
such as participation in the “Five Eyes” alliance. Third, the UK’s input in terms of 
expertise and implementation of financial sanctions has been seen as important for 
the EU.   
As the UK has left the EU structures on its departure date, its contribution in providing 
technical expertise for the EU’s sanctions policymaking has been largely lost, 
                                                     
 
174 UK House of Lords European Union Committee, op. cit., p. 21; see also, ibid., p. 185. 
175 See European Commission, Task Force for the Preparation and Conduct of the Negotiations 
with the United Kingdom under Article 50 TEU, Internal EU27 preparatory discussions on the 
framework for the future relationship: ´Security, Defence and Foreign Policy´ (slides), 24 January 
2018,  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/slides-security-defence-and-foreign-
policy_en, accessed 30 April 2020.  
176 As a response to Brexit, the FCO has increased the number of staff working in its unit 
dedicated to sanctions. In many other EU member states, the number of people working on 
sanctions is significantly lower, and the expertise is often scattered across different units. For the 
FCO organization, see UK Parliament, Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FSP0015), 15 January 2019, Annex 2, 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-
affairs-committee/global-britain-the-future-of-uk-sanctions-policy/written/94581.html, accessed 
18 December 2019. 
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although the Withdrawal Agreement allows consultation of the UK during the transition 
period when there is a need for coordination in CFSP matters. The reason for this 
stems from the fact that the UK is bound to apply the CFSP decisions during the 
transition period even if it is not taking part in the CFSP decision-making, including 
restrictive measures. The Withdrawal Agreement also enforces the principle enabling 
the UK not to apply a CFSP decision on the grounds of vital and stated reasons of 
national policy. 177 Importantly, any formal future coordination mechanisms on 
sanctions policy remains an open question currently addressed in the negotiations 
concerning the future EU-UK relations.    
During the UK’s withdrawal negotiations, the EU side has approached the potential 
future consultation on sanctions within the overall framework for the future EU-UK 
relationship, and assuming that the UK becomes a third state in its relations with the 
EU. Against this backdrop, the EU’s Task Force for Article 50 sketched a consultation 
mechanism based on three features.178 First, it should be reciprocal in terms of 
advanced information-sharing on envisaged new sanctions or the review of imposed 
ones. Second, the mechanism should be scalable enabling (i) regular EU-UK 
sanctions dialogue about the overall policy and practice in EU and UK sanctions 
regimes; (ii) regimes in place and their effectiveness; and (iii) the exchange of good 
practices. Third, it could be formalized.179 The scalability of the mechanism would 
allow intensification of dialogue and in-depth interaction at all appropriate stages of 
the policy cycle of sanctions regimes (old and new). Yet this would require a UK 
commitment to align itself with the EU foreign policy objectives that underpin the 
sanctions preparation in question. These key elements are largely reflected to draft 
text of the agreement on the new partnership with the UK provided by the European 
Commission.180 However, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson has stated that future EU-
UK cooperation in foreign affairs does not need to be managed by an international 
treaty, still less through shared institutions.  
                                                     
 
177 European Commission, Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, 17 
October 2019, article 129(4), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/consolidated_withdrawal_agreement_17-10-2019_1.pdf, accessed 10 December 
2019. 
178 European Commission, Task Force for the Preparation and Conduct of the Negotiations with 
the United Kingdom under Article 50 TEU, Foreign, security and defence policy (slides), 15 June 
2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/slides_on_foreign_security_defence_policy.pdf, accessed 18 December 2019. 
179 ibid. 
180 European Commission, Task Force for Relations with the United Kingdom, Foreign Policy, 
Security and Defence part of the Draft text of the Agreement on the New Partnership with the 
United Kingdom, 18 March 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/200318-draft-
agreement-forpolsec.pdf, accessed 30 April 2020.  
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A notable difference to the times of the UK’s EU membership relates to the early 
stages of the formulation of the EU’s and the UK’s foreign policy objectives, including 
the application of sanctions. After Brexit, the UK is now outside the general foreign 
policymaking structures of the EU, which might over time lead to variation in their 
respective objectives. Importantly, the UK is no longer part of the preparatory or 
decision-making bodies in the Council when the EU objectives and application of 
sanctions are initially discussed. In other words, any envisaged consultation 
mechanism would kick in at a later stage of the policy cycle; that is, when the EU has 
formulated its objectives and the UK has arrived at more or less similar ones, and 
then decides to align with the EU.      
Should the UK and the EU fail to strike an agreement on their future relations, 
coordination could continue through normal diplomatic channels available to a third 
state. A “no future deal Brexit” could significantly diminish trust between the EU and 
the UK, however, and have a negative effect on the overall relations with implications 
for foreign and security policy coordination.  
Against this backdrop, any form of Brexit is likely to seriously hinder the UK’s 
participation in the design of  EU sanctions and its political and technical input with 
regard to their formulation. Possibilities to mitigate this challenge by establishing novel 
coordination mechanisms in the context of the future EU-UK relations remain an open 
question.   
4.3 Towards an independent UK sanctions 
policy  
Brexit will mark a turning point after four decades during which the UK’s sanctions 
policy has been anchored in the EU institutions. In May 2018, Britain established a 
legal framework for its autonomous sanctions policy through the Sanctions and Anti-
Money Laundering Act.181 Civil servants have also prepared several statutory 
instruments to replicate a vast majority of the existing EU sanctions under the new 
legal framework.182 These efforts are aimed at giving the government the tools it 
needs to continue implementing existing sanctions, and at providing a legal backbone 
for London to impose its own sanctions independently of Brussels. As part of its 
                                                     
 
181 UK Government, Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act, 23 May 2018, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/13/contents/enacted, accessed 16 March 2020. 
182 Chase, I., Dall, E. & Keatinge, T., ‘Designing Sanctions After Brexit’ RUSI, Occasional Paper, 
September 2019, https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/designing-sanctions-after-brexit-
recommendations-future-uk-sanctions, accessed 16 March 2020. 
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foreign policy, Britain is to gain the autonomy to impose stricter, milder or completely 
different kinds of restrictive measures compared to the Union. However, the extent to 
which the autonomous UK sanctions policy that is being set up will align with that of 
the EU remains uncertain.183  
Demands for a clearer vision regarding the UK’s future sanctions have grown more 
vocal as the Brexit negotiations have proceeded.184 A report published in June 2019 
by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee of the House of Commons suggests that the 
government’s approach to sanctions is “fragmented and incoherent”, thus posing a 
risk to national security.185 Among its concerns, the report lists that the government 
has resourced the transition inadequately, obfuscated the viability of an independent 
human rights sanctions regime (the so-called Magnitsky Act), and failed to enhance 
cross-departmental coordination. The UK government’s response published in 
September 2019 indicates that the workload to ensure that the UK is legally able to 
maintain existing sanctions after the unpredictable Brexit process has been 
“enormous and unprecedented”.186  
No domestic agreement on the future sanctions policy has emerged. Many have 
pointed out that discrepancies between the EU and UK sanctions regimes would 
create a costly bureaucratic obstacle between the UK and continental Europe, as 
firms would have to ensure that they adhere to the requirements of both regimes. 
Such regulatory obstacles would not be conducive to the British government’s aim of 
maintaining the ease of doing business in London.187 For others, taking distance from 
the EU sanctions would signal that the UK has a sovereign foreign policy, which better 
realizes the vision of a “global Britain” than paralleling EU policies. Some even warn 
against adversarial moves, such as “sanctions dumping”, whereby the UK reaps 
commercial advantages by continuing trade with entities against which Europe 
maintains stricter sanctions.188 
Keeping the EU framework at arm’s length would not render Britain toothless, 
however. Brexit will increase the need for the UK to build up its own capacities, for 
instance as legal measures taken against sanctions policies shift from the European 
                                                     
 
183 Moret & Pothier, op. cit., p. 180. 
184 Chase, Dall & Keatinge, loc. cit.  
185 UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Fragmented and incoherent: the UK’s 
sanctions policy, 12 June 2019, 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/1703/170302.htm, accessed 16 
March 2020. 
186 UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Fragmented and incoherent: the UK’s 
sanctions policy: Government Response to the Committee’s Seventeenth Report’, op. cit. pp. 1-
2.  
187 UK House of Lords European Union Committee, loc. cit. 
188 Moret & Pothier, op. cit., pp. 187-88. 
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Court of Justice in Luxembourg to British courts. Targeting sanctions effectively, as 
well as designing asset freezes and other forms of financial measures requires 
significant expertise. On these fronts, Britain possessed better capacities than most 
EU member states even before the Brexit referendum, after which it started building 
its own sanctions policymaking, implementation and enforcement. In 2017, the UK 
created the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, a dedicated agency for 
implementing and enforcing sanctions. By building new measures, the UK is aiming to 
compensate for the lower influence it will wield with greater flexibility.189 
Significant leverage that the UK sanctions policy will retain post-Brexit relates to 
shaping access to the City of London, a global financial and business hub, which is a 
key asset for many global companies and wealthy individuals. No doubt Brexit may 
incentivize some companies to move their operations to Amsterdam, Dublin, 
Frankfurt, or Paris. However, until further notice, London remains a global business 
hub in which entities drawing the attention of both US and EU sanctions regulators 
have significant activities.190 Applying this leverage has its limitations, however: British 
sanctions will be somewhat constrained by the need to maintain  European business 
entities’ access to London. Further, any potential threat prohibiting an entity from 
using the British pound in business transactions is weakened by the availability of 
alternative currencies, such as the dollar, euro, renminbi and yen.191 Further, as a 
single country, the UK might be more vulnerable to counter-sanctions and lobbying 
regarding London access than the entire EU.192 
4.4 Assessing the key challenges 
While the future trajectory of Britain’s wider sanctions strategy is still shrouded in 
uncertainty, it is inevitable that Brexit will diminish the role that the UK can play in EU 
sanctions policy. The UK has departed from those EU negotiation tables on restrictive 
measures around which it has wielded considerable influence and amplified its 
                                                     
 
189 UK House of Lords External Affairs Sub-Committee, Corrected oral evidence: Brexit: 
sanctions policy, 20 July 2017, Tom Keatinge, 
Q10,http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-
external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-sanctions-policy/oral/69307.html, accessed 16 March 2020. 
190 E.g. En+, a company owned by Oleg Deripaska, a Russian billionaire, de-listing from the 
London Stock Exchange due to US pressure. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 
‘Fragmented and incoherent: the UK’s sanctions policy’, op. cit. paragraphs 37-48; UK House of 
Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Moscow’s Gold: Russian corruption in the UK, 21 May 
2018, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/932/932.pdf, accessed 16 
March 2020. 
191 UK House of Lords External Affairs Sub-Committee, op. cit., Francesco Giumelli, Q15. 
192 Moret & Pothier, op. cit., p. 188. 
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sanctions position throughout the EU.193 Equally, it is not participating in formulating 
the range of foreign and security policy means, such as mediation, peacekeeping, 
dialogue and crisis management, which accompany the use of sanctions. Restrictive 
measures are never the only tool used in realizing policy goals, as illustrated in 
relation to the Iran nuclear agreement, in which sanctions and dialogue were applied 
simultaneously.194  
Based on the above, it is likely that the UK sanctions policy after Brexit will remain 
aligned with that of the EU, at least in the short-term perspective. The UK government 
is very likely to articulate the forthcoming UK-EU partnership as “unprecedented” to 
highlight its difference from the relatively unidirectional relationship between EU 
regulation and many other non-EU European countries, such as Switzerland and 
Norway.195 However, many European measures, such as those against secondary 
sanctions, will remain in place. The UK has incorporated into UK domestic law the 
EU’s Blocking Statute aimed at countering US extraterritorial influence, and has 
indicated that it will maintain the INSTEX instrument to facilitate trade between 
European businesses and Iran.196 Convergence with the EU is also likely to prevail on 
the grounds that such an arrangement will help avoid overt administrative burdens for 
businesses in the UK, and increase the efficacy of sanctions that the UK imposes. Yet 
Brexit will pose some notable challenges for the EU from day one. These are related 
to the design of targeted sanctions and the substantiation of sanctions listings related 
to any new EU sanctions decision or review of existing ones. The ability of the EU and 
its member states to enhance their resources and expertise is therefore an urgent 
question for the EU (see Chapter 5).     
A mid- and longer-term perspective may reveal alternative trajectories. One scenario 
is that the UK policy will side more with the US approach in a manoeuvre to establish 
a “global UK” distinct from the EU. Prior to the Trump administration adopting a more 
unilateral position in its use of sanctions, the UK was instrumental in guiding the EU 
approach closer to the positions taken by the US, with which its own interests 
aligned.197 Now Britain has indicated that it might impose stricter sanctions on Russia, 
                                                     
 
193 UK House of Lords External Affairs Sub-Committee, op. cit., Maya Lester, Q2. 
194 Moret & Pothier, op. cit., p. 184-85. 
195 UK House of Lords European Union Committee, op. cit., Summary; Hellquist, E., ‘Either with 
us or against us? Third-country alignment with EU sanctions against Russia/Ukraine’, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 29, no. 3, 2016, pp. 997-1021. 
196 Denton, R.L., ‘UK Parliament approves regulations for post-Brexit blocking statute’, Baker 
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accessed 16 March 2020. 
197 See Moret, E. et al., The New Deterrent? International Sanctions against Russia over the 
Ukraine Crisis. Impact, Costs and Further Action, The Graduate Institute Geneva, Geneva, 2016. 
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for instance by using its Magnitsky clause on gross violations of human rights, which 
would align its approach more with that of the US.198 This would in turn be a blow for 
the EU, for instance if EU-based companies subsequently felt even more compelled to 
comply with US secondary sanctions.  
Alignment with EU sanctions still seems a likelier scenario, however, although how 
this will unfold is less certain. It might be that the UK and the EU will strive to establish 
a collaborative link between the regimes to retain some influence over each other’s 
policies at an early stage.199 Coordinating sanctions may also take place among 
smaller groups of countries than the Union as a whole, which is not uncommon in 
foreign and security policy.200 The UK will be free to impose its own sanctions, but the 
choices it makes will have to accommodate the policies of other power blocs, 
especially those of the EU and the US.201 
The clear incentives for close EU-UK coordination on sanctions will have to adapt to 
the changing nature of the relationship in which the UK has underlined its sovereignty 
and the EU the autonomy of its decision-making. Should these key principles frame 
the envisaged overall future relations, collaboration on sanctions, including the 
potential institutional formats and mechanisms, might turn out to be “lighter” than 
some have anticipated. The current UK government’s pledge to conclude future 
relations negotiations by the end of 2020 suggests that there is very little time to 
introduce and agree upon any novel-type arrangements for a third state to plug into 
the CFSP. Furthermore, the UK government is not seeking treaty-based and 
institutionalized arrangements for the EU-UK cooperation on foreign affairs in the first 
place.     
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ADAPTATION OF THE EU’S 
SANCTIONS FRAMEWORK 
5 EU decision-making on sanctions 
regimes 
Niklas Helwig & Matti Pesu 
Summary 
• The EU developed an elaborate decision-making process on restrictive 
measures. However, despite extensive deliberations between member states 
and input from EU services, individual or small groups of member states 
repeatedly slow down or veto final decisions on sanctions regimes.  
• The European Commission proposed the use of qualified majority voting on 
EU sanctions. While a derogation from the unanimity rule might speed up 
decision-making, it risks making member states more cautious of proactively 
using the policy instrument given the looming prospect of being outvoted.  
• The broader political context and EU foreign policy strategy is decisive for 
whether a sanctions regime is put in place and maintained successfully. The 
Russia sanctions in particular showed that leadership by large EU member 
states and a joint assessment of the violations or aggressions to be sanctioned 
is paramount. 
 
Recommendations 
• The departure of the UK from the EU decision-making process heightens the 
need for investing in joint resources for the preparation of sanctions. Additional 
resources at the EU level could be particularly useful in the process of 
compiling the open-source evidence packages that underpin the listing of 
sanctioned targets. 
• The existing opportunities to use qualified majority voting during the 
amendment of sanction listings could be used more consistently. This could 
contribute to a voting culture less dominated by the unanimity reflex. 
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• The EU can learn from its successful adoption and maintenance of Russia 
sanctions. The sanctions decision-making benefitted from being embedded in 
a broader diplomatic approach towards Russia, which ties sanctions relief to 
progress in peace efforts on the ground.  
5.1 Introduction 
The EU decision-making process on sanctions is rife with challenges. All EU member 
states with different security and economic interests have to reach an agreement to 
impose restrictive measures. Some sanctions regimes, for example sanctions against 
Russia and previously Iran, have significant economic implications for member states. 
Under these circumstances, it is astonishing that member states have made 
noteworthy qualitative progress on the adoption of this foreign policy tool during the 
last decade. However, with individual member states having the power to veto the 
adoption of legislation and thereby “torpedo” the whole decision-making process, it 
often remains slow and ineffective in adapting to changing circumstances on the 
ground. This chapter examines the mechanisms and politics that make the EU’s 
activity on restrictive measures possible. At the same time, it points to some of the 
remaining challenges for a more efficient decision-making process and discusses the 
possible effects of recent reform proposals.  
The chapter starts with an overview of the decision-making process. It then discusses 
possible reforms and improvements to the EU’s sanctions machinery. The remainder 
of the chapter analyses the role of national preferences and strategic cultures as well 
as the politics between EU member states in the formation of sanctions regimes. In 
particular, it examines the political dynamics behind the EU decision-making on 
Russia sanctions.   
5.2 How does the EU decide on restrictive 
measures?  
Over the decades, the EU has developed well-oiled machinery for determining, 
amending and renewing sanctions regimes. The system benefits from close 
interaction between member states, the European External Action Service, the 
European Commission and Council working groups (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Decision-making process on the adoption of EU autonomous sanctions. 
In some prominent cases, most notably the EU’s sanctions on Russia, restrictive 
measures originated from the European Council, and heads of state and government 
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tasked the Council with drawing up the concrete measures. In other instances, the 
decision-making process for EU sanctions centres on the deliberations of member-
state representatives in the working groups of the Council.202 The geographical 
Council working groups, such as COLAC for Latin America, MaMa for the Middle East 
or COEST for the post-Soviet space, are the first venue for discussions between 
member states when a crisis demands action. When the working group decides that 
sanctions should be pursued as part of the EU’s overall response, the RELEX working 
group takes over and becomes the main body for the deliberations on the scope and 
details of the sanctions regime.  
EU sanctions are adopted in a two-step procedure, which reflects the EU’s division 
into an intergovernmental political framework (the CFSP) and an integrated economic 
entity (the single market). If the proposed sanctions include economic and financial 
restrictions, a Council decision in the CFSP has to be followed by a Council regulation 
that details the economic and financial aspects. While the two steps have a different 
legal nature, the EU machinery strives to adopt the texts simultaneously. 
The mix of political and economic aspects means that an array of actors is involved in 
providing advice and preparing the sanctions regime. The heads of missions usually 
advises the geographical working group on the political aspects on the ground and 
possible listings of entities to be sanctioned, while the EEAS presents a draft of the 
Council decision. The Commission services, on the other hand, provide input on the 
economic and financial aspects and prepare the draft for the regulation. Since the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, both acts are formally tabled by the EU High 
Representative for the final decision – in the case of a Council regulation in 
collaboration with the European Commission.  
The final voting procedures differ between the two legal acts. The CFSP decision to 
adopt sanctions is taken by unanimity, while regulations can be adopted by a qualified 
majority vote. This leads to a peculiar dynamic. Due to the veto power that every 
member state holds over the CFSP decision, member states tend to use the text to 
reduce the leeway of the Commission in charge of drafting the regulation in order to 
prevent unfavourable listings. A member state may also delay the vote on the CFSP 
decision until the text on the implementing regulation is completed in order to maintain 
its veto power until the final details of the sanctions regime are settled. In any case, 
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member states are adept at maintaining control over the details of the sanctions 
regime.   
5.3 How can the EU decision-making process 
on sanctions be more efficient? 
In numerous cases, overwhelming member-state support for a restrictive measure has 
not translated into decisive joint action. For example: 
• The EU delayed the Iranian oil embargo by several months before it was able 
to decide on its terms in early 2012. The Greek caretaker government 
reportedly had strong reservations, as it enjoyed favourable oil supply 
contracts with Iran and wanted to avoid negative effects on its already weak 
economy.203  Other countries, such as Spain and Italy, were also heavily 
dependent on Iranian oil imports, but less vulnerable to a potential embargo. 
The EU agreed that the import ban would take effect on July 1, 2012. 
• As mentioned above, Greece reportedly blocked EU sanctions in response to 
the violation of democratic norms and human rights in Venezuela in August 
2017.204 The EU only imposed sanctions three months later after the situation 
on the ground had deteriorated further.  
• Hungary delayed the renewal of the EU arms embargo against Belarus three 
times between 2017 and 2019. The measures were only rolled out after certain 
adjustments were made, such as new exemptions on the types of weapons 
and parts that would be banned or an advancement of the Belarus Partnership 
Priorities.205 
Derogating from the CFSP unanimity rule on sanctions 
The reason for a slowed-down decision-making process or watered-down decisions 
can often be traced back to opposition by one or more member states. In order to 
                                                     
 
203 Mohammed, A., Pawlak, J. & Strobel, W., ‘Special Report: Inside the West's economic war 
with Iran’, Reuters, 28 December 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-
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204 Beesley, A., ‘EU refuses to recognise Venezuela poll but imposes no sanctions’, Financial 
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accessed 29 October 2019.   
205 Gricius, G., ‘European Union Extends Arms Embargo Against Belarus’, Global Security 
Review, 12 March 2018, https://globalsecurityreview.com/european-union-extends-arms-
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make it more difficult for individual member states to block decisions, it has been 
repeatedly proposed that the application of qualified majority voting (QMV) should be 
widened in the CFSP. In 2018, the Franco-German Meseberg declaration called for a 
“look into new ways of increasing the speed and effectiveness of the EU’s decision-
making in our Common Foreign and Security Policy”, including the use of qualified 
majority voting.206 A subsequent paper by the European Commission picked up the 
initiative and explicitly suggested the adoption and amendment of EU sanctions 
regimes as an area that would benefit from QMV.207 Commission President-designate 
Ursula von der Leyen and the nominated High Representative Josep Borrell also 
pledged to push for qualified majority voting on foreign policy questions.208 
Theoretically, the treaties provide different options to derogate from the unanimity 
requirement. For example, a limited number of member states can abstain from voting 
on a CFSP decision and are subsequently not bound by it (constructive abstention, 
Art. 31 (1) TEU). In the case of a CFSP sanctions decision, this would allow the 
Council the possibility to go ahead with the vote, even if a few member states had 
political reservations. However, abstaining member states will be obligated de facto to 
implement the EU sanctions because they have to refrain from any action that might 
impede the common position.  
Member states can also enable the use of QMV when the European Council first 
adopts a unanimous decision, setting out the EU’s strategic interests and objectives, 
or unanimously requesting the High Representative to prepare a proposal (Art. 31 (2) 
TEU). Both of these unused provisions would therefore ultimately require consensus 
in the European Council.   
  
                                                     
 
206 Meseberg Declaration by French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel. Die Bundesregierung, Meseberg Declaration: Renewing Europe’s promises of 
security and prosperity [media release], 19 June 2018, https://archiv.bundesregierung.de/archiv-
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Common Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels, 12 September 2018, 
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BOX 3:  POSSIBLE DEROGATION FROM UNANIMITY RULE FOR EU SANCTIONS 
Constructive abstention (Art. 31 (1) TEU): A number of member states can abstain from a 
CFSP decision. These member states will not be obliged by the decision. However, they have 
to refrain from any action undermining the decision.  
Implementation of European Council position (Art. 31 (2) TEU):  QMV is possible when the 
Council decides on the basis of a unanimous decision by the European Council relating to the 
Union’s strategic interests and objectives. 
High Representative proposal (Art. 31 (2) TEU): QMV suffices if the High Representative was 
unanimously tasked by the European Council with putting an initiative forward.  
Passerelle clause (Art.31 (3) TEU): The European Council can unanimously authorize the 
Council to use QMV in other cases. 
The option to use QMV in accordance with Article 31(2) has already been used in the 
past to amend listings of EU sanctions, for example against Syria. The Commission 
proposed to use this potential to derogate from the unanimity rule more consistently 
when amending sanctions regimes.209 The use of Article 31(2) is not possible if the 
original CFSP decision stipulates that unanimity is required for amendment of listings. 
This is for example the case concerning the Russia sanctions. However, even 
amendments of listings can have significant implications for particular businesses or 
member states. Member states used the option only in less sensitive cases.  
Even more ambitiously, the Commission advocates the use of the passerelle clause 
(Art. 31 (3) TEU) to introduce the QMV procedure to the adoption and amendment of 
sanctions. The clause allows the introduction of QMV voting in other cases based on 
a unanimously adopted decision by the European Council. In any case, a member 
state will still have the opportunity to stop the Council from taking a vote based on 
“vital and stated reasons of national policy” (Art. 31 (2) TEU). While member states 
still have the opportunity to block a decision, it becomes a much more difficult 
exercise politically, as they actively and openly have to stop the majority from acting. 
At first sight, it is appealing to use the passerelle clause to introduce QMV to the EU’s 
sanctions policy. Proponents of QMV state that a widening of QMV does not mean 
that member states will be regularly outvoted. Instead, the QMV rule works as a 
lubricant in the EU consensus machinery. The prospect of being outvoted in the 
Council incentivizes minority-position member states to intensify deliberations and 
reach a consensus agreement. This has been the case in other policy areas in which 
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QMV applies. In 2016, of all the cases where a qualified majority in the Council would 
suffice, member states reached a consensus nine out of ten times.210  
The need for unanimity also makes it less likely that member states will make 
necessary adjustments to sanction regimes when they are up for renewal. Member 
states avoid opening up decisions for negotiation, which might see competing 
interests and a failure to reach consensus. Instead, member states often opt for 
simple renewals.211 Without this fine-tuning of the sanctions regimes, it is more likely 
that targets remain one step ahead, restructure their businesses and manage to avoid 
sanctions.  
However, qualified majority voting on EU sanctions has potential downsides. Votes 
taken by qualified majority send a weaker signal of EU unity to targets and allies. For 
example, the Russia sanctions were intended in part to demonstrate the resolve of the 
whole EU in condemning Russian behaviour and in being willing to exact a price for it.  
Derogation from the unanimity rule on the adoption of sanctions might also 
disincentivize member states from implementing the measure properly.212 Stripped of 
the opportunity to readily veto a CFSP decision on sanctions, a member state in a 
minority position might choose to accommodate its reservations by adopting a more 
lenient interpretation of the sanctions regime. At a minimum, the incentive to follow 
stringent implementation of the agreed measure is lower. If the EU wants to prevent 
the worsening of the national implementation of EU sanctions regimes, it has to 
strengthen EU-level monitoring and enforcement.213 Tighter top-down control, 
however, would limit the room for member-state discretion and lower their incentives 
to agree on strong sanctions regimes in the first place.  
As a result, the introduction of QMV on sanctions decision-making could have an 
adverse effect and slow down the EU’s activity in this field. The power to veto any 
sanctions decision gives member states complete control and ownership of the 
sanctions regimes and heightens the trust that their national preferences will be 
respected. Even if a member state is uneasy about a certain restrictive measure, it 
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has the ability to veto its periodic extension in the future. Member states’ willingness 
to support sanctions might be lower overall if they feel that they have lost control over 
their content and duration. While weak EU-level enforcement hampers the consistent 
implementation of a restrictive measure, it increases member states’ willingness to 
use the foreign policy tool in the first place. Any decision to make QMV the norm for 
EU sanctions should be evaluated against its impact on the established decision-
making dynamics in this field, which are characterized by a high level of trust, as well 
as member states’ ownership and responsibility.   
Challenges based on the EU’s division between an economic and 
political pillar 
Despite the intent of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty to simplify the EU’s external relations, the 
EU remains divided between the commercial relations of its single market and the 
political relations organized in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Most 
types of EU restrictive measures – those that ban trade or sever financial relations 
with EU external entities – span these economic and political dimensions of the EU’s 
external relations. The EU developed a two-step procedure whereby the Council 
decides on a unanimous CFSP decision (Art. 31 TEU), and a qualified majority 
regulation details the measures and scope of the restrictions (Art. 215 TFEU).  
In light of the division between the EU’s economic and political external relations, 
resources for the planning and monitoring of sanctions are scattered across 
institutions. Both the EEAS and the European Commission have units of about ten 
officials dealing with sanctions.214 The EEAS unit is in charge of political aspects 
related to sanctions and the formulation of the CFSP decisions together with the 
Council working groups. The Commission has a unit in charge of the formulation of 
the implementing regulation. It also monitors member states’ implementation of the 
EU’s sanctions to some extent.  
The Commission’s sanctions unit used to be part of the Foreign Policy Instrument 
(FPI), which is co-located in the European External Action Service (EEAS) building 
and operated under the authority of the High Representative as Commission Vice-
President. However, in autumn 2019 Commission President-designate Ursula von der 
Leyen announced that the sanctions unit would move from the FPI to the 
Directorate‑General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets 
Union (FISMA). In the 2019–2024 Commission, it will operate under the Executive 
Vice-President for An Economy that Works for People, Valdis Dombrovskis. In 
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addition to the administration of EU sanctions, Dombrovskis was tasked with 
“developing proposals to ensure Europe is more resilient to extraterritorial sanctions 
by third countries”.215 With this change, the EU was reacting to the growing 
constraints stemming from US sanctions on European businesses.216 
The effect of the institutional changes on the EU’s ability to develop and implement its 
sanctions remains to be seen and might be limited. However, one of the reasons why 
the two-step process worked efficiently across the economic and political pillar in the 
past was that the High Representative had authority over both units in the 
Commission and the EEAS, which were also co-located in the organigram and the 
EU’s diplomatic service building. 
Resources supporting decision-making 
Current developments give rise to the question of whether the EU has the appropriate 
resources to design and implement its sanctions policy. With the UK leaving the EU, 
the bloc will lose a major contributor to and driver in this area.217 Even now, the 
growing use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool and the EU’s high standards in 
collecting the underlying evidence behind the sanctions listings place substantial 
demands on member-state and EU resources.  
Background interviews with several member-state representatives revealed that there 
was at the time of writing no apparent intention to compensate for the loss of UK 
resources with a substantial increase in national expertise elsewhere in the Union. 
While the bigger member states, especially France and Germany, have invested in 
staff that deal with sanction-related questions in the EU and UN context, the expertise 
is decentralized at the national level across different departments of the foreign 
ministries and between the ministries of foreign affairs, finance and the interior. These 
decentralized structures make it more challenging to invest in meaningful national 
resources that could bolster EU activities in this field.  
The UK’s departure offers the opportunity to make sensible investments to support 
the design of sanctions at the EU level. As the EU targets more and more entities with 
sanctions, the number of legal challenges appearing before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) has skyrocketed into hundreds of cases, with many of the 
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sanctions struck down by the courts.218 The EU has reacted to the increasing number 
of legal challenges and improved the process for justifying listings. However, the 
workload is substantial, as each listing requires general criteria as to why an individual 
has been chosen (“designation criteria”), a justification for targeting a person 
(“statement of reasons”) and evidence supporting the statement of reasons 
(“supporting evidence”).219 Additional resources at the EU level could be particularly 
useful in the process of compiling the open-source evidence packages that can be 
shown to European courts in the event of a challenge. 
5.4 What determines member states’ 
decisions on sanctions? 
Multiple domestic and international factors determine how states approach 
international sanctions. Strategic culture, economic factors, security concerns, history 
and international pressure and norms, inter alia, are all potential elements in the 
decision-making process on sanctions. Thus, EU member states unsurprisingly have 
very diverse preferences for the Union’s sanctions policy. Although the EU has an 
institutionalized decision-making system for sanctions (and for foreign policy in 
general), the formation of restrictive measures is a political process writ large.  
Firstly, one must pay attention to a state’s general attitude towards sanctions as a 
policy instrument. One of the key elements affecting strategic behaviour identified by 
the research literature is a state’s strategic culture. Countries have divergent and 
historically evolved traditions of policymaking and statecraft.220 Some states are more 
inclined to rely on coercive tools, while others prefer softer diplomatic measures. 
Although strategic culture has predominantly been used to analyse defence policy, 
the concept also captures essential factors shaping non-military strategic behaviour 
such as economic statecraft in general and sanctions policy in particular.   
The EU is a patchwork of different strategic cultures, with some member states being 
more assertive and prone to use coercive tools, and others less willing to promote 
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coercive measures.221 For instance, the Netherlands is one of the countries with a 
robust idealist culture prone to “escalate legitimately when core foreign policy values 
were perceived to be under threat”.222 Greece, in turn, is one of those member states 
“traditionally sceptical about the efficiency of policies based on sanctions”.223 The 
bottom line is that there are promoters of both hawkish and dovish measures within 
the EU. These various preferences are rooted in diverse national understandings of 
what the best tools for conducting statecraft might be.  
The second noteworthy issue is a country’s position on a certain sanctions regime. As 
one commentator pointed out, “[i]t is a combination of overlapping historical, cultural, 
geopolitical and economic factors that shape EU member states’ positions 
[concerning sanctions]”. More precisely, close economic ties between the sender and 
the target of economic sanctions can be a hindering factor in sanctions imposition if 
the expected losses for the sender’s economy are great. Geopolitical factors entail 
threat perceptions or other security concerns that sanctions could potentially 
address.224 Moreover, cultural or religious affinity and historical enmity or friendship 
are also aspects pertinent to a country’s sanctions policy. Lastly, domestic politics 
such as the pressure of interest groups can also be critical when a government is 
contemplating the direction of its policy line. One obvious interest group that is salient 
when it comes to sanctions formation are the respective industries and business 
lobbies of the member states.  
In addition to domestic factors, the international environment may also explain 
individual states’ decisions to join sanctions regimes. Both persuasion or outright 
pressure and coercion from other states might push a country to adopt sanctions 
regardless of initial reluctance.225 This international dimension is a highly salient factor 
in multilateral frameworks such as the EU, and peer pressure is a recognized 
phenomenon in European politics.226 EU member states must carefully consider when 
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to pursue their national interest assertively, since reputational losses may eventually 
decrease bargaining power within the Union.  
5.5 What are the politics behind the EU’s 
decision on Russia sanctions? 
The EU’s sanctions against Russia were unusual and novel in many respects. The EU 
imposed sanctions on a neighbouring great power that was the subject of highly 
diverse perceptions among member states. The sanctions included sectoral bans and 
combined several regimes into one sanctions package. They also included serious 
economic restrictions against Russia. What were the factors that enabled the Union to 
arrive at a consensus on enacting such sanctions against the country?  
Helene Sjursen and Gury Rosén argue that the centripetal factor constituting the EU’s 
response to the Russian aggression in Ukraine was normative. In other words, the 
EU’s collective action “was anchored in agreement across all member states that 
fundamental principles of international law were breached”. After an argumentative 
process among member states, EU members felt obliged to respond to Russia’s 
violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and right to self-determination. Mere security 
concerns were not enough to persuade member states to agree on a common line 
because not all member states were equally concerned about their security. Sjursen 
and Rosén therefore conclude that norms trumped security interest, and it was the 
blatant violation of territorial integrity in Europe that pushed the EU to agree on the 
restrictive measures.227  
The “hawk” countries pushing a harder line include the Baltic states, Poland, the 
United Kingdom and Sweden. In addition, Germany and Finland have also 
consistently supported the restrictive measures imposed upon Russia.228 The 
common denominators between these states are either Russia-related security 
concerns or an activist strategic culture. Austria, Greece, Cyprus, Italy and Hungary, 
for example, have in turn been portrayed as “doves”, reluctantly sticking to the 
common EU line. Close economic ties and cultural, political and religious affinities are 
key factors explaining their tepidity towards the EU’s restrictive measures. Between 
the hawkish and dovish approaches lies a considerable middle way, which is 
constituted by lukewarm supporters (e.g. France, Spain and the Netherlands), 
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internally divided member states (e.g. the Czech Republic and Slovakia), and 
bystanders (e.g. Ireland and Belgium).229  
The role of powerful member states has been essential in the formation process. They 
have considerable negotiation power and are able to lead by example. For example, 
both the UK and Germany supported sanctions early on, which swayed France to 
scrap its initial opposition.230 Major power interests are highly salient from a weaker 
state’s perspective. A stronger power can deny the smaller party certain benefits if it 
acts against its interest. For example, Greece – having been aware of Germany’s 
preferences – may not have wanted to endanger its interests in other domains by 
vetoing the Russia sanctions.  
The fate of the Russia sanctions hinges upon a number of issues. The EU began 
imposing restrictive measures on Russia over five years ago. The consensus 
underpinning the EU’s sanctions policy has prevailed thus far, and member states 
have renewed the existing sanctions over Ukraine biannually. Although a few states – 
such as Italy and Greece – have threatened to veto the renewal of the Russia 
sanctions, there is strong confidence among EU diplomats that the sanctions will 
remain in place.231  
Peer pressure is a key factor contributing to the durability of the restrictive measures. 
For some member states, maintaining the sanctions is an ultimate concern, which is 
respected by other less concerned members.232 Moreover, power also matters in a 
multilateral context. It is unlikely that member states would deviate from the EU line if 
the Franco-German duo sticks to the current policy. Furthermore, reputational factors 
also count.233 Hence, by questioning the maintenance of Russia sanctions, a state 
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https://www.politico.eu/article/matteo-salvini-italy-not-afraid-to-use-eu-veto-to-lift-russian-
sanctions-crimea-vladimir-putin/, accessed 4 November 2019.  
232 See Cadier, loc. cit. 
233 See e.g. Portela, C., ‘Member states’ resistance to EU foreign policy sanctions’, European 
Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 20, no. 3, 2015, pp. 39-61. 
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may lose negation capital in other EU policy domains. Moreover, Russia’s ongoing 
campaign to weaken the EU consensus on sanctions and its aggressive actions 
elsewhere – from Syria to Salisbury – has sustained the critical attitude towards 
Moscow, which has contributed to the continuity of the restrictive measures.  
The ideal way out of the sanctions would be a successful implementation of the Minsk 
protocol and the return of Crimea to Ukraine, which would result in all Russia 
sanctions related to its aggression in Ukraine being lifted. Both scenarios – hardly the 
only imaginable ones234 – currently look highly unlikely, particularly the return of 
Crimea.235 The more likely scenario of sanctions relief entails a political compromise 
or bargain between Russia and some Western powers such as the United States, 
France and Germany. In other words, due to waning security concerns and 
evaporating “normative outrage” caused by the Russian aggression, major states in 
the increasingly fragmented West might think that reconciliation is needed to tackle 
global challenges such as the rise of China and terrorism. Furthermore, the US and 
France have both entertained the idea of the reintroduction of the G8 format.236 
Another question concerns the demand for possible concessions from the Russian 
side. In terms of lifting the non-Crimea-related sanctions, EU leaders have been clear 
about the need for implementing the Minsk Agreement. However, it is also possible 
that some member states are willing to ease sanctions, demanding only partial 
compliance or accepting concessions in unrelated policy fields.237 
The fate of the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia is determined in practice by 
the interplay of normative questions, security and economic interests, and other 
concerns not related to the situation in Ukraine. The question is intimately tied to the 
diplomatic process around the Ukrainian crisis. The most desirable way of lifting the 
sanctions would be a diplomatic solution, which is out of reach at the time of writing.  
                                                     
 
234 Moret, E. et al., The New Deterrent? International Sanctions against Russia over the Ukraine 
Crisis. Impact, Costs and Further Action, The Graduate Institute Geneva, Geneva, 2016.  
235 Allan, D., ‘The Minsk Agreements Rest on Incompatible Views of Sovereignty’, Chatham 
House, 15 July 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/minsk-agreements-rest-
incompatible-views-sovereignty, accessed  4 November 2019.  
236 Rose, M., ‘France wants progress in Ukraine before Russia returns to G7’, Reuters, 21 
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5.6 Conclusion 
The EU is capable of deciding on and maintaining significant sanctions regimes. The 
restrictive measures against Russia, or previously against Iran, are proof of this. 
However, the decisions often concern vital national security and economic interests. 
The politics behind the setting-up and renewal of sanctions regimes is therefore 
bound to be messy and slow. More often than not, it requires clear leadership by 
bigger member states, a process of persuasion and member-state willingness to 
compromise.  
Consequently, the degree to which institutional reforms can improve the efficiency of 
decision-making on sanctions is overstated. Existing options in the EU treaties to 
derogate from the unanimity rule have only been used to amend listings in EU 
sanctions regimes in less sensitive cases. In most cases, member states still value 
their tight control over the CFSP decision-making process.238 The introduction of 
qualified majority voting promises to bring about more efficiency, especially in cases 
where only one or two member states deviate from the majority position. Yet it risks 
weakening member states’ ownership of EU sanctions policy. A less controversial 
option would be to make more consistent use of the existing QMV options (Art. 31 (2) 
TEU) during the amendment of sanctions regimes, duly fostering a voting culture that 
weakens the unanimity reflex.  In addition, the EU’s resources can be improved to 
help with the increasingly complex design of sanctions regimes. Additional staff in the 
EEAS can contribute to improving the underlying evidence that supports the sanctions 
decisions.   
                                                     
 
238 Koenig, N., ‘Qualified Majority Voting in EU Foreign Policy: Mapping Preferences’, Policy 
Brief, Jacques Delors Centre, 10 February 2020, https://hertieschool-
f4e6.kxcdn.com/fileadmin/user_upload/20200210_Policy_Brief_QMV_Koenig.pdf, accessed 13 
November 2019. 
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2020:31 
 
88 
 
 
6 Implementation and enforcement 
Clara Portela 
Summary 
• While the adoption of sanctions legislation at the EU level is centralized, 
implementation and enforcement remain, by contrast, in the hands of the 
member states. Other than supervision by the Commission, the current system 
foresees a mechanism for information exchange among member states on 
interpretation, implementation and enforcement issues, keeping the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission in the loop. 
• The current set-up does not guarantee uniform implementation of EU 
sanctions, as it leaves individual member states with considerable room for 
manoeuvre. This creates a risk of significant discrepancies among member 
states in terms of implementation and enforcement. 
• Any attempt to tighten the supervision of member state compliance might 
affect the readiness of member states to agree to CFSP sanctions in the first 
place. 
 
Recommendations 
• Improvements in the collection and analysis of member states’ information on 
the enforcement and derogation of sanctions could improve the homogeneous 
implementation of sanctions and make shopping practices by third actors less 
likely.  
• In order to minimize overcompliance with EU sanctions by European 
businesses, national authorities could be mandated to closely follow 
Commission opinions. This would reduce the confusion regarding the coverage 
of EU bans and prevent possible discrepancies in interpretation. 
 
The EU operates a decentralized system of sanctions implementation and 
enforcement, which contrasts with its centralized production of sanctions legislation. 
In other words, the EU has legislative competence (compétence normative) but lacks 
operational competence (compétence opérationnelle) in sanctions policy.239 The 
system is set out in two key Council documents. These include “Guidelines on 
implementation and evaluation of restrictive measures in the framework of the EU” 
(henceforth “Guidelines”), first adopted in 2003 and most recently updated in 2018, 
                                                     
 
239 Martin, E., ‘La politique de sanctions de l’Union Européenne: Ambition multilatéral contre 
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and the 2015 “Best Practices on Effective Implementation of Financial Restrictive 
Measures”.240 Both documents deal with standardization of wording and common 
definitions for legal instruments, while the political aspects of sanctions policy are 
discussed elsewhere, in the “Principles for the Use of Restrictive Measures”.241  
6.1 How EU sanctions are implemented 
While the adoption of sanctions legislation at the EU level is centralized, 
implementation remains, by contrast, in the hands of the member states. EU 
sanctions legislation stipulates the conditions under which exemptions may be 
dispensed.242  
The procedure for granting exemptions to private operators differs depending on 
whether the regime originates from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), or is 
an autonomous243 EU regime:  
1. When the EU implements sanctions mandated by the UNSC, the authority to 
grant exemptions remains with the UN Sanctions Committee responsible for 
the sanctions regime at hand. In accordance with the text of the UNSC 
resolution, requests for exemptions by member states are processed by the 
UN Sanctions Committee.  
2. For autonomous sanctions regimes, exemptions are granted by national 
authorities, which decide on them on a case-by-case basis, ensuring that they 
are not misused to circumvent the objectives of the ban.244 Member states 
notify each other of exemptions granted, informing the Commission as well.  
                                                     
 
240 Council of the European Union, Restrictive measures (Sanctions): Update of the EU Best 
Practices for the effective implementation of restrictive measures, (10254/15), Brussels, 24 June 
2015, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10254-2015-INIT/en/pdf, accessed 17 
March 2020. 
241 Council of the European Union, Basic principles on the use of restrictive measures 
(Sanctions), (10198/1/04), Brussels, 7 June 2004, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010198%202004%20REV%201, 
accessed 12 March 2020. 
242 Council of the European Union, Guidelines on implementation and evaluation of restrictive 
measures (sanctions) in the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
(5664/18), Brussels, 4 May 2018, p. 12., https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
5664-2018-INIT/en/pdf, accessed 12 March 2020. 
243 When the UN Security Council (UNSC) agrees sanctions, the EU passes legislation to 
implement the bans stipulated in UNSC Resolutions. When the EU decides its own measures, it 
adopts exactly the same type of legislation as when it implements UNSC decisions, but it does 
not act under its authority. 
244 Council of the European Union, 2018, loc. cit. 
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Not all measures require implementation by the private sector, as some are 
implemented directly by member states. This applies notably to visa bans, where 
member states operate a no-objection procedure: A member state wishing to grant 
exemptions notifies the Council. The exemption is granted unless a member state 
raises an objection within two working days, in which case the Council, acting by 
qualified majority, may grant the exemption.245 
6.2 How EU sanctions are enforced 
The enforcement system takes a decentralized form. EU legislation exhorts member 
states to enact penalties for violations of bans. According to the “Guidelines”, member 
states must ensure that bans are implemented and complied with, and must lay down 
penalties applicable to breaches of sanctions legislation.246 Thus, each member state 
is responsible for designating the authority in charge of implementation and 
enforcement and endowing it with appropriate powers, and for passing national laws 
penalizing breaches and determining penalties.  
The decentralization that characterizes the enforcement system has its foundation in 
the principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in the EU Treaty. According to this principle, 
matters are best handled at the level closest to the citizen, given that the national 
legislator is best positioned to take into account local conditions. Locating the 
authority to determine penalties with the member states facilitates coherence with the 
legal tradition of each country, and ensures that the financial fines are adequate for 
local standards.  
Similar to other fields of EU action, the Commission is responsible for collecting 
information on laws and associated penalties in each member state, and for checking 
their adequacy and alignment with the provisions of EU sanctions legislation. In the 
event of misalignment, the Commission is responsible for approaching the member 
states at fault and requesting them to take corrective action. As a last resort, it has the 
power to launch an infringement procedure against any member state for failing to 
implement EU legislation.  
Other than supervision by the Commission, the current system foresees a mechanism 
for information exchange among member states on interpretation, implementation and 
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enforcement issues, keeping the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the 
Commission in the loop. The “Guidelines” provide that member states shall inform 
each other of assets frozen and the amounts concerned, derogations granted, 
measures taken in implementation of sanctions legislation, violation and enforcement 
problems and relevant judgments by national courts.247  
6.3 How private sector compliance is 
supported    
Providing guidance to private actors on how to comply with sanctions is a 
responsibility of member states exercised via national authorities. While national 
authorities constitute the first point of contact, the European Commission also plays a 
role. 
Standard bans on armaments, and restrictions on admission and asset freezes, which 
constitute the most common CFSP sanctions, present little difficulty in terms of 
interpretation. Arms embargoes routinely apply to the pre-agreed “common military 
list”, while visa bans and asset freezes apply to blacklists of individuals and entities 
featuring identifiers. However, when the EU introduces new types of restrictions, 
further clarification may be required by affected industries. The measures imposed on 
Russia in 2014 are a case in point. When the legal text leaves room for ambiguity 
regarding the scope of the bans, the Council may draft a new version of the legislation 
specifying their coverage. Another option, complementary to the previous one, is the 
issuance of guidance, which is, by its very nature, non-binding.    
6.4 Where (possible) deficits lie 
The current set-up does not guarantee uniform implementation of EU sanctions, as it 
leaves individual member states with considerable room for manoeuvre.248 This 
creates a risk of significant discrepancies among member states in terms of 
implementation and enforcement. The present section draws attention to a number of 
possible weaknesses that may hamper the operation of the current system.249     
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analysis does not make any claim regarding the actual exploitation of identified loopholes by any 
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Exemptions 
Firstly, a decentralized system for granting exemptions affords third-country actors 
opportunities for shopping. EU companies are obliged to obtain authorizations from 
the authority responsible for their country, but nothing prevents third-country actors 
from trying their luck in several member states. Since national authorities enjoy 
discretion in determining whether a specific request falls under an exemption, 
interpretations may vary. When a national authority rejects an application for an 
exemption, the requesting entity may approach another member state in the hope of 
eventually receiving a positive answer. National authorities face mixed incentives. On 
the one hand, they might interpret prohibitions with laxity out of humanitarian 
concerns, or out of a desire not to obstruct legitimate trade flows needlessly. On the 
other hand, authorizing a request rejected elsewhere may incur reputational costs.  
The only entity foreseen for conflict resolution here is the Commission. A member 
state that objects to an authorization granted by another member state may bring the 
matter to the attention of the Commission, which can approach the national authority 
allegedly in the wrong and request the withdrawal of the controversial authorization. 
The dissatisfied member state can contact the national authorities allegedly at fault 
directly to voice concern. In both cases, the national authorities, having granted the 
disputed authorization, can benefit from the discreet nature of the démarche. No 
publicly accessible data exist on whether member states disagree with authorizations 
granted by other member states and, if so, which methods of conflict resolution they 
select and with what outcome. While the Commission retains the option of launching 
an infringement procedure against a state in the hypothetical case that it refuses to 
enforce sanctions legislation, this scenario has never materialized.   
Capacities for evasion detection 
While equipping the authority competent for implementation and enforcement with the 
necessary tools is the responsibility of member states, national agencies may differ 
considerably in terms of size, investigative capacity, manpower and expertise at their 
disposal.250 Accordingly, their ability to detect and prosecute evasion may be at 
variance. Neither the “Guidelines” nor EU legislation stipulate what specific resources 
member states need to make available to ensure optimal compliance by domestic 
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actors. In other words, possible deficiencies in state capacity for sanctions 
implementation and enforcement remain unaddressed.  
Penalties 
The Commission checks national legislation stipulating the penalties for sanctions 
violations. If the Commission detects inadequacies, it can approach the member state 
in question and request their correction. In the event that the member state at fault 
persistently refuses to rectify identified deficiencies, the Commission could open an 
infringement procedure. In any case, the Commission would follow the standard it 
expects the Court to apply; in other words, only blatant deviations, such as 
disproportionately low fines, would qualify. The opening of an infringement procedure 
is also an option available to the Commission in the event that the enforcement 
authorities of a member state manifestly fail to stop evasion of a sanctions regime.  
Guidance for private actors 
The issuance of non-binding guidance was recently introduced by the Commission, 
with the specific aim of assisting private actors to comply with EU bans. Moreover, at 
the request of national authorities, the Commission may issue opinions.251 This 
replicates standard practice elsewhere. Still, Commission guidance, offered as a 
Commission Notice following a Q&A format, as well as Commission opinions include 
the following disclaimer:    
“The Commission oversees the application of Union law under the control of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. Pursuant to the Treaties, only the Court 
of Justice of the European Union can provide legally binding interpretations of 
acts of the institutions of the Union”.252  
As highlighted by this disclaimer, adhering to Commission guidance does fully protect 
private operators from fines, given that, in the event of litigation, the national 
prosecutor’s interpretation of a ban may differ from the Commission’s understanding. 
Uncertainty is exacerbated by a lack of coincidence as the entity responsible for 
initiating prosecution, which is located at the national level, is not the same actor that 
issues guidance, the Commission.253 This diverges from the US system, where the 
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Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) is empowered to carry out both 
functions. As a result, private operators may be inclined to overcomply with bans, 
foregoing operations that the sanctions designers never intended to ban.254 In 
particular, many banks are known to overcomply with sanctions legislation as part of 
their regular policy of “de-risking”. The inability to transact financially with actors in 
target countries amplifies the breadth of the measures, affecting legitimate trade 
flows.     
In addition, private operators have sometimes lamented the weak responsiveness by 
national authorities. An executive from a major European bank reports that it took him 
about a year to receive clarification on a question of legal interpretation that he had 
requested from his national authority, while the US Treasury agency, OFAC, replied in 
one week.255 Both phenomena, purposeful overcompliance by the private sector and 
protracted processing times by competent national agencies, have been pinpointed as 
obstructive to the operations of humanitarian actors.256 
6.5 Should the system be reformed?  
Our brief survey reveals that the system is not watertight: It allows for discrepancies in 
the interpretation of bans, offering third-country operators aspiring to benefit from 
exemptions opportunities for shopping. The current system was shaped by a 
preference for a member state-driven sanctions process that centralized relatively few 
functions with the Brussels institutions. Neither major instances of violations nor 
significant deficits in member state implementation have been publicly exposed. Is the 
system working satisfactorily despite its shortcomings?  
Little is known about the extent of discrepancies in implementation and enforcement 
between member states, and what their origins are. Since neither the EEAS nor the 
Commission share data on implementation and enforcement, we lack accurate 
information to assess the extent to which the system deters and addresses violations. 
In addition, it is impossible to know whether the Commission actually receives all 
required information from national agencies. In the absence of publicly available data, 
independent research on the implementation of EU sanctions remains scarce.257 An 
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academic compariso ofsanctions enforcement legislation in two member states finds 
notable differences.258  
Nevertheless, the fact that implementation and enforcement have not proved 
problematic thus far does not mean that they will not become an issue in the future. In 
the past, EU autonomous sanctions were largely free of consequences for European 
firms, bar the defence industry.259 Now that EU sanctions entail economic 
consequences affecting businesses, implementation and enforcement are 
increasingly coming under scrutiny by private firms, which aspire to level the playing 
field. Certain private operators in some member states perceive discrepancies in the 
stringency with which sanction legislation is implemented. Some of them have 
expressed concern that competitors in other EU countries do not apply restrictions as 
diligently as they do.260 
There are recent indications of a new willingness for improved implementation and 
enforcement of sanctions. One strand points to creating a centralized agency dealing 
with implementation and enforcement, following the OFAC model. The UK set up an 
Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), which already issued several 
enforcement actions, one of which fined a bank for dealing with a person blacklisted 
under the EU’s Egypt sanctions regime.261 French Minister Bruno LeMaire proposed 
the establishment of an agency comparable to the US Treasury’s OFAC, which is 
endowed with far-reaching powers and staffed with a two hundred-strong 
workforce,262 a proposal that has resonated with the think-tank community.263 The 
establishment of an EU agency comparable to the US Treasury’s OFAC is not readily 
practicable in the short to medium term given that the OFAC is endowed with 
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competences that are currently in the hands of member states. Since the transfer of 
such competences would require a qualitative leap in integration that is not currently 
planned, the eventual establishment of a European OFAC can be only be understood 
as part of a long-term vision. 
Another strand advocates the enhanced use of powers at the disposal of the EU, in 
the absence of institutional reform. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte recently called 
for enhanced coordination in sanctions policy and supervision with a view to ensuring 
a level playing field for firms, and to strengthening the role of the Commission in 
monitoring enforcement and providing guidance for private actors.264 Following the 
appointment of Josep Borrell as the new High Representative, the Foreign Ministers 
of Czechia, Denmark and the Netherlands laid out their vision for EU foreign policy, 
arguing as follows: “Sanctions need swifter implementation, better guidance and 
stricter compliance. This is above all a national responsibility. But we also must 
strengthen European institutions to ensure maximum coordination and full compliance 
with the sanctions regime”.265 
This approach appears to have resonated with the current Commission. In her 
mission letter to Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis, Executive Vice President for an 
Economy that Works for People, new President of the European Commission Ursula 
von der Leyen provides an explicit mandate to enhance implementation: “Given that 
any legislation is only as good as its implementation, I want you to focus on the 
application and enforcement of EU law within your field. You should provide support 
and continuous guidance to Member States on implementation, and be ready to take 
swift action if EU law is breached”.266 The simultaneous transfer of the Commission’s 
sanctions unit from Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) to the Directorate General for 
Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA) as part 
of the latest reorganization of Commission portfolios267 makes it clear that the 
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monitoring of sanctions implementation is part of that task. President von der Leyen 
explicitly mandates Commissioner Dombrovskis “to ensure that the sanctions imposed 
by the EU are properly enforced, notably throughout its financial system”.268  
However, any attempt to tighten the supervision of member state compliance might 
affect the readiness of member states to agree to CFSP sanctions in the first place. 
While individual capitals often agree to the enactment of sanctions regimes, even in 
situations where national priorities are not at stake, the possibility of exposing 
themselves to public criticism, or judicial action, for deficient implementation and 
enforcement may disincline them to do so in the future. 
6.6 Recommendations 
Notwithstanding the possible consideration of a more ambitious reform, a number of 
modest improvements to the current system could be envisaged in the short term:  
1. National authorities only have an obligation to notify the requests for 
derogations they accept, not those that were declined. Collecting information 
on declined requests, mirroring current practice with export controls, can 
provide insights into the possible existence of “shopping” practices by third 
actors and/or diverging interpretations of provisions among national 
authorities. It can also help identify items sought by humanitarian actors.  
 
• In the event that “shopping” practices by third countries are detected, a 
mechanism to address shopping should be devised. 
   
2. A key hurdle to the analysis of the state of implementation and enforcement in 
the EU is posed by the lack of information. Nevertheless, it is evident that the 
present system presents various vulnerabilities. 
 
• The first recommendation consists of strengthening the availability of data 
to enable the research necessary to give us a clear picture.  
• The vast amount of information currently collected by the Commission 
could be analysed for the production of some basic statistics on the nature 
of the items for which derogations are granted, the number of enforcement 
actions and court cases conducted in each member state, and the 
amounts allowed for basic expenses for blacklisted individuals.    
• A study should be conducted to compile detailed information on the 
capacity of individual member states for implementation and enforcement, 
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including human resources committed full-time, in police and investigative 
agencies, prosecutor offices, and relevant sections of the ministries 
involved. In accordance with the findings of this study, recommendations 
should be formulated for individual member states regarding the optimal 
allocation of resources to each of the agencies/ sections involved, 
proportional to the size of the finance sector and the volume of external 
trade of the member state in question. Equally, penalties for violations 
should be reviewed with reference to their deterrent effects. 
 
3. The phenomenon of overcompliance is associated with the existence of US 
sanctions with extraterritorial effects. However, this may also result from 
confusion regarding the coverage of EU bans. However, the current system 
could be improved if observance of Commission Opinions were made binding 
upon national authorities, preventing possible discrepancies in interpretation.     
6.7 Conclusion 
The configuration of the current system for sanctions imposition and implementation 
has not proved controversial in spite of the scarcity of means available to EU 
institutions to address deficiencies. The increasingly economic nature of EU bans 
might soon put previously inconspicuous vulnerabilities or discrepancies in member 
state implementation and enforcement into the public spotlight and lead to calls for 
improving the current system. 
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7 Secondary sanctions 
Ilari Aula 
 
Summary 
• Secondary sanctions imposed by the US pose a notable challenge for the 
economic sovereignty of the EU and its member states and hamper its foreign 
policy. The challenge of the current situation is heightened by the breakdown 
of collaboration between the US and the EU as sanctions senders.  
• The EU’s possibilities to respond to US measures are limited due to the 
importance of the US market for EU businesses, the pivotal position of US 
financial institutions, and the efficient implementation and enforcement of US 
sanctions. 
 
Recommendations 
• The EU should systematically make it costlier for the US to impose secondary 
sanctions. Measures include developing a robust risk mitigation and sharing 
mechanism, bolstering the euro as a medium of exchange, and advancing 
INSTEX as one test case. 
• The EU’s efforts should take into account that in the not-too-distant future, 
other major economies might become relevant senders of sanctions with 
extraterritorial implications for the EU.   
 
Secondary sanctions pose a challenge to the EU, as their increasingly assertive use 
by the United States compromises the Union’s authority over citizens, firms and 
organizations under its jurisdiction, and threatens to counteract the Union’s common 
foreign policy. This section explores the current situation and the ways in which the 
EU has responded to secondary sanctions. 
7.1 Transatlantic activities 
The EU imposes primary sanctions, which aim to control the dealings of EU entities 
with foreign actors, for instance by prohibiting EU citizens from engaging in business 
transactions with their counterparts in a sanctioned country. From a European 
perspective, secondary sanctions are demands that a non-EU state imposes on a 
European entity in order to stop the entity from engaging in dealings that the non-EU 
state disapproves of. They are a tool used by a foreign state to exert influence on EU 
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entities; even though secondary sanctions are not enforced by the EU member states, 
EU firms might still have an incentive to comply with them.269 
So far, secondary sanctions of concern to the EU have been those enacted by the 
United States. The US administration has presented or threatened to present 
European firms with a choice between access to US markets or to those of a targeted 
country.270 The size of the US market, the role of the US dollar as an international 
currency, and the centrality of many American companies in global financial 
transactions, such as Visa and Mastercard, have been a weighty factor even for those 
European firms that do not operate in the US home markets.271 Over-compliance by 
European businesses amplifies the effect of US secondary sanctions, as firms 
interpret the restrictions broadly for fear of violating US restrictions.272 As detailed in 
this study, the Trump administration has harnessed an assertive sanctions regime, 
using the threat of losing access to US markets as a tool to push foreign entities to 
sever their ties with countries such as North Korea, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela.273 
Among the US secondary sanctions to which Europe is sensitive are those imposed 
against Iran. In January 2016, Iran, China, France, Russia, the UK, the US, and 
Germany successfully negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 
aimed at nuclear non-proliferation. In May 2018, the new Trump administration 
withdrew from the agreement, reimposed heavy sanctions on Iran to realign its 
nuclear policies, and began pressuring financial institutions around the world to stop 
dealings with Iranian actors. European business engaging with Iran now faces the risk 
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of being cut off from the US financial system.274 Even if European authorities 
considered the firms’ conduct in line with the Union’s continued commitment to the 
JCPOA, an exodus of European companies from Iran, including France’s Total, 
Germany’s Siemens, and Italy’s Danieli, has ensued.275 
The US has also imposed secondary sanctions on Russia. In the aftermath of the 
2014 Ukraine crisis, the EU and the US agreed on the broad lines of restrictive 
measures imposed on Russian entities. Since 2017, Washington has adopted a more 
assertive position, passing legislation that imposes secondary sanctions on foreign 
actors involved with Russian energy and banking sectors, and retaining the option of 
further sanctions.276 While the European sanctions against Russia remain in place, 
many European businesses have deemed it necessary to comply with US demands 
as well. In Finland, for instance, Russian oligarch Boris Rotenberg unsuccessfully filed 
a lawsuit against several banks operating in Finland, claiming that they had refused to 
provide banking services because they feared US secondary sanctions.277 Recent 
measures taken by the Trump administration against firms building Nord Stream 2, a 
gas pipeline between Russia and Germany, illustrate the versatility of the tool. 
7.2 European response 
The EU is keen to find a defence against US secondary sanctions, as they 
compromise the Union’s authority over its independent investment and trade 
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policies.278 A key legislative tool has been the Blocking Statute, which prohibits 
European companies from complying with US extraterritorial sanctions. The 
legislation was drafted but never implemented to dissuade the US from imposing 
sanctions against Cuba, Iran and Libya in the mid-1990s. In 2018, the Statute was 
updated to defend the EU’s foreign policy on Iran.279 Further, France, Germany and 
the UK have established the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), 
which attempts to provide EU nations and non-EU members with a non-US dollar, 
non-SWIFT mechanism for doing business with Iranian companies. Up to now, the 
instrument has been confined to facilitating trade in goods permitted under the US 
sanctions, such as pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and agri-food goods.280 
Initially, the divergence between EU and US sanctions policies seems to place 
European companies between a rock and a hard place. The US authorities pressure 
European companies to comply with secondary sanctions while Europeans build up 
measures, including legal instruments, to insulate the firms against the US influence. 
The unilateral US strategy has often prevailed to date: the case of Iran in particular 
has exposed the fact that European capitals currently possess relatively few means to 
convince European firms not to exit the country if the US threatens businesses with 
repercussions.281  
At least three factors have contributed to this asymmetry. First, the US sanctions 
regime is better resourced for the strategic use of secondary sanctions than the EU’s 
decentralized system is for countering them. In designing, implementing and enforcing 
sanctions, the US Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) follows up on foreign 
companies’ undertakings on a scale that has no parallel in Europe.282 The OFAC has 
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managed to use its resources strategically through “naming and shaming” the entities 
it targets, and by maintaining fuzzy guidelines on the measures that the firms need to 
take to avoid secondary sanctions. As a result, European companies also tend to 
“overcomply” in order to ensure that they will not be accused of circumventing 
sanctions.283  
In comparison, the EU does not yet have robust mechanisms for sharing and 
mitigating the risks companies face if they reject US secondary sanctions. INSTEX 
shows that European countries recognize the need for a common front, but the 
instrument has gained momentum slowly and remains confined to trade in products 
that do not defy the US sanctions.284 Other potential measures to counter US 
pressure include improving the EU’s own implementation of its sanctions and 
countermeasures to them, such as the Blocking Statute. However, the relative lack of 
risk-sharing mechanisms enables OFAC to target individual European companies. 
Second, changes in US foreign policy have made its secondary sanctions seem 
intrusive for Europeans. During the Obama administration, the use of secondary 
sanctions against Iran was part of a foreign policy more or less coordinated with that 
of the EU. Moreover, in the immediate aftermath of the Russian annexation of Crimea, 
the US and the EU held shared foreign policy concerns. However, the US has 
stepped up its secondary sanctions regime against both states with little transatlantic 
dialogue, a process cemented by the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries 
Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).285 
Accordingly, the EU has explored means of resisting rather than appeasing US 
demands. Experts have called for European deterrence and resilience measures 
against secondary sanctions, which would include reducing the US opportunities to 
use the interdependencies against Europe’s interests, and building the capacity of the 
European bloc to retaliate with similar measures. Such proposals do not rule out a 
dialogue between the US and EU sanctions policies, but the Trump administration’s 
unilateral policy line tends to diminish the possibilities for this in the short term. 
Further, there are no guarantees that future US presidents would not resort to new 
secondary sanctions.286  
Third, the US secondary sanctions derive much of their strength from European 
companies’ asymmetrical dependence on the US financial markets. As noted above, it 
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is not only European enterprises aiming for US home markets that are affected. The 
US dollar remains a global medium of exchange, and American authorities operate or 
have a say in several key elements of the global financial system. For example, in 
November 2018, SWIFT, a company based in Belgium, yielded to US demands by 
cutting the access of certain Iranian banks to its cross-border payment network, a 
decision that came as a disappointment to European policy-makers.287American say 
in many key tenets of the global financial system is unlikely to diminish in the short 
term. Yet the EU can shield itself against some forms of US strong-arming. Bolstering 
the global role of the euro is one part of the efforts. Enhancing international dialogue 
on sanctions could also help reduce the Union’s interdependence on other power 
blocs, as other countries, including China, India, Russia and Turkey, are 
simultaneously engaged in creating non-dollar platforms. The aim of such efforts is 
not to reduce Europe’s dependencies on the US economy, but rather to make it 
costlier for the US to use them against European interests.288 
The EU is looking for new measures against secondary sanctions at a time when 
major powers are making increasing use of economic asymmetries as foreign policy 
tools. The likelihood that European firms dealing with China or Russia – which are 
more important trading partners for Europe than Iran – will face further secondary 
sanctions in the future cannot be ruled out. Moreover, it is unlikely that the US will 
remain the only major actor that leverages its economic weight to exert extraterritorial 
demands for geopolitical gains. Hence, the EU’s measures to counter secondary 
sanctions reflect a wider trend in international politics. 
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8 Future prospects: Adapting to the 
geo-economic environment 
Niklas Helwig & Juha Jokela 
 
Summary 
• In addition to being an incentive for closer cooperation, economic 
interdependence between states is increasingly regarded as a potential 
vulnerability. The disruption of trade, financial relations or energy supply can 
have far-reaching consequences, while at the same time being a more cost-
effective and acceptable tool in international relations compared to military 
confrontation. 
• Given the EU-level competences in the field of trade and its regulatory clout, 
the EU is at first sight well-positioned to be a powerful actor in the geo-
economic competition. However, other actors, such as China, Russia and the 
US, can use the decentralized system of the EU by actively undermining its 
internal cohesion. 
• The geo-economic competition poses a challenge to the EU’s sanctions policy 
with regard to the Union’s cohesion (ability to decide), sovereignty (ability to 
implement) and credibility (ability to matter).  
 
Recommendations 
• Multilateral cooperation is an important prerequisite for the effective use of EU 
sanctions. The EU and its member states should build alliances in political and 
diplomatic support of international sanctions regimes. 
• While geo-economic competition might make the adoption of comprehensive, 
bilateral sanctions more challenging in the future, the EU can make progress in 
horizontal sanctions regimes. The recently initiated EU human rights 
framework is a positive example.  
• The departure of the UK and disquieting developments in the US sanctions 
policy underline the need for a broader discussion on the future prospects of 
sanctions as an EU foreign policy instrument among member states. 
8.1 Introduction 
The development of the EU’s sanctions policy is taking place amidst a larger shift in 
the international order, which affects the EU’s ability to formulate and effectively apply 
joint policies. The last decade has seen a relative decline in the power of “the West” 
and the rise of new players. China in particular has transformed from an economic 
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powerhouse into the prime challenger of US hegemony.289 More than previously, the 
US administration under President Donald Trump has acknowledged the new 
competitive international environment and made great-power rivalry a core theme of 
its latest national security strategy.290 It did not take long for Europeans to realize that 
their traditional foreign policy model based on multilateral rule-based cooperation 
facilitated by strong global and regional institutions is facing difficulties. By way of 
example, the former German foreign minister declared in 2017, “in a world full of 
carnivores, vegetarians have a very tough time of it”.291 In a similar vein, President of 
the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen stated on the eve of her inauguration 
that the EU could no longer rely on soft power to promote its interests and that 
“Europe must learn the language of power”.292 This chapter explores the challenges 
that the EU and its sanctions policy are facing in the area of international competition 
and what this means for the future prospects of this specific policy area. 
8.2 The EU in the geo-economic competition 
A key feature of today’s international competition is that states are increasingly rivals 
on the economic playing field. Most relevant international players deploy economic 
means to pursue their strategic goals. China uses its “Belt and Road Initiative” of 
infrastructure development to exert influence in Asia, Africa and in the Asian-
European corridor. It is expected to pour about 1.2 – 1.3 trillion US dollars into the 
development of railways, highways or energy pipelines by 2027.293 The US 
administration and US Congress increasingly favour the economic tools in their 
foreign policy toolbox and do not shy away from imposing trade tariffs on key 
competitors including the EU, and economic sanctions on foes, with secondary 
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implications for allies.294 Russia allegedly uses its energy resources for political ends 
in order to divide Western partners and to keep its alliances together.295 
These individual strategies signify that international relations are very different today 
from the expectations of the 1990s. After the Cold War, a cooperative and rule-based 
approach seemed possible, based on the growing economic interdependence of 
states. In the last decade, the vulnerabilities associated with economic 
interdependence became much more prominent.296 The disruption of trade, financial 
systems or energy supply can have far-reaching consequences for a target and can, 
at the same time, be more cost-effective and acceptable compared to military 
confrontation. 
In addition to the exploitation of economic interdependencies, states use investments 
and regulatory power to compete in the race for new technologies and for setting 
global standards. While multilateral cooperation (for example via the UN system, the 
World Trade Organization or the more informal G20) was once intended to resolve 
transnational challenges in a cooperative fashion, it is now limping. Instead, bilateral 
trade deals have increased in relevance, and are pursued with the aim of setting joint 
standards and maintaining strategic partnerships. In addition, unilateral action has 
moved to centre stage, for example on the question of how to certify next-generation 
mobile communication technology (5G). Instead of finding a solution at the EU level, 
member states set their own criteria for the adoption of the new mobile technology. In 
short, the current era of geo-economic competition is less multilateral in nature and 
more antagonistic as well as national interest- driven instead.  
At first sight, the EU is relatively well-positioned to be a more powerful actor in the 
geo-economic rather than the geopolitical competition. On foreign and security policy, 
the EU’s international clout is weakened by the fact that “high politics” still remains at 
the core of member states’ sovereignty. In contrast, member states transferred the 
regulatory and commercial competences of the internal market, including external 
trade policy, to the supranational level a long time ago and allocated sizable sums in 
the EU budget for investments in research and development or international 
assistance. The single currency and monetary policy set by the supranational Europe 
Central Bank has strengthened the EU’s position in the global financial system and 
regulation. Consequently, the EU and the European Commission are much more at 
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home on the geo-economic playing field. President Trump’s perception of an EU 
“killing” the US on trade matters simply goes to show that the EU is taken seriously on 
the international stage. The 2019 start of the European Commission under Ursula von 
der Leyen exemplifies the confident role that Brussels seemingly takes in a more 
competitive world. On issues such as climate change, digitalization, and defence 
capabilities, the von der Leyen Commission is willing to use its budget as well as 
regulatory and executive powers to push a global agenda in Europe’s interest.297  
However, one should avoid an all too rosy picture of the EU’s ability to make an 
impact on the geo-economic competition. The EU has some systemic disadvantages 
compared to its competitors.298 Compared to authoritarian states, or states with strong 
state control of domestic industries, such as China and Russia, the EU lacks the 
ability to translate political interests directly into economic actions. As a liberal 
economy, the EU and its member states can only regulate and incentivize economic 
activities within the framework of the law.  
In addition, the EU is also faced with a disadvantage compared to other democracies, 
such as the US. While the US is centralized in its foreign policy decision-making and 
has significant resources for nationwide implementation of policies, the EU’s decision-
making is slowed down by the divergent interests of member states and is often 
dependent on national authorities for implementation.299 While the EU’s supranational 
competences are strongest in the field of the economy, they do not match those of 
key competitors. 
Competitors, such as China, Russia and the US, can also try to benefit from the 
decentralized system of the EU by actively trying to influence EU member states, with 
implications for the EU’s internal cohesion. While an outside power can actively use 
economic interdependencies to break the EU consensus, they can also rely on more 
subtle forms of influence to advance their interests. The existence of close economic 
ties or foreign investment alone can change the calculus of an EU member state on 
important geo-economic or foreign policy matters. The most vivid example of this is 
China’s strategic investment in Greek infrastructure, especially in the Port of Piraeus. 
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The economic ties between Beijing and Athens allegedly held Greece back in its 
support for an EU statement on Chinese human rights abuses.300    
8.3 Geo-economic challenges for the EU’s 
sanctions policy 
We can identify three geo-economic challenges for the EU’s sanctions policy: 
  
• Cohesion challenge: The unanimity requirement of EU sanctions makes this 
policy area vulnerable to economic and political coercion from outside players. 
Thus far, attempts to undermine EU cohesion on sanctions through hard 
economic diplomacy have been unsuccessful. For example, Russia’s counter-
actions towards EU sanctions, including import bans, can also be interpreted 
as an attempt to undermine EU cohesion in its approach towards Russia 
during the Ukraine crisis. Even though the counter-actions affected some 
countries more than others, such as Finland, the EU consensus on Russia 
sanctions was not broken. However, in a trade war with a major power, such 
as China, the economic effects for big export countries like Germany would be 
much more far-reaching and consensus could be difficult to uphold.    
• Sovereignty challenge: The accumulation of economic power outside the EU 
leads to a situation in which sovereign decisions by elected governments in 
Europe are undermined or rendered ineffective. For example, the dominance 
of the US market and the dollar for global payments is a massive source of 
power for the US administration. The US Congress or the White House do not 
shy away from making use of this power and pressuring EU business to 
comply with US sanctions.301 In the case of the Iran nuclear deal, this meant 
that the sovereign decision of EU countries to lift sanctions against Iran and 
implement the nuclear deal was rendered ineffective when the US reinstated 
its sanctions and forced EU businesses to comply. There are signs that the US 
might increasingly make use of this coercive policy tool.302 Even though there 
are no concrete signs, it is also not beyond the realms of possibility that China 
might strong-arm the EU in the future through trade restrictions (for example 
on rare earths).303   
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• Credibility challenge: Power in international relations is dependent on 
perceptions. Imagine a new round of nuclear negotiations with Iran ten years 
from now. The leadership in Teheran will know from experience that the real 
economic power does not reside with Europe but with the US, and will see the 
EU’s position in the talks as less credible. EU sanctions policy will lose its 
relevance if the targets perceive the real power to be residing elsewhere. 
Relatedly, if the consensus on major sanctions regimes set by the EU breaks 
down and sanctions are lifted without achieving their stated objectives (or a 
new negotiated resolution to the issues), the credibility of the EU as a 
sanctions sender and foreign policy actor would be severely damaged.    
8.4 Future prospects 
As geo-economic competition increases, there are clear signs that the world in the 
2020s will not be the same as during the 2010s. EU member states cannot take it for 
granted that the qualitative improvements in the EU’s sanctions policy can be 
sustained over the next decade. The future prospects of the EU’s sanctions policy 
depend on the way in which geo-economic competition will develop and on how the 
EU will be able to adapt to the new environment.  
In particular, sweeping economic sanctions will be difficult for the EU to adopt and 
maintain in a future marked by geo-economic competition. As the Iran and Russia 
sanctions of the past two decades have shown, broader trade and financial bans often 
require a high degree of international cooperation, EU internal cohesion to achieve 
the political decision, and economic instruments to implement them. In the case of the 
Iran sanctions, this was realized through the involvement of the P5+1 and a close 
consultation process in Brussels on the progress of the nuclear talks. While the 
Russia sanctions were to some degree based on German leadership, the support of 
the Obama administration in nudging the remaining sceptics in European capitals to 
an agreement was vital. The competitive international environment already 
constrained international cooperation on these security issues. In addition, for some 
member states, breaking with the EU consensus and following policies more closely in 
line with either US or Russian interests might be appealing. 
Nevertheless, there is still a future for the EU’s sanctions policy. First, the obituary on 
multilateral cooperation has not been written yet. The US attack on multilateral 
agreements and organizations, from the Iran nuclear deal to the World Trade 
Organization, has already caused a counter-reaction. For example, Germany, 
together with France, has launched the “Alliance for Multilateralism”. Participating 
countries, such as Canada, Mexico, South Korea and Japan, have high stakes in the 
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preservation of a rules-based order. The EU has also been busy forging new alliances 
on human rights matters in the UN Human Rights Council.304 It seems obvious that 
multilateralism in a world with a more assertive China, US and Russia is prone to 
being more complicated and often based on ad-hoc coalitions and piecemeal 
compromises. Nevertheless, it will still offer possibilities to cooperate and build 
alliances in political and diplomatic support of international sanctions regimes. 
Keeping the UK as closely aligned as possible with the EU’s sanctions policy is 
paramount in this regard.  
Second, it is still very early days for the development of a better economic toolbox for 
the EU to implement its policies amidst a competitive environment. It is widely 
acknowledged that the INSTEX mechanism for trade with Iran, despite US sanctions 
on Teheran, has yielded poor results so far. Despite being the second largest 
currency, the international role of the euro has remained relatively weak.305 Yet the 
EU has woken up to the challenge. Ursula von der Leyen tasked the Commissioner 
for Energy, Kadri Simson, with “looking at ways to sharply increase the use of the 
euro in energy markets”.306 The Russian energy giant Rosneft has announced that it 
will run future tenders denominated in euros not dollars.307 These efforts do not aim to 
decouple the EU’s trade relations from the US economy, but they might render a 
future US strong-arming tactic against EU businesses a less attractive option.308 
Third, the main advance in the EU’s sanctions policy in the last decade has been 
made in the field of targeted sanctions in the form of travel bans and asset freezes, 
while the larger yet still targeted bans, such as those against sectors of the Iranian 
and Russian economies, have been the exception.309 The toolbox of targeted 
sanctions can be further improved irrespective of the growing geo-economic 
competition. The push towards horizontal sanctions regimes – organized along 
thematic lines rather than by countries – is noteworthy. In early December 2019, the 
EU Foreign Affairs Council cleared the way for the creation of an EU human rights 
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sanctions framework similar to the US Magnitsky Act. Instead of singling out specific 
countries, this framework will allow for the listing of targets related to human rights 
abuses independent of their location. Another EU sanctions regime headlined by a 
theme rather than a country concerns cyber perpetrators.310 The EU has taken action 
to deter cyber-attacks by building its readiness to respond with sanctions.  
By targeting specific concerns rather than countries, the EU avoids singling out and 
confronting individual countries. At the same time, it will be more nimble in reacting to 
international events. On the downside, horizontal sanctions do not put the same kind 
of pressure on a targeted regime. One of the main benefits of the traditional country-
specific sanctions is that they are part of a broader diplomatic approach aimed at 
changing the calculation of a country’s leadership. The effect of horizontal sanctions 
regimes is more diffuse and the pressure on targets cannot be as easily leveraged by 
traditional diplomatic instruments.  
8.5 Conclusion 
Without question, the EU’s sanctions policy faces serious challenges in the 
environment of geo-economic competition. From a European perspective, sanctions 
are primarily seen and have been used as a tool in support of international norms 
based on multilateral cooperation. When actors, such as the US, use sanctions as a 
tool of power politics, the EU has difficulties in adapting to this harsh new reality. 
There is already a clear intention to increase the resilience of the EU’s sanctions 
policy framework. However, the departure of the UK, disquieting developments in the 
US sanctions policy and a general climate of geo-economic competition also 
underline the need for a broader discussion on the future prospects of sanctions as an 
EU foreign policy instrument among member states. 
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THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF EU 
SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA 
9 The effects of targeted economic 
sanctions on Western countries’ 
exports and on the Russian 
economy 
Birgitta Berg-Andersson & Markku Lehmus 
 
Summary  
• EU´s trade sanctions against Russia, which were accompanied by several 
other western countries, seems to have had the greatest impact on the 
economies of Ukraine, the United States, Japan, France, Australia and Latvia. 
The share of sanctioned goods of world total commodity exports to Russia 
amounted to 1.01 % before sanctions in the years 2001-2014, the 
corresponding figure for the EU countries was 0.28 %. 
• The share of counter-sanctioned goods of world total commodity exports to 
Russia amounted to 7.19 % before sanctions in the years 2001-2014, the 
corresponding figure for the EU countries was 2.1 % and for the other 
countries subject to import restrictions it was 1.1 %. The countries with the 
smallest shares of import-restricted foodstuffs, i.e. Ukraine, Finland, France, 
Germany and Italy are the countries which on the country level have suffered 
the least from Russia’s import restrictions. 
• Ukraine, Germany and Finland however accounted together for 50.4 % of total 
world exports of product group “Cheese and curd” (CN0406) to Russia in the 
years 2001-2014. Finland’s share was 9.3 %, in practice it was all exported by 
the finnish dairy company Valio Ltd which subsequently was hit very hard by 
the import restrictions. 
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• The United States has imposed more than 70 rounds of sanctions on Russian 
individuals, companies, and government agencies. The sanctions include 
blocking of assets subject to US jurisdiction; limits on access to the US 
financial system, including limiting or prohibiting transactions involving US 
individuals and businesses; and denial of entry into the United States, for 
instance. Our analysis shows that particular US sanctions have indirectly 
affected the Russian economy via increasing uncertainty and volatility in the 
financial and commodity markets, which has probably led to a (slightly) lower 
GDP growth rate. 
Politics and economics are closely intertwined. Every political decision always has 
some kind of economic implications for a country or countries. It is therefore important 
to discuss not only the politics around sanctions, but also the effects they have on 
economies around the world. 
The EU’s trade sanctions against Russia came into force on 1 August 2014. From an 
economist’s point of view, the main purpose of the sanctions imposed by the EU is to 
serve as a political statement against Russia. Inevitably, the sanctions also have a 
negative economic impact on the EU countries themselves to some extent, although 
this is by no means their  aim. Apparently, the EU has nonetheless considered that it 
is important to restrict/prohibit the exports of certain goods to Russia for political 
reasons, although companies in the EU (and some other countries) that are 
manufacturing these products will suffer because of this. 
The negative economic effects of the EU’s sanctions at the country level include 
reduced export possibilities, lower employment, and weakened investment 
opportunities for EU countries, which can all result in a lower GDP depending on the 
size of the negative effects. There are also some effects on the financial markets. The 
EU has also imposed financial sanctions on Russia, but in this chapter they are 
omitted from our discussion. At the company level, the effects of sanctions may vary 
considerably, depending on how important Russia has been as a trade partner. 
In this study, we will concentrate on analyzing the effects of the EU’s trade sanctions 
against Russia on Western countries’ exports. In several other studies concerning EU 
sanctions, the main focus has been on examining the effects of the sanctions on the 
Russian economy.311 As Russia responded with import restrictions on certain 
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foodstuffs from EU countries, we will also analyze the effect of these restrictions on 
the exporting countries’ export volumes. In terms of background information, we begin 
by looking at the total world exports to Russia during the period from 2001 to 2018. 
Lastly, we will evaluate the economic effects of the US sanctions on Russia. Before 
reporting on our own results, we will provide an overview of the results in previous 
studies. 
Crozet and Hinz have focused on the impact of sanctions from the perspective of the 
sender country. They use a general equilibrium counterfactual framework and monthly 
country-level trade data from December 2013 to June 2015, divided into three 
different periods. Export flows of arms and ammunition and certain Harmonized 
System (HS) codes for which trade takes place infrequently in very large values are 
excluded, however.312 
One result of their study is that the global trade loss is very unevenly distributed 
among countries. Furthermore, they calculated that 82% of the export loss is 
accounted for by products that are not targeted by the Russian counter-sanctions and 
that the EU countries bear 77% of all trade loss. They also found that Norway and 
Australia are the hardest hit in relative terms. Firms that exported to Russia before the 
events were not able to fully recover their lost trade by shifting to other markets.313  
Fritz, Christen, Sinabell and Hinz have analyzed the impacts of the sanctions on 
international trade flows by updating a global econometric model used in their earlier 
studies, which allows a separation of the sanction-induced impact on exports from the 
impact of other relevant factors. They have simulated hypothetical trade flows in the 
absence of sanctions and compared them with observed trade flows. The model thus 
predicts a world without sanctions and provides an estimate of sanction-induced “lost 
exports”. The model covers 27 EU countries and other important trading partners.314 
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Fritz et al. duly conclude that in terms of the absolute value of banned goods in 2013, 
Lithuania and Poland were affected the most, followed by Germany, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, Belgium and France. Losses in EU exports to Russia have 
been compensated for only marginally, by rechannelling trade flows to other 
destinations, especially the African continent and China.315 
Ahn and Ludema have estimated the impact of targeted sanctions using detailed 
company-level data. Their main finding is that the average sanctioned company loses 
about one-third of its operating revenue, over one half of its asset value, and about 
one-third of its employees after being targeted. They conclude that targeted sanctions 
do have a powerful impact on the targets themselves. They also calculated that 80% 
of the decline in Russia’s GDP and import demand between 2013 and 2015 can be 
explained by falling oil prices, with very little left to be explained by sanctions or other 
factors.316  
The researchers found that sanctions and counter-sanctions have had quite a small 
effect on the exports of most EU countries. Adding together the impacts of sanctions 
and counter-sanctions on exports, they found a median impact across EU countries of 
just -0.13% of GDP. The reasons for this are that Russia generally accounts for a 
small share of the total EU countries’ exports, and most of the decline in Russian 
imports is explained by lower oil prices and trend factors. The biggest declines in 
exports could be seen for Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Finland and Poland. 
Accordingly, the median estimated decline in EU exports to Russia from counter-
sanctions as a percentage of GDP was -0.02%, with the biggest declines estimated 
for Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Finland and Denmark.317 
Cheptea and Gaigné have focused on the impact of the Russian counter-sanctions in 
terms of trade flows. The aim of their study was to quantify the direct and indirect 
effects of the Russian food ban on the value of trade, and to analyze the resulting 
reallocation of EU exports and Russian imports. Several advanced statistical models 
were used to analyze monthly trade data for the period from January 2013 to 
December 2015. They draw the conclusion that only 45% of the drop in EU28 exports 
of banned food products to Russia would be due to the ban. The drop in oil prices and 
the depreciation in the Russian rouble have thus generated a larger EU export loss.318 
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The EU bears most of the negative effects of the food ban according to Cheptea and 
Gaigné319. Other countries targeted by the Russian food embargo register smaller 
losses, as Russia was not a major destination for their exports of banned products. 
The largest losses in exports of banned products to Russia were registered for 
Lithuania, Poland and Germany, while most of the other EU countries were only 
marginally affected by Russian import restrictions. 
The number of destination markets reached by EU exports increased after the 
Russian food ban. The effect was stronger for banned products. Russia switched to 
imports from non-banned countries for both banned and non-banned products. The 
largest gains were made by Belarus and Brazil. 
Korhonen, Simola and Solanko report that Russian imports declined notably between 
2014 and 2016 as a result of falling demand and the sharp rouble depreciation. They 
also point out that import bans and rouble depreciation supported domestic production 
to some extent, which replaced some imports that were banned or that became too 
expensive.320 
Volchkova, Kuznetsova and Turdeyeva have calculated that total consumer loss due 
to counter-sanctions amounts to 2,000 roubles per year for each Russian citizen. 
Counter-sanctions resulted in increased domestic prices, declining consumption and 
increased domestic production. They compared data for 2013 with data for 2016, 
consisting of 12 commodity groups. Their study reveals that the average real price of 
1 kg of beef (in 2013 constant prices) increased by 5.3%, while domestic consumption 
decreased by 33.1% and domestic output by 0.8%. The average real price for 1 kg of 
cheese increased by 26.5%. Domestic consumption decreased by 2.1% and domestic 
output increased by 39.1%.321  
Korhonen reports that the IMF concluded in 2019 that sanctions reduced Russia’s 
growth rate by 0.2 percentage points per year during the period from 2014 to 2018. 
Low oil prices, however, reduced the GDP growth rate by 0.7 percentage points per 
year. Korhonen also points out that Russia’s counter-sanctions have become part of 
its general import substitution policies.322 
Barseghyan (2019) has calculated that sanctions and counter-sanctions have reduced 
FDI net inflows, as a percentage of GDP since 2014, by an average of 2 percentage 
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points a year. Income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, was found to be 
lower on average by 1 percentage point per year during the 2014–2016 period. The 
study also reveals that value added in agriculture per worker increased on average 
during 2014–2017, reflecting improvements in both the productivity and living 
standards of agricultural workers.323 
Without sanctions and counter-sanctions, the share of agriculture’s value added in 
GDP would have been on average 0.54 percentage points lower per year during the 
period 2014–2017, while real GDP per capita would have been considerably 
higher.324 
The data in our own study is for a much longer period than in the studies mentioned 
above, the first year being 2001 and the last 2018. This study is more descriptive in 
nature and is easy to follow compared to the sophisticated statistical models in some 
of the studies above. Our trade data include all of the countries in the world, while 
some other studies have only calculated trade effects for the EU countries. In this 
study we calculate the share of sanctioned goods325 as a percentage of the total 
exports to Russia, both for countries that have sanctions against Russia and for 
countries that don’t. This approach relating a country’s exports of sanctioned goods to 
the country’s total exports to Russia has not been used in other studies to the best of 
our knowledge. To this end, we think that our study will contribute to the literature by 
providing new information on the trade effects of the EU’s sanctions and Russia’s 
counter-sanctions. 
9.1 Total world exports of goods to Russia 
and the most important exporting 
countries 2001–2018 
Goods were exported to Russia from the rest of the world at a value of about 50 billion 
euros during 2001–2003. Subsequently, exports started to rise and export growth was 
particularly strong in 2006–2008, when the growth accumulated to a value of more 
than 30 billion euros per year. World trade collapsed in 2009 as a result of the 
financial crisis, when exports of goods to Russia naturally also dived. By 2010, 
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exports had already started to rise again, however. The growth in exports was 
stronger than before during 2010–2011, when exports of goods increased at a value 
of around 50 billion euros per year. Exports of goods to Russia dipped in 2013, 
however – that is, before the EU sanctions and Russia’s counter-sanctions were 
imposed in 2014. Exports stopped decreasing in 2016, and recovered in 2017. All in 
all, goods at a value of 2,468 billion euros were exported to Russia from the whole 
world during the time period 2001–2017. In 2018, the value of exports stayed at the 
same level as in the previous year. So the total exports to Russia amounted to 2,669 
billion euros in 2001–2018. 
From Russia’s point of view, the five most important exporting countries are China, 
Germany, USA, Ukraine and Belarus. It is worth noting that among the ten most 
important exporting countries there are only three EU countries, namely Germany, 
Italy and France. If we look at the group of the fifteen most important exporting 
countries, we find that seven of these are EU countries, namely in addition to 
Germany, Italy and France, we have the United Kingdom, Poland, Finland and the 
Netherlands. The goods exports to Russia from almost all of the top fifteen exporting 
countries have developed in roughly the same way as exports from the whole world to 
Russia. The profiles of the countries’ export curves duly look quite the same, although 
the export volumes differ between countries. This is fairly natural because the 
economic trends in the world economy affect different countries in quite the same 
way.              
China is the superior exporter of goods to Russia; its share of total world exports of 
goods to Russia was as high as 15.8% in 2001–2018. The second biggest exporting 
country was Germany with its 11.9% share. The United States was in third place with 
a 5.3% share. Ukraine’s share was 5%, Belarus 4.9%, and Japan 4.5%. Here, we do 
not examine what kind of products different countries are exporting to Russia because 
we are primarily interested in gaining an overview of the countries that have delivered 
the most goods to Russia this century, measured in value terms. We need these facts 
as background information so that we can subsequently analyze the effects of the 
sanctions and counter-sanctions on different countries’ exports.      
Italy’s share of goods exports to Russia was 4.4% in 2001–2018, while France had a 
share of 3.9%. Finland exported goods at a value of 52.4 billion euros, which 
corresponded to a 2% share. The fifteen most important exporting countries 
accounted for 72% of the total exports of goods to Russia during the time period from 
2001 to 2018. In 2018 the share was 71%. Studying only these countries 
consequently covers the majority of the exports of goods to Russia. The fifteen most 
important exporting countries were in the same order during  2001–2018 as they were 
during 2001–2017. 
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Figure 2. Exports of goods to Russia, the most important (1–5) exporting countries 2001–2018, billion euros 
(International Trade Centre). 
 
Figure 3. Exports of goods to Russia, the most important (6–10) exporting countries 2001–2018, billion 
euros (International Trade Centre). 
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Figure 4. Exports of goods to Russia, the most important (11–15) exporting countries 2001–2018, billion 
euros (International Trade Centre). 
Finland’s exports of goods to Russia reached their peak value in 2008 when their 
share of Finland’s total commodity exports was 11.6%. At the time of the financial 
crisis, exports plummeted and although they started to recover in 2010, it was no 
longer possible to return to peak levels. Before the financial crisis, exports of mobile 
phones and re-exports of them (which was included in the regular statistical figures of 
goods exports) to Russia was very strong, but when Nokia’s heyday was over, it could 
also be seen in Finland’s total exports to Russia. At the same time, the very strong re-
exports of passenger cars all but came to an end. The port of Ust-Luga in Russia was 
expanded so the need to transport cars (including re-exports) via Finland decreased. 
Several other countries’ exports to Russia increased during 2011–2012, but exports 
from Finland remained at their 2010 level. In 2012, Russia’s share of Finland’s 
exports of goods was still 10%, but by 2017 it had dropped to 5.7%, and in 2018 was 
just 5.2%. 
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Table 1. Exports of goods from the whole world to Russia, the most important exporting countries 
(International Trade Centre; ETLA’s calculations). 
 
2001–2017 2017 2018 2001–2014 2015–2018  
billion  
euros 
Share,  
% 
billion 
euros 
Share,  
% 
billion  
euros 
on average per year,  
billion euros         
WORLD 2468 
 
202.0 
 
201.7 138.3 183.3 
China 376 15.3 42.8 21.2 44.2 19.1 38.3 
Germany 297 12.0 20.1 10.0 21.6 17.3 19.1 
USA 130 5.3 11.1 5.5 10.7 7.1 10.6 
Ukraine 129 5.2 4.4 2.2 4.6 8.3 4.4 
Belarus 120 4.8 9.5 4.7 10.3 6.7 8.9 
Japan 113 4.6 6.9 3.4 7.5 6.7 6.6 
Italy 107 4.4 8.7 4.3 9.0 6.0 8.0 
France 97 3.9 8.1 4.0 8.1 5.4 7.2 
South Korea 82 3.3 6.1 3.0 5.9 4.8 5.2 
Kazakhstan 62 2.5 4.1 2.0 4.5 3.6 3.9 
United Kingdom 62 2.5 3.6 1.8 3.4 3.7 3.4 
Poland 60 2.4 4.1 2.0 4.4 3.5 3.9 
Finland 50 2.0 3.0 1.5 2.9 3.0 2.6 
Turkey 49 2.0 3.0 1.5 3.6 2.9 3.1 
Netherlands 46 1.9 3.2 1.6 3.1 2.7 2.9         
  
72.1 
 
68.7 
   
The total exports of all goods from the whole world to Russia was higher on average 
during 2015–2018 compared to 2001–2014, which is understandable. When looking 
at the top 15 exporting countries, exports from Ukraine, Japan, the United Kingdom 
and Finland were lower on average per year during the later time period, however. 
9.2 The impact of the EU’s trade sanctions 
against Russia on Western countries’ 
exports 
The economic sanctions that the European Union imposed against Russia on 31 July 
2014, due to the Ukraine crisis, are still in force. There are several kinds of sanctions 
in use. For example, access by large Russian state-owned financial institutions to the 
EU’s financial markets has been limited. In addition, export and import bans were 
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imposed for defence equipment as well as export restrictions for dual-use goods and 
technologies that could be intended for military use in Russia. Dual-use goods include 
nuclear material, electronics, computer devices, data communications and data 
protection equipment, sensors and lasers, which are suitable for both ordinary civilian 
use and for military purposes, or the development of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). Exports from the EU to Russia of technology products and services that can 
be used for oil drilling and exploration have also been restricted. The sanctions are 
based on decisions and acts issued by the Council, which came into force on 1 
August 2014. They were even extended soon after, when a new act came into force 
on 12 September 2014. Since then, trade sanctions have been renewed every half 
year.     
The evaluation of the economic effects of the sanctions imposed by the EU against 
Russia is primarily confined in this study to the effects of the trade sanctions on the 
exports of different countries. Russia’s own economy is omitted from the examination. 
The trade sanctions imposed by the EU concern 44 CN product category codes. More 
precisely, in this chapter we concentrate on studying exports of products with customs 
codes belonging to the CN73 and CN82-87 product groups, which the EU has listed 
as banned. Exporting products that belong to these groups to Russia is subject to 
licence. However, the ban on exports of so-called sensitive technology concerns only 
those products and services destined for forbidden projects in the oil sector. Projects 
of this kind comprise deep-sea or Arctic oil exploration and production, as well as 
shale oil projects. Export services such as boring, test pumping, sounding services 
and bringing a borehole into production as well as the delivery of certain floating oil 
platforms are also forbidden.  
The statistical data in this section of the study consist of 44 CN product groups for 112 
countries. In addition to the above-mentioned CN product groups, we briefly overview 
exports of arms and ammunition (CN93) to Russia. The statistical source we have 
used is the database maintained by the International Trade Centre (ITC), which 
provides statistics on exports and imports by product groups from the year 2001 
onwards. On the basis of these statistics, we have attempted to gauge which 
countries have suffered the most from the trade sanctions. According to our data, it 
seems that Finland has suffered less than many other countries. 
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Figure 5. World exports of sanctioned goods to Russia 2001–2017, billion euros (International Trade Centre). 
During the period 2001–2017, commodity exports from the whole world to Russia 
reached their peak value in 2012, when goods were exported to Russia at a value of 
246 billion euros. When we looked at exports of products to Russia subject to 
sanctions (commodity groups CN73, CN82-87), we found that their total export value 
peaked at 3.5 billion euros in 2011. In Figure 5 we can see that during 2001–2011 
exports of banned products to Russia developed in the same way as the total exports 
of goods to Russia, but in 2012 and 2013, before the sanctions were imposed, that 
was no longer the case. The exports of sanctioned products to Russia fell 
substantially in  2012 – more precisely, the value fell by 1.7 billion euros from the 
previous year, although the total exports of goods to Russia was still rising. In 2011, 
when exports of sanctioned goods were at their highest value, commodities belonging 
to the CN89052000 product group (floating or submersible drilling or production 
platforms) were exported the most when measured by value, which totalled almost 1.3 
billion euros. The export value of this product group duly amounted to one-third of the 
total export value of sanctioned products in that year.     
According to the statistics, EU-sanctioned goods were still exported to Russia during 
2015–2017, but clearly less than in previous years. The export ban does not concern 
contracts that were made before the act took effect on 12 September 2014. Products 
from only 14 customs codes were not exported to Russia at all during 2015–2017. 
These groups included line pipes of the kind used for oil or gas pipelines, drill pipes of 
the sort used in drilling for oil or gas, and casing and tubing of the type used in drilling 
for oil or gas.       
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All in all, goods were exported to Russia during 2001–2017 at a value of 2,468 billion 
euros. Products that are subject to sanctions (product groups CN73, CN82-87) were 
exported at a value of 22 billion euros, and military equipment (CN93) at a value of 
0.9 billion euros. Exports of military equipment were at their highest level of 222 
million euros in 2013. 
Countries that exported banned products to Russia during 2001–2017 
Which exporting countries are the most important when studying exports of 
sanctioned goods (product groups CN73, CN82-87) to Russia? In this section we look 
at the countries’ exports in different years and put them  in order of importance 
according to their total exports of banned products between 2001 and 2017. It is 
characteristic of the exports of these products that they do not follow the development 
of the total exports of goods, but in individual years export figures for different 
countries may be very high and in other years very low, as can be seen in the graphs. 
The most important exporting countries were Ukraine with its 17.6% share and China 
with its 14% share. As in the case of the total exports of goods, Germany is the only 
EU country that one can find among the five most important exporting countries. 
South Korea and Germany had an 11.9%  share and the United States a 10.7% 
share. In terms of the total exports of goods, Ukraine, China, Germany and the United 
States were also in the group of the five most important exporting countries, with only 
the order of importance differing. 
Figure 6. Exports of sanctioned goods to Russia, the most important (1–5) exporting countries 2001–2017, 
billion euros (International Trade Centre). 
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Table 2. Exports of sanctioned goods to Russia (EU sanctions) (International Trade Centre; ETLA’s 
calculations). 
 
2001–2017 2017 2001–2014 2015–2017 
 
billion  
euros 
Share,  
% 
billion  
euros 
Share,  
% 
on average per year,  
billion euros        
WORLD 21.77 
 
0.7177 
 
1.396 0.739 
Ukraine 3.82 17.6 0.0301 4.2 0.267 0.028 
China 3.05 14.0 0.1686 23.5 0.189 0.136 
South Korea 2.60 11.9 0.0145 2.0 0.183 0.012 
Germany 2.59 11.9 0.1182 16.5 0.162 0.108 
USA 2.32 10.7 0.0899 12.5 0.142 0.109 
Japan 1.37 6.3 0.0243 3.4 0.094 0.018 
Italy 0.94 4.3 0.0526 7.3 0.056 0.048 
Canada 0.69 3.2 0.0364 5.1 0.044 0.026 
Finland 0.57 2.6 0.0057 0.8 0.040 0.006 
United Kingdom 0.40 1.9 0.0110 1.5 0.024 0.020 
Belarus 0.38 1.8 0.0213 3.0 0.024 0.013 
France 0.34 1.6 0.0204 2.8 0.021 0.015 
Austria 0.31 1.4 0.0151 2.1 0.018 0.016 
Sweden 0.29 1.3 0.0136 1.9 0.017 0.014 
Turkmenistan 0.20 0.9 0.0000 0.0 0.000 0.065 
  91.3 
 
86.6 
  
 
Figure 7. Exports of sanctioned goods to Russia, the most important (6–10) exporting countries 2001–2017, 
billion euros (International Trade Centre). 
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Figure 8. Exports of sanctioned goods to Russia, the most important (11–15) exporting countries 2001–
2017, billion euros (International Trade Centre). 
Among the list of the fifteen most important countries that have been exporting 
banned products are eleven countries that are also among the fifteen most important 
countries in the total exports of goods. In the latter group, Kazakhstan, Poland, Turkey 
and the Netherlands do not belong to the top countries exporting banned products to 
Russia. Conversely, Canada, Austria, Sweden and Turkmenistan are among the most 
important countries that export banned products, although these countries do not 
belong to the top fifteen countries in the total exports of goods.    
In 2011, South Korea exported sanctioned goods at a value of 1.29 billion euros, 
which is the highest export value in any year among all countries. The bulk of this 
sum, namely 1.26 billion euros, was placed in the commodity group Floating or 
submersible drilling or production platforms (CN89052000). During 2006–2007, South 
Korea exported sanctioned goods at a value of 0.5 billion euros, with the major part in 
both years belonging to the group Boring or sinking machinery for boring earth or 
extracting minerals or ores, not self-propelled and not hydraulic (CN84304900). 
During 2006–2007, Ukraine also exported products at a value of roughly 0.5–0.6 
billion euros. These were mainly Line pipes of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines 
(CN73051100), as well as Casing and tubing, seamless, of a kind used in drilling for 
oil or gas (CN73042910) in 2007. 
In 2008, China exported sanctioned goods at a value of 0.6 billion euros, of which 
products belonging to the commodity group Boring or sinking machinery 
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(CN84304900) were at a value of 0.36 billion euros. In 2013, products were exported 
at a value of 0.5 billion euros, the biggest groups being Casing and tubing, seamless, 
of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas (CN73042910), Parts for boring or sinking 
machinery (CN84314300) and Drill pipes, seamless, of a kind used in drilling for oil or 
gas (CN73042300). In 2014, products were exported at a value of 0.4 billion euros; 
the three biggest commodity groups were the same as in the previous year.       
Germany exported the most sanctioned goods in 2007, at a total value of 0.38 billion 
euros, of which 0.2 billion were products belonging to the Line pipes of a kind used for 
oil or gas pipelines (CN73051100) group. Other big groups were Boring or sinking 
machinery (CN84304900) and Parts of machinery (CN84314980). In 2010 and 2011, 
Germany exported commodities at a value of 0.3 billion euros. In both years, the Line 
pipes of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines group (CN73051100) was predominant. 
The United States exported the most sanctioned goods in 2008 and 2013, at a value 
of approximately 0.25 billion euros. In 2018, the biggest groups were Boring or sinking 
machinery (CN84304900) and Parts for boring or sinking machinery (CN84314300). 
In 2013, the biggest groups were CN84314300 and Drill pipes, seamless, of a kind 
used in drilling for oil or gas (CN73042300). In total, from 2001 to 2017, the United 
States exported the most goods belonging to the CN84314300 product group. 
Japan exported sanctioned goods at a value of 0.36 billion euros in 2005. Out of this 
amount, 0.35 billion belonged to the Floating or submersible drilling or production 
platforms (CN89052000) product group. In 2011, the value of exports was 0.23 billion 
euros, more than half of this sum belonging to the Line pipes of a kind used for oil or 
gas pipelines (CN73051100) group. 
Finland exported sanctioned goods to Russia at a value of 0.23 billion euros in 2010, 
and at a value of 0.21 billion euros in 2011. In both years, the majority belonged to the 
Line pipes of a kind used for oil or gas pipelines (CN73051100) group. Among other 
products, the biggest groups were Parts of machinery (CN84314980) and Parts for 
boring or sinking machinery (CN84314300). In other years, exports of sanctioned 
goods from Finland varied between 4 million euros (in 2016) and 20 million euros (in 
2008). 
Exports from Italy were at their highest level in 2012, from Canada in 2013, and from 
the United Kingdom in 2008. Exports from Belarus rose markedly in 2012 and 2013, 
when the majority of the export value came from the Rock-drilling or earth-boring tools 
(CN82071910) product group. In 2016, Turkmenistan delivered products at a value of 
0.19 billion euros belonging to the Floating or submersible drilling or production 
platforms (CN89052000) group. In other years, very few or no products at all 
belonging to the groups subject to sanctions were exported. 
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The share of sanctioned goods in the countries’ total exports of goods 
to Russia 
Earlier in this report, we have studied different countries’ total exports of goods to 
Russia and their exports of sanctioned goods separately. In order to gain a better 
picture of those countries that have suffered the most as a result of sanctions 
imposed by the EU, in this section, for all exporting countries, we have calculated the 
share of exports of sanctioned goods as a percentage of each country’s total 
commodity exports to Russia during 2001–2017.326 In Table 3 we have included the 
same 15 most important countries as in Table 2, namely those countries that have 
exported the most sanctioned goods to Russia (commodity groups CN73 and CN82-
87). 
Table 3. The share of sanctioned goods of total commodity exports to Russia, % (International 
Trade Centre; ETLA’s calculations). 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
 
WORLD 1.32 1.64 1.00 0.76 1.00 1.58 0.72 0.87 0.72 0.42 0.49 0.36 
  
Countries that have sanctions against Russia in the CN73 and CN82-87 product groups 
  
Ukraine 7.16 6.05 2.49 1.83 3.44 3.59 1.78 1.63 1.72 0.51 0.75 0.69 
Germany 1.15 1.96 0.77 0.80 1.44 1.20 0.53 0.69 0.70 0.64 0.55 0.59 
USA 1.27 2.26 2.50 2.28 2.59 2.35 1.62 2.02 1.43 1.22 1.12 0.81 
Japan 0.49 1.09 0.52 0.88 1.26 2.11 0.74 0.96 0.73 0.25 0.24 0.35 
Italy 0.71 0.52 0.75 1.06 0.65 0.81 1.17 0.92 0.81 0.73 0.56 0.60 
Canada 1.61 8.92 4.24 8.04 4.49 3.76 4.65 7.72 5.41 3.44 2.39 4.20 
Finland 0.31 0.52 0.45 0.36 6.55 5.05 0.24 0.28 0.30 0.34 0.19 0.19 
United Kingdom 0.24 0.47 1.86 0.31 0.89 0.49 0.52 0.42 0.37 0.62 0.94 0.31 
France 0.29 0.40 0.28 0.31 0.74 0.67 0.41 0.46 0.35 0.20 0.18 0.25 
Austria 0.20 1.76 0.97 0.73 1.01 0.66 2.15 1.96 1.61 0.84 1.18 0.82 
Sweden 0.62 0.80 0.71 1.04 1.32 1.25 1.23 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.80 0.74 
Romania 0.17 1.38 3.99 1.90 1.06 0.58 0.86 0.57 0.58 0.11 0.66 0.92 
Australia 0.34 2.03 0.45 0.21 0.45 0.67 0.61 0.86 0.73 0.26 0.24 0.53 
Latvia 0.05 0.31 0.99 1.14 0.73 1.04 1.88 0.89 1.08 0.09 0.13 0.13 
Lithuania 0.29 0.22 0.19 0.15 0.05 0.09 0.23 0.08 0.33 1.43 0.80 0.19 
  
                                                     
 
326 Crozet & Hintz op. cit. have used monthly data for 2013–2014 in their theoretical study.  
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  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Countries that have no trade sanctions against Russia 
China 0.05 1.63 2.65 0.89 0.64 0.70 0.66 1.13 1.11 0.40 0.33 0.39 
South Korea 9.96 8.47 0.18 0.29 0.71 15.5 0.53 0.50 0.56 0.29 0.21 0.24 
Belarus 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.36 1.78 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.22 
Turkmenistan 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.03 4.85 0.00 64.8 0.00 
Kazakhstan 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.16 1.21 0.73 0.01 0.03 0.05 
Azerbaijan 0.57 3.60 4.44 1.12 2.65 10.9 1.29 1.99 5.13 0.07 0.15 0.07 
Mexico 0.13 2.77 0.77 1.92 1.49 2.81 4.06 3.31 2.10 0.63 0.40 0.29 
Singapore 0.19 0.97 2.42 0.86 1.79 4.01 2.12 4.69 2.36 1.90 3.78 0.80 
Argentina 0.01 0.97 1.34 2.27 1.65 0.67 1.04 0.74 0.64 0.02 0.04 0.01 
United Arab 
Emirates 0.03 14.1 6.63 8.48 2.27 3.40 1.34 1.33 2.09 4.14 0.85 0.55 
Uzbekistan 0.00 0.01 0.04 1.02 1.38 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Serbia 1.66 1.23 0.25 0.18 0.10 0.21 0.49 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.20 0.10 
Saudi Arabia 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.17 0.44 0.25 0.58 0.85 1.32 0.06 0.00 0.39 
In addition to these countries, we have added other countries to Table 3 that have an 
export share of more than 1% in at least one year.        
Ten of the countries in Table 3 are EU countries, in addition to which are four other 
countries that support the trade sanctions imposed against Russia. Ukraine has 
imposed its own trade sanctions against Russia. The other countries in Table 3 are 
outside the trade sanctions programme. Sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia 
affecting companies in the EU countries also concern their subsidiaries in third 
countries.  
In addition to the EU countries, the United States, Japan, Canada, Australia, Norway 
and Iceland also support the trade sanctions against Russia. Ukraine has imposed 
sanctions, for instance, against Russian companies and individuals that are 
participating in construction and other activities in Crimea. Ukraine has also imposed 
trade sanctions and specific customs duties on certain products that Russian 
companies have been manufacturing. The sanctions concern products that can be 
manufactured in Ukraine or that can be replaced. The trade embargo concerns 
Russian cement, fertilizers, plywood and certain industrial products and vehicles, 
among others. Customs duties have been imposed on all products imported from 
Russia, apart from sensitive products such as black coal, gas and pharmaceutical 
products.    
China has remained outside the western sanctions The country has invested heavily 
in Russia and has probably benefited from the economic sanctions. On the other 
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hand, China has even done business with Russian partners that are black listed and 
has therefore been subject to the US sanctions. South Korea has also refrained from 
imposing trade sanctions on Russia. 
In Table 3 we can see that for every country the share of exports of sanctioned goods 
as a percentage of the country’s total goods exports to Russia varies widely from one 
year to another. In this context, we talk about sanctioned goods whether the trade 
sanctions concern the country or not.          
If we look at the ratios for the whole world to begin with, we can see that in 2001 
(excluded from the Table), 2006–2008 and 2010–2011 the share of sanctioned goods 
of total goods exports from the whole world to Russia was at least 1% – more 
precisely, it varied between 1% and 1.64%. In 2004, the share was only 0.57%, while 
in the other years prior to 2015 it was 0.7–0.9%. We can see that the share of 
sanctioned goods as a percentage of the total exports to Russia was clearly smaller in 
2015–2017 when the trade sanctions were in force. The share was 0.42% in 2015, 
0.49% in 2016, and only 0.36% in 2017. 
Finland’s share was 6.6% in 2010 when it was at its highest, and 5.1% in 2011, that 
is, substantially larger than the average share for the whole world. In both years, there 
were larger deliveries than was normally the case. In the other years before the 
sanctions were imposed, the share ranged between 0.24–0.52%, which is a 
considerably smaller figure than for the whole world on average. In 2016, Finland’s 
share plummeted to 0.19% as a result of the trade sanctions, a share substantially 
smaller than for the whole world on average. From this we can conclude that Finland 
has suffered less from the trade sanctions than the world on average because 
Finland’s share was already smaller before the sanctions, and the decline in the 
country’s share has been smaller since they were imposed.  
In relation to the total exports to Russia, Canada’s share of sanctioned goods has 
been particularly high every year, even in 2015–2017. In 2007, the share was as high 
as 8.9%, in 2009 it was 8%, in 2013 7.7%, and in 2014 5.4%. Despite the sanctions, 
the share was as high as 4.2% in 2017.  
The share of Ukraine and the United States has also been substantially higher than 
average almost every year. Ukraine’s share was 7.2% in 2006 and 6.1% in 2007. 
Among the countries that have sanctions, the export shares of Japan, Austria, 
Romania and Australia exceeded 2% in individual years, while the shares of 
Germany, Sweden and Latvia exceeded 1% in several years. Italy’s export shares 
were higher than the world average in certain years during the period 2006–2014, 
while the UK’s share was higher than average only in 2008. Of the countries with 
sanctions, France and Lithuania had the smallest figures during the whole period.    
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Next we look at countries that have not imposed trade sanctions against Russia with 
regard to the CN73 and CN82-87 product groups. Of these countries, South Korea, 
Azerbaijan, Mexico, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates exported a large 
quantity of sanctioned goods to Russia in relation to their total goods exports to the 
country during 2006–2017. South Korea’s share was as high as 15.5% in 2011, 10% 
in 2006 and 8.5% in 2007. Azerbaijan’s share was 11% in 2011 and 5.1% in 2014. 
The Arab Emirates’ share was as high as 14.1% in 2007, 6.6% in 2008, and 8.5% in 
2009. Turkmenistan’s share was remarkable in 2014 and 2016, but dropped to almost 
zero during the other years.     
Measured in terms of the value of exports, China was second in exporting the most 
sanctioned products to Russia during 2001–2017, but measured in terms of the export 
share, the country was nowhere near the top. In only four years was the share more 
than 1%. Argentina’s export share was in the same size class as China’s. Belarus, 
Serbia and Uzbekistan had an export share that exceeded 1% in two years, while 
during the other years it was zero or close to zero. Kazakhstan’s and Saudi-Arabia’s 
export share climbed above 1% in just one year.  
To what extent have the shares of the different countries changed since 2014? One 
might assume that the shares of all countries with sanctions would have decreased 
with the imposition of the trade sanctions. For the whole world this assumption holds 
true. Germany’s share barely changed, however, during 2015–2017 compared to the 
three preceding years. The UK’s shares have even risen slightly. In this context, it is 
prudent to remember that export contracts that were made before the day when the 
sanctions took effect remain in force. Moreover, the sanctioned product groups also 
include such deliveries that can be exported to Russia despite the sanctions. For 
these two reasons, it is very difficult to gain a comprehensive picture of the effects of 
the trade sanctions.  
Italy’s and Canada’s export shares have decreased somewhat since the trade 
sanctions took effect, but Canada’s share remained exceptionally high during 2015–
2017. Finland’s and Sweden’s shares were clearly smaller during 2016–2017 
compared to the previous years, and Austria’s share was smaller during 2015–2017 
than in the previous years. The shares of Ukraine, the United States, Japan, France, 
Australia and Latvia have decreased considerably, however, since 2014. This could 
be interpreted in such a way that trade sanctions have had the greatest effect 
precisely on the economies of these countries. Romania’s share rose during 2016–
2017, while Lithuania’s was also bigger than previously in 2015–2016. 
When we look at the countries that have not imposed any trade sanctions against 
Russia, it seems that the ratio has decreased for all countries in the Table since 2014, 
apart from Turkmenistan, Singapore and the Arab Emirates. In fact, it would appear 
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that the export share of sanctioned goods as a percentage of the countries’ total 
goods exports to Russia has diminished more in those countries that have not 
imposed sanctions against Russia. This could be interpreted in such a way that 
Russia’s demand for certain products has decreased in respect of all countries as a 
result of the fact that, by virtue of their trade sanctions, the EU countries, the United 
States, Japan, Canada and Australia have discontinued certain large projects in 
Russia. For example, if certain products have been imported from country Y and other 
products related to the project from country Z, then the demand from country Z will 
automatically decrease if the goods cannot be imported from country Y. In addition, 
this position can be affected by the fact that subsidiaries of those EU companies that 
operate outside the EU’s borders cannot export sanctioned goods to Russia either.  
Exports of arms and ammunition to Russia 
The export share of arms and ammunition as a percentage of the total exports of 
goods from the whole world to Russia peaked at 0.09% in 2013. In 2002–2007 and 
2017, the share was 0.01%, in 2008, 2009 and 2014 it ranged between 0.02 and 
0.03%, while in 2010–2012 and 2015 it was 0.06–0.07%. In 2016 the share was 0%. 
The share for the whole world was 0.03% on average in 2001–2014 and 0.02% in 
2015–2017 after sanctions had been imposed. 
In 2013, when the share of arms and ammunition as a percentage of the total exports 
of goods for the whole world was at its peak, Azerbaijan had the largest share of 
exports of these goods to Russia, with a total that rose as high as 19%. Kyrgyzstan’s 
share was 6.4% at that time. Both countries are non-EU countries with no trade 
sanctions against Russia. During the period 2001–2014, the United Arab Emirates 
had an average share of 2.3%, Azerbaijan 2%, and Kyrgyzstan 0.8%. Among 
countries with sanctions, Italy had the largest average share at 0.14%. During 2015–
2017, after sanctions had been imposed, Azerbaijan had an average share of 4.9%, 
Italy’s share was 0.07%, and Kyrgyzstan’s 0.01%. The United Arab Emirates didn’t 
export any arms and ammunition to Russia during those years. 
During 2001–2017, the twenty most important exporting countries had an aggregate 
share that was more than 95% of the whole world’s exports of arms and ammunition 
to Russia. Finland’s share was 1.1%, and the country is not an important exporting 
country in this product group.     
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According to public information on the topic, three export licence applications for 
defence equipment were rejected in Finland in 2014, and two in 2015.327 In 2016, 
there were no applications at all. According to export statistics, no arms and 
ammunition were exported from Finland to Russia during 2015–2017. As Finland’s 
exports of arms and ammunition to Russia have always been small, the negative 
effect of the sanctions on Finland’s exports has been almost non-existent. Finland’s 
exports were at their highest level of 2.3 million euros in 2012. During 2010–2011 and 
2013–2014, the export value was a little over one million euros. In all other years, the 
value of exports has remained below one million euros. Arms exports do not 
constitute a very important product group for other countries either from the 
perspective of total goods exports. 
Table 4. Exports of arms and ammunition to Russia, billion euros (International Trade Centre, 
ETLA’s calculations). 
 2001–2017  2017  
  billion euros Share, %  billion euros Share, % 
        
WORLD 0.922   29.26   
        
Countries that have sanctions against Russia in the CN93 product group   
        
Italy 0.161 17.4   9.012 30.8 
Ukraine 0.139 15.1   0.164 0.6  
Germany 0.090 9.7   3.767 12.9  
USA 0.024 2.6   0.335 1.1  
Spain 0.022 2.4   1.447 4.9  
Czech Republic 0.021 2.3   2.026 6.9  
Belgium 0.015 1.6   0.035 0.1  
Austria 0.013 1.4   0.692 2.4  
Finland 0.010 1.1   - 0.0  
Japan 0.007 0.8   0.384 1.3  
France 0.007 0.8    0.758 2.6  
  55.1    63.6  
  
                                                     
 
327 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 2016 & 2017, 
https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Liiteasiakirja/Documents/EDK-2016-AK-68805.pdf & 
https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Liiteasiakirja/Documents/EDK-2017-AK-135622.pdf, accessed 
12 March 2020. 
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 2001–2017  2017 
  billion euros Share, %  billion euros Share, % 
      
Countries that do not have trade sanctions against Russia    
        
Azerbaijan 0.186 20.2   0.201 0.7  
Turkey 0.063 6.8   4.616 15.8  
Taiwan 0.030 3.2   1.553 5.3  
China 0.029 3.2   1.541 5.3  
United Arab Emirates 0.027 2.9   - - 
Kyrgyzstan 0.015 1.6   0.059 0.2 
Belarus 0.014 1.5   1.492 5.1  
Libya 0.011 1.2   - - 
India 0.011 1.2    - - 
  41.8    32.3  
Total   96.8      96.0 
Even though certain countries listed in Table 4 do not have trade sanctions against 
Russia, it is worth pointing out in this context that Russia has imposed sanctions on 
some of these countries itself, such as Libya. Russia also has sanctions against 
Turkey. Italy’s share of exports of arms was almost a third in 2017, but its value was 
only 9 million euros. 
Dual-use goods and technologies 
In the Finnish legislation concerning national export supervision, the term “dual-use 
items” refers to products, technologies, services or other goods that, besides normal 
civilian use, may have military applications or may contribute to the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Goods that can be used to improve  general 
military capability are also classified as dual-use goods, as well as products that are 
meant for use in the nuclear energy field. Dual-use items are usually high-technology 
products, for example electronics, certain computer devices, data communications 
and data protection equipment. 
The goal of the export control of dual-use items is to make use of a policy that 
prevents the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This is fulfilled by international 
agreements and export control cooperation in many forms. In a broader sense, this 
kind of policy also concerns ordinary arms when export control covers dual- use items 
that further the development of general military performance, as well as arms exports 
controlled by other legislation. Trading outside the EU is more complicated than 
trading within the Union. In intra-EU trade, authorization is only required for nuclear 
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2020:31 
 
136 
 
 
material and other very sensitive products. Extra-EU exports of all dual-use items are 
subject to authorization. For transit trade, a licence is occasionally needed. In Finland, 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is the licensing authority for dual-use items. 
The European Union has published a list (correlation table) of the customs codes for 
dual-use items and the corresponding dual-use codification, as well as a TARIC (tariff 
code for the classification of goods at customs) footnote for every customs code. 
There are as many as 6,197 customs codes on the list. No separate statistics for the 
exports of dual-use goods, at least from Finland, are available. To the best of our 
knowledge, it is only the licensing authority that has information on the number of 
applications and the number of issued licences. In Finland, according to public 
information from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,328 two export applications for dual-
use goods were not granted in 2016. In these cases, there was a risk that the 
products would have ended up being used for military purposes in Russia. Due to the 
complexity of this issue and the lack of official statistics and other relevant 
information, we will not examine exports of dual-use items in this chapter. 
Business perspective 1: The impact of the EU’s sanctions on the 
Finnish marine industries’ exports to Russia  
The total value of exports from Finland to Russia amounted to 3.6 billion euros in 
2019. Over the years, a little more than half of the exports to Russia have been 
products from the metal industry,329 including ships such as ice-breakers, and 
machinery and equipment for the Russian oil industry. As early as the bilateral trade 
dealings between Finland and Russia after the Second World War, the Finnish marine 
industries’ exports to Russia were central and new technologies were created for 
export to Russia. In 2013, before the sanctions, the value of exports to Russia totalled 
5.4 billion. 
In 2019 there were ten shipyards in Finland, the most well-known of which are Meyer 
Turku, Helsinki Shipyard (the former Archtech Helsinki Shipyard), Pori Offshore 
Constructions, and Rauma Marine Constructions. The Archtech Helsinki Shipyard 
started operations in December 2010 with a new owner, the United Shipbuilding 
Corporation. In 2014, US economic sanctions were imposed on three Russian banks 
and the Russian state-owned company United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC),330 
                                                     
 
328 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2017, op. cit. 
329 Metals and metal products (14.5% share of total exports to Russia in 2019), Machinery and 
equipment (21.1%), Electric and electronics industry products (12.6%) and Transport equipment 
(9.1%), according to the Finnish customs. 
330 US Department of the Treasury, Announcement of Additional Treasury Sanctions on Russian 
Financial Institutions and on a Defense Technology Entity [media release], 29 July 2014, 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2590.aspx, accessed 3 April 2020. 
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which manufactured defence technology. Although the Archtech Shipyard was 
building ships for civil use only, the financing of its operations became difficult 
because of the Russian owner base. Due to the US sanctions, banks do not want to 
be involved with financially sanctioned persons or companies.  
In order to gain a broader perspective of the problems surrounding sanctions, we 
interviewed Maritime Counsellor (the Finnish honorary title of Merenkulkuneuvos) 
Mikko Niini,331 who has 30 years’ experience in the Finnish shipbuilding industry. The 
interview took place at  ETLA Economic Research (ETLA) on 22 November 2019. 
According to Niini, the new Finnish technology made a breakthrough with the help of 
Exxon in 2003 when the first so-called double-acting icebreaker was delivered from 
the shipyard in Helsinki to Sakhalin oil field. Another breakthrough came a few years 
later with Norilsk Nickel, when they ordered six ships with technology developed by 
the Finns. Thanks to these ship orders, the big Russian oil companies became 
convinced about  Finnish technological know-how. In 2013 the international oil 
company Exxon signed a contract with Rosneft concerning seven big production 
projects outside the Siberian coast, but when the western sanctions were imposed the 
projects were cancelled. This also meant that the Finnish companies lost huge 
potential for export deals.   
An open question now is how far the sanction limits go. The gas sector is still free, 
while in the oil sector companies have been seeking limits for what constitutes Arctic 
or deep-water oil drilling. Activities below a water depth of 150 metres are forbidden, 
but it may still be unclear where the limit is exactly. This is the reason why many 
companies do not want to join uncertain projects. According to Niini, the sanctions 
imposed by the EU have been very effective, since the Russians have not been able 
to develop the Arctic offshore at all.  
Sanctions have also changed the business climate insomuch as Russian projects 
have been abandoned by Finnish firms in order to protect other businesses. 
Companies are wary of the indirect effects of the American sanctions, fearful that their 
businesses elsewhere might suffer.  
From the discussion with Mikko Niini, we can conclude that the EU’s financial 
sanctions are milder than the US sanctions. The latter have an impact above all 
through the transfer of payments. Many companies have been affected when banks 
have refused to transfer money. The commercial financing of big projects has all but 
                                                     
 
331 Currently Chairman of the Board, Rauma Marine Constructions Oy (RMC); 2004–2014 
Managing Director, Aker Arctic Technology Inc, Chairman of two working committees of the 
Finnish-Russian Intergovernmental Commission for Economic Cooperation.  
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been blocked. The financing difficulties came about gradually, however. An open 
question remains as to how much business has been left undone due to fear about 
the indirect effects of the US sanctions, namely  problems relating to money transfer.  
The Russian localization requirement, which was set along with the Russian counter-
sanctions, serves to worsen the situation for Finnish exporters. Helsinki Shipyard has, 
with help of new owners,332 received passenger ship orders, but ice-breakers are in 
the sphere of Russia’s localization requirement, however. Mikko Niini pointed out that 
the Russians are keen to buy Finnish technology products, and because of the 
localization requirement, companies have been asked to establish some kind of 
subsidiary in Russia, but for the time being the companies have not been interested in 
investing in production in Russia. We can conclude that as a result of the sanctions, 
great potential for exports has probably been lost.  
9.3 The impact of Russia’s countersanctions 
(import restrictions) on exports from 
Finland and other countries     
The Russian government responded to the sanctions issued by the European Union 
on 1 August 2014 by prohibiting imports of certain agricultural products and foodstuffs 
from the EU, the US, Canada, Australia and Norway, one week later in August 
2014.333 In addition to these countries, the ban also concerns Iceland334 (from August 
2015 onwards), Liechtenstein, Montenegro, Albania and Ukraine.335 The import ban 
covers certain meats, meat products and sub-products, milk and dairy products 
(including cheese), root vegetables, vegetables, fruit and nuts, food products based 
                                                     
 
332 Reuters, ‘Helsinki shipyard says new Russian owners will help secure new orders’, Reuters, 
15 May 2019, https://de.reuters.com/article/us-russia-finland-shipyard-idUSKCN1SL1WY, 
accessed 3 April 2020. 
333 Finnish Government Communications Department, Government to assess effects of 
retaliatory sanctions, [media release], (308/2014), 7 August 2014, 
https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/government-to-assess-effects-of-retaliatory-
sanctions?_101_INSTANCE_YZfcyWxQB2Me_languageId=en_US, accessed 18 March 2020. 
334 Islandsbloggen, Ryssland: Island måste backa för att sanktioner ska slopas [Russia: Iceland 
must back down in order for sanctions to be abolished], 28 August 2015, 
http://www.islandsbloggen.com/2015/08/ryssland-island-maste-backa-for-att.html, accessed 18 
March 2020;  
Islandsbloggen, Island backar inte från EU:s sanktioner mot Ryssland [Iceland not backing away 
from EU sanctions on Russia], 22 May 2016, http://www.islandsbloggen.com/2016/05/island-
backar-inte-fran-eus-sanktioner.html, accessed 18 March 2020. 
335 Islandsbloggen, Ryssland förlänger handelssanktioner mot Island till 2018 [Russia extends 
trade sanctions against Iceland for 2018], 9 July 2017, 
http://www.islandsbloggen.com/2017/07/ryssland-forlanger-handelssanktioner.html, accessed 18 
March 2020. 
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on vegetable oil, as well as fish, shellfish, scallops and other invertebrates. All in all, 
the list of banned products includes 50 different CN classes in the customs statistics. 
The ban was initially set to last for one year only, but it has been prolonged every year 
since then. 
The data in this part consist of 50 customs codes for 176 countries, which during one 
year at least between  2001–2018 exported some goods to Russia that were placed 
on the list of import-restricted goods in 2014. The data were extracted from the 
International Trade Centre’s (ITC) database. Figure 9 shows that exports of counter-
sanctioned (import-restricted from 2014 onwards) goods mirror the shape of the curve 
for total world exports to Russia quite closely. 
In the first section, we will look at the top thirty countries that exported the majority of 
the import-restricted foodstuffs to Russia during 2001–2017. These statistics are 
shown in Table 5. In the second section, we have calculated the share of banned 
foodstuffs as a percentage of the different countries’ total exports to Russia. The 
calculations have been made for all years during the 2001–2018 period, but space 
constraints in Table 6 prevented us from showing the figures for 2001–2006. 
 
Figure 9. World exports of counter-sanctioned goods (import-restricted) to Russia 2001–2018, billion euros 
(International Trade Center). 
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Russia’s import restrictions on foodstuffs and exports of these 
foodstuffs to Russia during 2001–2018 
The fifteen most important countries that exported counter-sanctioned goods to 
Russia during 2001–2017 accounted for 65.9% of all countries’ exports of these 
counter-sanctioned goods to Russia. This is clearly lower than 72.1%, which we 
arrived at when looking at the total world exports of goods to Russia. 
Among the fifteen countries in Table 5 that exported most of the import-restricted 
foodstuffs to Russia during  2001–2017 are eight countries that are also on the list of 
the top 15 countries (Table 1) that are exporting the most goods to Russia overall. 
These countries are Belarus, Turkey, USA, China, Germany, Ukraine, Poland and the 
Netherlands. 
When we look at all thirty countries in Table 5, we can see that fourteen of these are 
subject to Russia’s import restrictions on foodstuffs. Ten are EU countries and the 
other four are USA, Norway, Ukraine and Canada. In total, the top thirty countries 
accounted for 86.6% of the whole world’s exports of import-restricted goods to Russia 
during 2001–2017. 
What kind of import-restricted foodstuffs were exported to Russia the most during 
2001–2018? When we look at our data for the whole world, we find that the Frozen 
meat of bovine animals product group (CN0202) accounted for 11.3% of all counter-
sanctioned exports. Meat of swine (CN0203) had a 9.6% share and Citrus fruit 
(CN0805) a 7.4% share. The top five groups also included Cheese and curd 
(CN0406) with a share of 7.2% and Meat and edible offal of fowls (CN0207) with a 
share of 5.9%. 
As Russia’s imports of foodstuffs are spread over so many countries, we will only look 
at selected countries that may be of interest. Food imports from the United States, for 
example, have clearly been dominated by the Meat and edible offal of fowls product 
group, which has a 54.6% share. The other top groups are Meat of swine (15%), Food 
preparations CN21099098 (8.5%), Other nuts CN0802 (7.5%) and Frozen meat of 
bovine animals (4.3%). 
Germany mainly exports products from the Cheese and curd (27.9%), Meat of swine 
(23%), Food preparations CN21099098 (12.6%), Meat and edible offal of fowls (8.2%) 
and Frozen meat of bovine animals groups (7.7%). 
Food exports from Norway to Russia are concentrated on three product groups, Fresh 
or chilled fish (CN0302) with a share of 52.9%, Frozen fish (CN0303) with a share of 
37.1%, and Fish fillets and other fish meat (CN0304) with a share of 5.7%. 
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Ukraine’s main export groups are Cheese and curd (43.3%), Frozen meat of bovine 
animals (19.8%), Concentrated milk and cream CN0402 (5.1%), Fresh or chilled 
tomatoes CN070200000 (4.4%) and Meat of swine (4%). 
Table 5. Exports of counter-sanctioned (import-restricted) goods (foodstuffs) to Russia 
(International Trade Centre; ETLA’s calculations). 
 
2001–2017 2017 2018 2001–2014 2015–2018  
billion 
euros 
Share, 
% 
billion 
euros 
Share, 
% 
billion 
euros 
on average per year, 
billion euros 
WORLD 171.81  12.08  12.83 9.94 11.37 
Brazil 19.53 11.4 1.22 10.1 0.19 1.14 0.95 
Belarus 12.33 7.2 2.63 21.8 2.54 0.38 2.39 
Turkey 10.51 6.1 0.84 7.0 0.82 0.58 0.81 
USA 9.63 5.6 0.07 0.6 0.02 0.68 0.03 
China 8.84 5.1 0.99 8.2 0.94 0.44 0.91 
Ecuador 8.80 5.1 1.00 8.3 0.97 0.43 0.93 
Germany 6.66 3.9 0.15 1.2 0.04 0.46 0.07 
Norway 6.59 3.8 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.47 0.01 
Ukraine 5.57 3.2 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.39 0.03 
Argentina 5.14 3.0 0.31 2.6 0.43 0.30 0.32 
Poland 4.88 2.8 0.02 0.2 0.01 0.35 0.01 
Spain 3.94 2.3 0.01 0.1 0.00 0.28 0.00 
Netherlands 3.92 2.3 0.03 0.2 0.02 0.27 0.02 
Chile 3.51 2.0 0.44 3.7 0.59 0.16 0.48 
Morocco 3.31 1.9 0.33 2.7 0.29 0.16 0.32 
Denmark 3.08 1.8 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.22 0.00 
Paraguay 3.05 1.8 0.21 1.7 0.37 0.16 0.28 
France 2.86 1.7 0.02 0.2 0.01 0.20 0.01 
Egypt 2.72 1.6 0.34 2.8 0.35 0.13 0.32 
Uzbekistan 2.68 1.6 0.11 0.9 0.14 0.18 0.09 
Canada 2.58 1.5 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.18 0.00 
Azerbaijan 2.38 1.4 0.36 3.0 0.42 0.11 0.31 
Finland 2.33 1.4 0.01 0.0 0.00 0.17 0.00 
Iran 2.16 1.3 0.23 1.9 0.31 0.11 0.23 
Belgium 2.14 1.2 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.15 0.00 
Israel 2.13 1.2 0.21 1.8 0.20 0.11 0.21 
Uruguay 2.02 1.2 0.09 0.7 0.12 0.13 0.09 
South Africa 1.94 1.1 0.19 1.6 0.20 0.10 0.18 
Italy 1.84 1.1 0.01 0.1 0.00 0.13 0.01 
Lithuania 1.68 1.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.12 0.00   86.6   81.5   
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Like Norway, Canada’s food exports to Russia are concentrated on three product 
groups, comprising Meat of swine (70.3%), Crustaceans CN0306 (16.3%) and Frozen 
fish (7.5%). 
Finland has two main product groups, Cheese and curd (41.3%) and Butter CN0405 
(26.6%). Other important groups are Meat of swine (8.5%), Buttermilk, curdled milk and 
cream, yoghurt and kefir CN0403 (4.8%) and Milk and cream, not concentrated CN0401 
(4.4%). 
Germany, Ukraine and Finland together accounted for 39% of exports of Cheese and 
curd from the whole world to Russia. Other countries with a large share of these 
products are the Netherlands, Lithuania and Belarus. Finland’s share was 7%, while 
Belarus had a share of 26%. 
World exports of counter-sanctioned goods to Russia amounted to 171.8 billion euros 
during 2001–2017, a lot more than the total world exports of EU-sanctioned goods, 
the value of which was 21.8 billion euros during the same period. Taken together, 
both kinds of sanctioned goods accounted for 7.8% of the total world exports to 
Russia in 2001–2017. 
We have also calculated the value of exports on average per year for each country 
separately for 2001–2014 before Russia’s import restriction on foodstuffs, and for 
2015–2018 after the restrictions were imposed. During the later period, exports for all 
of the sanctioned countries dropped to zero or very near zero, which was also the 
case for those countries not listed in Table 5. Hence, we can conclude that the import 
restrictions have been highly effective. Germany is the country with the highest export 
value for 2015–2018, namely 0.07 billion euros on average per year. In this context, it 
may be worth pointing out that in the import-restricted product groups there may also 
be some minor products that the restrictions do not concern. 
If we look at the non-sanctioned countries in Table 5, we can see that their exports 
per year on average were substantially higher during 2015–2018 compared to 2001–
2014. Only Brazil, Uzbekistan and Uruguay had a lower export value on average 
during the later period. Belarus did not export any import-restricted foodstuffs during 
2001–2010, which is why the export value is very much higher for the later period. 
An open question remains, however. Did the exports of non-sanctioned countries 
increase because of the sanctions on other countries, or would the increase in their 
exports have been the same even without the import restrictions? The answer 
probably lies somewhere between the two. 
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The share of import-restricted foodstuffs as a percentage of the total 
country exports to Russia 
In order to gain a picture of which countries have suffered the most as a result of 
Russia’s import restrictions,  in this section we have calculated the share of banned 
foodstuffs as a percentage of the different countries’ total exports (all branches) to 
Russia. 
The way we see it, there are three approaches to evaluating the impact of the import 
restrictions on different countries’ exports to Russia, without undertaking any 
statistical analyses. These three approaches involve looking at 1) the country level, 2) 
the branch level or 3) the company level. Opinions may differ on the right way to study 
the impact of import restrictions, to which end, the conclusions may also differ.   
The first approach entails looking at exports of import-restricted goods in relation to a 
country’s total exports from all branches to Russia. Countries with a high share of 
import-restricted goods in relation to their total exports will then show the biggest 
negative impact of sanctions. Countries which have a low share of exports of 
foodstuffs in their total exports will show a lower negative impact, although the share 
of restricted foodstuffs as a percentage of all exports of foodstuffs may be very high. 
When adopting a branch-level approach, a country may show a very high negative 
impact of import restrictions even though the share of exports of foodstuffs is very low 
when examining the country’s exports as a whole. 
Further, from the company-level point of view, the negative impact may be very high, 
even if the country has a very low share of restricted imports in relation to all foodstuff 
exports. 
In this chapter, we have chosen to analyze the data from the country-level perspective 
in order to get a broad picture of the effects of countersanctions. Among the countries 
that have sanctions against Russia, Iceland and Norway have the highest shares of 
import-restricted foodstuffs in relation to total commodity exports to Russia. Iceland’s 
share was already 30% in 2001, increasing to more than 60% in 2004, and to almost 
91% in 2014. The share was still high at 81% in 2015 after restrictions were imposed, 
but in 2016 it dropped to zero. Norway typically had a share between 50 and 70%, but 
in 2006 it was only 42%. In 2015–2018, Norway had a share between 0.5 and 2.8%, 
so it seems that it was still allowed to export some products in the restricted groups to 
Russia. 
Countries with a share of more than 20% in some years at least include Greece, 
Canada, Denmark, Australia and Lithuania. Greece had a share of 15% in 2001, but 
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this dropped to 5% in 2003. In 2004–2008, it was around 15%. In 2010, the share 
rose to 31% and was at its highest at 40% in 2012. Canada had a share ranging 
between 10% in 2003 and almost 30% in 2011. Denmark’s share varied between 12% 
and 29% in 2006. Australia’s share was at its lowest level of 3% in 2005 and 2007, 
and at its highest at 28% in 2011. Lithuania had a share of 11% in 2001–2004, which 
rose to 20% in 2007, and then to 27% in 2013. 
As Table 6 indicates, the countries that have imposed sanctions against Russia 
include seven that had a share of at least 10% in a particular year during 2001–2014, 
namely Spain, Poland, the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, the United States and 
Estonia. Spain had a share of around 16–17% in 2001–2004, which was then 
substantially lower at 9% during the subsequent four years. In 2009, the share rose to 
14%, and reached almost 19% in 2011 and 2010. Poland’s share dropped five years 
in a row from 15% in 2003 to 5% in 2008. Between 2009 and 2014, the share varied 
between 9 and 14%. The Netherlands has had a more steady share, ranging between 
8 and 14%. 
Ireland had a very high share in 2001–2004, rising as high as 23–39%. Since then, its 
share has varied between 8 and 13%, before finally falling to 5% in 2014. Belgium 
had a share between 6 and 9% in 2001–2009, which rose to 11% in 2010, but fell 
after that. The United States shows a diminishing share year after year. Its share was 
highest in 2001 at 20%, but only 5% in 2013 before the import restrictions were 
imposed, and 3% in 2014. During 2001–2013, Estonia had the lowest share of 4% in 
2003, and the highest – 18% – in 2010. In 2014, its share dropped from 12% to 2%. 
The share of counter-sanctioned foodstuffs as a percentage of the total commodity 
exports to Russia for the whole world on average varied between 6.2 and 8.7% during 
2001–2014. Countries with a lower share than the world average in almost every year 
included Ukraine, Finland, France, Germany and Italy. Ukraine’s share was lower than 
the world average, apart from the years 2001, 2003 and 2004. The average for the 
world was around 8% in 2001–2005. Between 2007 and 2014, Ukraine had a share 
ranging between 3 and 5%. 
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Table 6. The share of counter-sanctioned goods (foodstuffs) of total commodity exports to Russia, 
% (International Trade Centre; ETLA’s calculations). 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
WORLD 6.5 6.2 8.7 7.4 6.4 6.8 7.4 7.2 6.5 6.0 6.0 6.4 
Countries with sanctions against Russia 
USA 11.0 12.2 14.2 9.2 8.2 8.0 5.0 3.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.2 
Germany 2.0 2.0 3.2 4.1 2.9 2.5 2.1 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.2 
Norway 65.8 62.1 70.0 65.3 51.3 61.3 66.1 51.4 1.5 0.5 1.3 2.8 
Ukraine 3.1 3.2 5.1 4.4 3.3 4.1 4.6 3.9 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Poland 7.0 5.0 11.0 11.0 8.7 11.9 13.6 9.0 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 
Spain 9.3 8.6 14.1 15.9 18.8 18.5 16.2 9.9 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Netherlands 8.2 8.8 9.1 12.7 11.4 9.8 13.6 8.5 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.6 
Denmark 25.6 21.7 25.5 24.2 22.8 18.5 25.0 11.8 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.1 
France 3.4 3.7 3.6 5.2 4.5 2.7 3.2 2.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Canada 18.5 22.1 14.4 24.2 29.5 28.4 20.8 26.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Finland 4.5 4.4 6.3 6.8 6.1 6.8 6.7 5.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Belgium 7.9 6.2 7.9 10.7 9.1 6.4 7.3 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 
Italy 1.8 1.7 2.0 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.0 1.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Lithuania 20.1 23.1 19.1 21.1 24.7 25.5 26.7 18.0 1.5 0.7 1.0 0.5 
Australia 3.1 24.9 13.6 23.6 27.8 18.6 22.4 15.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Greece 14.7 14.8 19.8 30.6 31.7 39.7 38.9 32.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Ireland 9.8 9.2 7.7 12.9 13.4 7.7 10.8 5.2 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.5 
Iceland 65.2 66.7 82.9 82.6 87.3 86.2 87.0 90.6 81.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Estonia 10.4 7.9 14.6 18.1 7.6 9.7 11.7 2.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 
Countries with no trade sanctions against Russia 
Brazil 49.7 50.6 61.7 48.3 35.2 50.3 56.5 61.1 52.7 44.8 43.0 9.0 
Belarus 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.5 17.9 24.6 28.3 27.5 27.8 24.6 
Turkey 16.3 13.4 30.4 26.9 22.1 19.5 21.0 22.9 31.0 23.6 27.7 22.9 
China 2.6 2.2 2.9 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.8 2.2 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.1 
Ecuador 73.7 72.0 73.9 73.0 73.7 70.9 75.4 78.5 80.8 83.9 86.6 89.1 
Argentina 52.5 47.6 63.5 46.2 40.6 31.1 42.9 49.0 36.8 45.8 51.9 59.5 
Chile 66.4 73.8 67.7 70.6 69.9 70.0 76.2 76.2 77.6 74.8 60.7 66.5 
Morocco 77.8 64.1 64.7 66.7 67.7 63.8 63.6 68.7 73.5 68.3 68.9 62.0 
Paraguay 95.8 77.0 46.9 47.4 38.5 65.0 56.1 49.3 41.1 34.0 37.8 50.3 
Egypt 79.6 79.0 82.5 82.7 85.0 74.6 80.3 80.8 85.0 73.5 77.0 77.5 
Uzbekistan 26.2 18.3 32.5 28.3 19.9 9.4 5.4 3.1 5.8 11.6 11.6 16.0 
Azerbaijan 38.9 50.2 58.6 50.0 43.1 52.9 37.7 56.3 53.3 65.5 66.6 63.8 
Iran 55.1 50.7 71.4 80.0 75.6 66.3 63.6 62.2 73.0 72.5 65.9 69.5 
Israel 17.6 15.2 22.2 25.5 29.6 25.3 23.2 32.2 32.6 28.5 30.0 30.3 
Uruguay 69.6 89.3 82.9 86.9 91.4 79.7 77.9 79.2 78.6 80.4 79.2 80.7 
South Africa 42.6 37.3 45.4 41.4 46.4 31.4 32.6 33.5 37.1 30.5 34.2 29.6 
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Finland had a share lower than the world average during the whole period from 2001 
to 2014, with the exception of 2012 when its share was 6.8%, like the whole world on 
average. Finland had its lowest share, 3.5%, in 2001. In 2002–2003, its share was 
around 6%, and then a little more than 4% in 2004–2008. In 2009–2013, its share was 
more than 6% percent, and was still 5.1% in 2014 when the import restrictions were 
taken into use. 
France had a somewhat larger share than Finland in 2001–2002, but in all other years 
its share was clearly lower than Finland’s. France had a share of around 5% in 2010–
2011, but this had already dropped to around 3% in 2012–2013 before the import 
restrictions were taken into use. Germany had a much lower share of counter-
sanctioned foodstuffs than both Finland and France. Germany’s highest shares were 
in 2001–2002 and in 2010, when it reached 4%. Italy had an even lower share than 
Germany. Italy’s highest shares were in 2001–2003 and in 2010–2012, when it was 
close to 3%. 
Table 6 shows that countries with no trade sanctions against Russia usually had 
higher shares of import- restricted foodstuffs than countries that had imposed 
sanctions against Russia. Ecuador, Chile, Morocco, Paraguay, Egypt, Iran and 
Uruguay had a share above 70% in many years. Furthermore, Brazil, Argentina and 
Azerbaijan had a share above 50% in several years. Turkey, Uzbekistan, Israel and 
South Africa all had shares higher than 20%. This also applies to Belarus from 2014 
onwards. China had a very low share compared to the other countries, at only 2–3%. 
If we look at the most recent years between 2015 and 2018 after the import 
restrictions were taken into use, we can see that Belarus, Turkey, China, Ecuador, 
Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan all had a larger share of import-restricted foodstuffs 
compared to the previous years. 
Our conclusion is that the countries with the smallest shares of import-restricted 
foodstuffs, namely Ukraine, Finland, France, Germany and Italy, are countries which 
have suffered the least from Russia’s import restrictions at the country level. The 
reason for this – in the case of Finland and Germany at least – is that investment 
goods account for the majority of these countries’ exports. 
It would also have been interesting to calculate the share of banned foodstuffs as a 
percentage of the countries’ total exports of foodstuffs to Russia, but for the purposes 
of this study we only collected data on the import- restricted foodstuffs.  
Nor do we have company data for different countries, but if we had chosen the 
company-level approach, the Finnish dairy company Valio Ltd would probably be one 
of the companies in the world most affected by Russia’s import restrictions on 
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foodstuffs. In the next section, we will therefore discuss Russia’s import restrictions 
from the company point of view, using Valio Ltd as an example. 
Business perspective 2: The Finnish dairy industry – Valio Ltd 
Finnish exports of food, beverages and tobacco amounted to 1.42 billion euros in 
2019. The share of these products as a percentage of the total goods exports from 
Finland was 2.2%. 
For many decades, almost one-third of Finland’s food industry exports (including 
beverages and tobacco) were directed to Russia, one-fifth to Sweden, and almost 
one-tenth to Estonia. Russia, France and Germany constitute the largest markets for 
foodstuffs in Europe. 
In 2018, a few years after Russia’s counter-sanctions were imposed, Sweden was 
Finland’s most important country for food industry exports with its 24% share,336 while 
Estonia was the second most important country with a share of 9.3%. Russia’s share 
of the food industry’s exports was 7.4%. In 2019, Russia’s share of the exports stood 
at 7%. 
In 2013, before Russia’s import restrictions were imposed, the share of dairy product 
exports as a percentage of Finland’s total food industry exports to the whole world 
was 37%. In 2014, this share had already declined to 34%, and in 2015 to 31%. By 
2016, it was down to 29%, while in 2017–2019 it stood at 30%. 
The share of dairy products and cheese as a percentage of Finland’s food industry 
exports to Russia was 60%  in 2013, and 53% in 2014. In 2015, the share decreased 
to 0.8%, dropping even further in 2016 to 0.1%. In 2017 and 2018, it rose to 0.6% and 
1.1% respectively. As these figures show, the Russian import restrictions have hit the 
Finnish dairy industry particularly hard.  
In practice, it is one company – Valio Ltd – which has been hit. More than 90% of 
Finnish dairy produce exports are products from Valio, and the company has been 
exporting dairy produce to Russia since the 1950s. For this reason, we chose to 
conduct an interview with a representative of the company, Riitta Brandt, Senior Vice 
President, Food and Trade Policy, which took place on 3 January 2020 at Valio. 
Although some sort of policy response to the EU’s sanctions was expected, the actual 
content of Russia’s counter-sanctions came as a surprise to Valio. This hit home on 7 
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August 2014 when only two out of a total of 16 Valio trucks filled with dairy products 
were allowed to continue to Russia at the Nuijamaa border- crossing point. At the 
time, there were 1.6 million kilograms of Oltermanni cheese with Russian labelling in 
storage, intended for the Russian market. They were duly sold at a knock-down price 
in Finland, with special permission from the authorities. 
The importance of the Russian market to Valio was substantial. Of the 1,929 million 
litres of milk337 received from producers in 2014, exports to Russia were equivalent to 
400 million litres (300m litres of milk in the form of cheese and 100m litres as butter 
and spreadable milk fat). As a result, any instant adjustment to the new market 
situation was difficult, as a Russian market no longer existed for most of the dairy 
products. Only ice-cream, infant formula and lactose-free milk were permitted for 
export. The adjustment was complicated due to the fact that Valio’s exports to Russia 
consisted of fresh products which, by definition, could not be stored. The only 
alternatives available to Valio were to immediately find new markets for these 
products, which was practically impossible, or to dry the milk to extend its shelf life. 
Fortunately, at that time there was enough capacity to dry the milk in Lapinlahti, 
Seinäjoki and Joensuu. 
As a direct consequence of Russia’s counter-sanctions, Valio’s milk processing plant 
in Tampere had to shut down in autumn 2014. The plant in Haapavesi, which 
specialized in cheese products, was set to continue with  reduced capacity. 
Production at the Riihimäki plant, still under construction at that time, had to be 
redesigned as the capacity was of the wrong kind. As a consequence, co-
determination talks to reduce and reorganize the staff soon ensued at Valio. The 
negotiations concerned the whole personnel, even those at head office, but the 
situation was worse for employees in Tampere and Haapavesi. Cutbacks were also 
made at the company’s small Russian subsidiary. 
Valio’s parent company in Finland employed 3,734 persons on average in 2014, and 
3,437 in 2015, so the reduction in personnel due to the counter-sanctions was around 
300 employees.338 Globally, Valio employed around 4,662 persons in 2014, and 4,272 
in 2015, namely 390 less than in the previous year.339 
Valio was nonetheless able to process all the milk that they received from producers 
in Finland into fat-free powdered milk (industrial powder) and butter, which was 
                                                     
 
337 Valio, Yritysvastuuraportti 2014 [sustainability report 2014], 
https://www.valio.fi/vastuullisuus/raportit/, accessed 27 April 2020. 
338 Valio, Yritysvastuuraportti 2015 [sustainability report 2015], 
https://www.valio.fi/vastuullisuus/raportit/, accessed 27 April 2020. 
339 Valio, Board of Directors’ Report and Financial Statements 1 Jan.-31 Dec. 2017, 
https://www.valio.fi/vastuullisuus/raportit/, accessed 27 April 2020. 
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exported to several countries at world market prices. Milk producers’ revenues 
declined, but not as much as Valio’s revenues, measured in cents per litre. In 2013 
before the countersanctions the turnover of the company’s subsidiary in Russia was 
almost 400 million euros,340 while today the turnover is around 100 million euros. 
Riitta Brandt also pointed out that it is difficult to find markets for Finnish fresh milk, as 
it cannot be exported long distances. In many European countries, Ultra High 
Temperature milk is the most common form as it can be stored for a long time. 
According to ETLA’s calculations, the Finnish food industry lost export revenues 
totalling about one billion euros between 2015 and 2018 due to the Russian import 
restrictions. 
9.4 Macroeconomic effects of the US 
sanctions on Russia 
Since 2012, the United States has imposed more than 70 rounds of sanctions on 
Russian individuals, companies, and government agencies spanning nine issue 
areas, as calculated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.341 The 
sanctions have been imposed in response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, 
election interference, other malicious cyber-enabled activities, human rights abuses, 
use of a chemical weapon, weapons proliferation, illicit trade with North Korea, and 
support for Syria and Venezuela. The sanctions include blocking of assets subject to 
US jurisdiction; limits on access to the US financial system, including limiting or 
prohibiting transactions involving US individuals and businesses; and denial of entry 
into the United States. The United States also tightly controls exports to Russia’s 
energy and defence sectors, as described by Rennack and Welt.342 
To date, the United States has imposed Ukraine-related sanctions on more than 665 
persons, according to Rennack and Welt.343 The basis for these sanctions is a series 
of executive orders that were issued in 2014 and codified by the Countering Russian 
Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017. Newling and Mankoff note that more 
recent sanctions, including the 2017 Countering American Adversaries Through 
                                                     
 
340 Valio, Yritysvastuuraportti 2013 [sustainability report 2013], 
https://www.valio.fi/vastuullisuus/raportit/, accessed 27 April 2020. 
341 CSIS, ‘Russian sanctions tracker’, CSIS, https://russiasanctionstracker.csis.org/#database, 
accessed 30 April 2020.  
342 Rennack, D.E. & Welt, C., ‘U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview’, CRS In Focus, 23 March 
2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10779.pdf, accessed 15 April 2020. 
343 ibid. 
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Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and the April 6, 2018, “oligarch sanctions”, are less related 
to specific policy objectives compared to previous sanctions. For instance, CAATSA 
covers broad issue areas, ranging from corruption and cyber-enabled activities to the 
privatization of state-owned companies by government officials and arms transfers to 
Syria. Similarly, the April 6, 2018 “oligarch sanctions” have a broad mandate: to 
prevent oligarchs from profiting from a “corrupt system” and to confront “a pattern of 
malign activity around the globe”, as stated by Newlin and Mankoff.344 Most of the 
sanctions in relation to the 2014 Ukraine crisis were closely coordinated and 
simultaneously adopted by the US and the EU. 
This raises the question of whether the US sanctions are working. What are the 
economic consequences of the sanctions for the Russian economy, for instance? 
Even though the question cannot be answered precisely, the Russian macrodata 
provide some indications that the sanctions have affected the Russian economy to 
some extent, if not otherwise at least indirectly by causing uncertainty and volatility in 
the financial markets. 
The economic implications of the US sanctions for Russia 
The Russian economy has performed rather poorly since the annexation of Crimea. 
GDP fell by 0.2% in 2014 and 2.3% in 2015. Since then, the economy has recovered, 
albeit at a slow pace. Yet it is difficult to distinguish the effects of different factors on 
the performance. The oil price development, still the most important single factor 
when determining Russian GDP growth, has admittedly played the biggest role (see 
Figure 10). The decline in the oil price was followed by a devaluation of the rouble and 
hikes in the central bank’s policy rates, which aggravated economic performance. The 
sanctions imposed by the EU have, for their part, played a role in this development. It 
is, however, possible to associate, at least to some extent, changes in the US 
sanction policies with developments in the Russian financial markets, as well as 
specific commodity prices. 
While more than 70 rounds of sanctions have been implemented by the US 
government altogether, we have concentrated on 2017–2019 and restricted the 
analysis to US sanctions with a broad mandate, spanning broad issue areas. To 
understand their possible impact on uncertainty, Figure 11 shows the Russian market 
volatility index together with the announcements concerning “CAATSA” and “oligarch 
sanctions” made after 2017 (the content of which was described above). 
                                                     
 
344 Newlin, C. & Mankoff, J., ‘U.S. Sanctions against Russia: What You Need to Know’, CSIS 
Critical questions, October 31, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-sanctions-against-russia-
what-you-need-know, accessed 12 March 2020. 
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The April 6 oligarch sanctions can clearly be associated with a surge in volatility in the 
Russian stock market. Their effect can also be seen in a sharp devaluation of the 
rouble/USD exchange rate (Figure 12) and a significant fall in the Russian stock 
market index (MOEX) (Figure 13). Yet their most striking effect can be observed in the 
price of aluminium, depicted in Figure14. The reason for this dramatic development 
was the inclusion of Oleg Deripaska – the main shareholder of United Company 
Rusal, the second-largest aluminium company in the world – in the US sanctions list. 
Mr Deripaska subsequently made a deal with the US Treasury and reduced his 
ownership in order to get US sanctions removed from the company. 
Figure 10. GDP of Russia (constant, trillion roubles) and oil price (Brent, dollars) (Macrobond). 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
19
19,5
20
20,5
21
21,5
22
22,5
23
1.
1.
20
11
1.
5.
20
11
1.
9.
20
11
1.
1.
20
12
1.
5.
20
12
1.
9.
20
12
1.
1.
20
13
1.
5.
20
13
1.
9.
20
13
1.
1.
20
14
1.
5.
20
14
1.
9.
20
14
1.
1.
20
15
1.
5.
20
15
1.
9.
20
15
1.
1.
20
16
1.
5.
20
16
1.
9.
20
16
1.
1.
20
17
1.
5.
20
17
1.
9.
20
17
1.
1.
20
18
1.
5.
20
18
1.
9.
20
18
1.
1.
20
19
Russia, Gross Domestic Product, Total (National), Constant Prices, SA, trillion RUB (left
axis)
Oil (Brent) price, dollars per barrel (right axis)
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2020:31 
 
152 
 
 
Figure 11.  Russian market volatility index, the “CAATSA” and “oligarch sanctions” announcements, 2017–
2019 (Macrobond). 
Figure 12.  Rouble per USD Exchange rate, the “CAATSA” and “oligarch sanctions” announcements, 2017–
2018 (Macrobond). 
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Figure 13. MOEX Russia (equity) index (trillion roubles), the “CAATSA” and “oligarch sanctions” 
announcements, 2017–2018 (Macrobond). 
Figure 14. World price of aluminium, USD, 2017–2018 (Macrobond). 
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The effects of the CAATSA announcements, on the other hand, are more difficult to 
pin down from daily financial market data. The November 8, 2018 and December 19, 
2018 CAATSA sanction announcements are to some extent associated with rising 
volatility in the stock markets and declines in the MOEX index. However, other factors 
have probably played a role here, too. Moreover, the announcement of the December 
19, 2018 CAATSA sanctions correlates with the rouble’s devaluation vis-à-vis the US 
dollar, and that of the March 15, 2018 CAATSA sanctions with a decline in the MOEX 
index. Instead, the August 2, 2017 CAATSA announcement is negligibly connected 
with Russian stock markets and exchange rate developments. 
Changes in policy-related economic uncertainty for Russia can also be quantified 
using some novel methods. Baker, Bloom and Davis for example, constructed an 
index based on frequency counts of newspaper articles. In terms of data, they used 
Kommersant, a nationally distributed daily paper focused primarily on economics and 
politics. The index counts the number of newspaper articles containing the terms 
“uncertain” or “uncertainty”, “economic” or “economy”, and one or more policy terms. 
In their time series, frequency is scaled to count by the total number of articles in the 
same newspaper and month. They chose policy terms in the index including the 
Russian language equivalents of “policy”, “tax”, “spending”, “regulation”, “central 
bank”, “law”, terms relating to political institutions like the Duma, and “budget”, among 
others. Lastly, they normalized the Russian index of economic policy uncertainty to a 
mean value of 100 prior to 2012.345 
                                                     
 
345 Baker, S.R., Bloom, N. & Davis, S.J., ‘Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty’, NBER 
Working Paper, no. 21633, 2015, https://www.nber.org/papers/w21633.pdf, accessed 12 March 
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Figure 15 Policy-related economic uncertainty in Russia, 2012–2019 (Baker et al. 2015; Macrobond). 
Figure 16. Policy-related economic uncertainty in Russia, 6-month moving average, 2012–2019 (Baker et al. 
2015; Macrobond). 
Figures 15 and 16 show that policy-related economic uncertainty increased somewhat 
in Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the rise in policy tensions with 
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the West. Nevertheless, the time series depicts a volatile picture of economic policy 
uncertainty in Russia with changes in the time series probably reflecting multiple 
factors, most of which were most likely related to domestic economic policy news. Yet 
it is possible to observe a trend-like increase in uncertainty, firstly in the years 
between 2012 and 2014 and then later, between the second half of 2017 and 2019. 
Another observation is an increase in the volatility of the time series in time. 
Concluding remarks 
As mentioned above, we have not attempted to analyze the impact of all of the US 
government executive orders concerning Russia in this brief section. The impact of all 
of these would be hard to pin down from the data due to their high frequency, 
especially after 2017. This analysis nonetheless provides evidence that  particular US 
sanctions have indirectly affected the Russian economy via increasing uncertainty 
and volatility in the financial and commodity markets.  
Earlier research by Baker et al. assessed the effects of uncertainty and found that 
elevated policy uncertainty in the United States and Europe has had materially 
harmful effects on their macroeconomic performance, reflected in variables such as 
employment growth, aggregate investment, output and employment.346 Hence, it is 
highly likely that increases in uncertainty concerning the Russian economy caused by 
the US sanctions have somewhat lowered aggregate investments in Russia as well, 
the effects of which have been reflected in a (slightly) lower GDP growth rate. The 
magnitude of these effects is, however, more likely to be moderate, implying that the 
slow growth rate of Russia’s GDP is to a great extent explained by oil price 
development and structural weaknesses in the economy. Yet the structural problems 
are more difficult to tackle with fewer Western direct investments and imports in the 
key areas of Russia’s economy. 
9.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has analyzed export statistics that cover the whole world, and on the 
basis of these data we can conclude that during 2001–2017 the fifteen most important 
exporting countries accounted for 72.1% of the total exports of goods to Russia. 
When looking at exports of EU-sanctioned goods (product groups CN73, CN82-87), 
the fifteen most important exporters accounted for as much as 91.3% of the total 
exports of sanctioned goods from the whole world to Russia. The EU’s trade 
                                                     
 
346 ibid. 
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2020:31 
 
157 
 
 
sanctions against Russia came into force on 1 August, 2014. For exports of counter-
sanctioned goods (import-restricted foodstuffs by Russia), the corresponding figure 
was only 65.9%. From this, we can conclude that exports of EU-sanctioned goods, 
which are usually investment goods, are more concentrated on a few exporting 
countries, compared to exports of counter-sanctioned goods, which are consumer 
goods (foodstuffs). The most important exporters of goods banned by the EU were 
Ukraine, China, South Korea, Germany and the United States. Finland was the ninth 
most important exporting country. Almost half of the top countries were EU countries. 
The top five countries exporting import-restricted foodstuffs to Russia were Brazil, 
Belarus, Turkey, the United States and China. 
The total exports of all goods from the whole world to Russia were higher on average 
during 2015–2018 compared to 2001–2014, which is understandable while the whole 
world trade increased simultaneously. When looking at the top 15 exporting countries, 
exports from Ukraine, Japan, the United Kingdom and Finland were, however, lower 
on average per year during the later time period.  
When it comes to EU-sanctioned goods, the value of exports to Russia was lower on 
average during 2015–2017 for the whole world compared to 2001–2014. This can be 
explained by the fact that number of the major exporting countries were subject to the 
EU’s trade sanctions. The non-sanctioned countries – China, South Korea and 
Belarus – also had lower exports on average per year in the later period. The reason 
for this is most likely the fact that many investment projects cannot be fulfilled without 
the necessary goods and services from Western countries, as a result of which the 
demand from non-sanctioned countries will also decrease. 
World exports of counter-sanctioned goods to Russia amounted to 171.8 billion euros 
during 2001–2017, much more than the total world exports of EU-sanctioned goods, 
the value of which was 21.8 billion euros during the same period. Taken together, 
both kinds of sanctioned goods accounted for 7.8% of the total world exports to 
Russia in 2001–2017. Finland exported EU-banned products to Russia during this 
time period at a value of 0.57 billion euros and import-restricted foodstuffs at a value 
of 2.3 billion euros. 
During 2015–2018, after Russia’s import restrictions on foodstuffs were imposed, the 
average value of exports per year dropped to zero or almost zero for all sanctioned 
countries. Hence, we can conclude that the import restrictions were highly effective.  
We also studied the share of EU-sanctioned goods as a percentage of different 
countries’ total exports of goods to Russia. When it comes to the whole world, the 
share of sanctioned products as a percentage of the total exports of goods to Russia 
decreased after 2014 due to the trade sanctions. The share varied on average 
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between 0.57 and 1.64% during 2001–2014, and decreased to 0.36% in 2017. 
Finland’s share was clearly lower in 2016–2017 compared to the previous years. In 
2010–2011, there were exceptionally large deliveries at a value of 0.2 billion euros. In 
relation to Finland’s total exports of goods to Russia, this accounted for a share of 
6.6% in 2010, when the corresponding share for the whole world was only 1%. In the 
other years before the sanctions, Finland’s percentage share was substantially 
smaller than the average share of the whole world, and after they were imposed 
Finland’s share dropped less than in other countries that have sanctions against 
Russia. We therefore draw the conclusion that Finland has suffered less from the EU 
trade sanctions than the rest of the world on average.  
It seems that the EU trade sanctions, which several other Western countries also 
joined, would have had the greatest impact on the economies of Ukraine, the United 
States, Japan, France, Australia and Latvia. It is  very difficult, however, to gain a 
complete picture of the effects of the trade sanctions because export contracts that 
were made before 1 August 2014, when sanctions took effect, are still in force. In 
addition, the banned product groups include certain deliveries that can still be 
exported to Russia despite the sanctions. No arms and ammunition (CN93) were 
exported from Finland to Russia during 2015–2017, however. 
The share of counter-sanctioned foodstuffs as a percentage of the total commodity 
exports to Russia varied on average for the whole world between 6.2 and 8.7% during 
2001–2014. Among the countries that have sanctions against Russia, the share was 
almost zero in 2015–2018. It seems, however, that it is still permitted to export some 
products in the restricted groups to Russia. 
Iceland and Norway had the highest shares of import-restricted foodstuffs in relation 
to their total commodity exports to Russia. Iceland’s share was already more than 
60% in 2004, increasing to almost 91% in 2014. Norway typically had a share ranging 
between 50 and 70%. Countries with a share of more than 20% in at least one year 
included Greece, Canada, Denmark, Australia and Lithuania. Countries that had a 
share of at least 10% at some point during 2001–2014 included Spain, Poland, the 
Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, the United States and Estonia. The United States 
showed a diminishing share year after year, amounting to only 5% in 2013 and 3% in 
2014.  
Countries with a lower share than the world average in almost every year comprised 
Ukraine, Finland, France, Germany and Italy. Finland had a share lower than the 
world average during the whole period from 2001 to 2014, with the exception of 2012 
when its share was 6.8%, like the whole world on average. Germany had a much 
lower share of counter-sanctioned foodstuffs than both Finland and France, while Italy 
had an even lower share than Germany.  
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Countries with no trade sanctions against Russia usually had higher shares of import-
restricted foodstuffs than countries that implemented sanctions. Ecuador, Chile, 
Morocco, Paraguay, Egypt, Iran and Uruguay had a share above 70% in many years. 
Furthermore, Brazil, Argentina and Azerbaijan had a share above 50% in several 
years. China had a very low share compared to the other countries, only 2–3%. If we 
look at the latest years since the import restrictions were taken into use, between 
2015 and 2018, we can see that Belarus, Turkey, China, Ecuador, Uzbekistan and 
Azerbaijan had a bigger share of import-restricted foodstuffs compared to the earlier 
years. 
We conclude that the countries with the smallest shares of import-restricted 
foodstuffs, namely Ukraine, Finland, France, Germany and Italy, are the countries that 
have suffered the least from Russia’s import restrictions at the country level. In the 
case of Finland and Germany at least, this is explained by the fact that the majority of 
these countries’ exports are investment goods. 
The effect of both EU sanctions and Russia’s counter-sanctions is that companies in 
specific sectors have lost considerable export potential, and export revenues as a 
consequence. Those companies that have sold the most products to Russia have 
suffered the most. For some companies, for example in the dairy industry, it may be 
almost impossible to find replacement markets and, even if possible, it may take a 
very long time. From a political point of view, the EU sanctions have been highly 
effective as they have halted the development of Russia’s oil sources in the north for 
at least ten years ahead, according to experts in the Finnish maritime industry. From 
the perspective of some EU companies, however, the US sanctions are more harmful 
than the EU’s financial sanctions because the former affect the financial markets to a 
greater extent and make it more difficult to acquire financing and transfer money. In 
addition to the sanctions, Russia’s localization requirement will have a negative effect 
on other countries as it diminishes their export possibilities. 
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IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
10 EU sanctions – political 
implications for Finland 
Matti Pesu 
Summary 
• The EU’s restrictive measures placed the sanctions instrument at the core of 
Finnish foreign policy interests. The Russia sanctions “politicized” a tool that 
had previously been of limited significance to Finnish foreign affairs.  
• A brief period of adaptation took place in the Finnish approach to Russia 
sanctions before a domestic consensus emerged to support Finland’s policy 
vis-à-vis the restrictive measures.  
• The future salience of the EU’s sanctions instrument for Finnish foreign policy 
hinges on the development of the CFSP. Moreover, the possible political 
implications of sanctions hinge on the scope of the sanctions as well as on the 
target state.  
 
Recommendations 
• Finland should prepare for an era in which the principles of geo-economics 
prevail over the idea of positive economic interdependence between states. To 
this end, Finland should enhance its national capacity to understand the very 
principles of international political economy, including sanctions.  
• Finland should increasingly rely on the EU in seeking a “shelter” against geo-
economic threats, by supporting the progress towards more efficient EU 
decision-making, for example. 
• Finland would benefit from close EU-UK sanctions coordination. It should lend 
its support to the emergence of a functional mechanism between the parties.  
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10.1 Finland and international sanctions: a 
brief historical overview 
One of the constants of Finland’s sanctions policy is the fact that Finland is a small 
power with a relatively small economy. As a result, it has limited influence in 
international politics. Finland, like other small states, can only practise a meaningful 
and effective sanctions policy as part of a larger multilateral effort, since it is simply 
not powerful enough to conduct independent economic statecraft.347 This is the reality 
irrespective of the ongoing era.  
The size of the economy is not the only relevant factor that affects Finland’s general 
approach to sanctions. The prevailing political orientation and strategic culture also 
matter, which is clearly visible in the history of Finland’s approach to international 
sanctions. During the Cold War when Finland pursued a policy of neutrality, the 
country largely refrained from participation in sanctions. There were nonetheless a 
few exceptions. For example, Finland – following its obligations as a UN member – 
was involved in the sanctions regime targeted against South Rhodesia in 1965–1979. 
Interestingly, South Africa’s apartheid policy again struck a chord among Finnish civil 
society. Finland had followed the UN arms embargo since 1977. However, in 1985 the 
Transport Workers’ Union imposed a unilateral embargo against South Africa. The 
Union was able to control Finnish seaports, which significantly limited Finnish trade 
with South Africa. In 1987, following fellow Nordic states and domestic pressure, the 
Finnish parliament enacted a law prohibiting trade between Finland and South Africa. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Finland’s involvement in sanctions grew as the UN 
increasingly decided on restrictive measures, and it took part in the sanctions against 
Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Libya, Haiti, and Sudan.348 
The end of the Cold War and Finland’s subsequent membership of the EU changed 
both the international environment and, eventually, the Finnish approach to sanctions. 
Finland joined the EU without any demands for a special status in terms of its foreign 
and defence policy. Rather, it began to reconcile its own foreign policy with the 
emerging and slowly developing CFSP. There were certain reservations regarding the 
future direction of the EU foreign policy, however. Even some of the most vocal 
advocates of Finnish membership were of the opinion that sanctions against Russia 
                                                     
 
347 Koskenniemi, M., Kansainväliset pakotteet ja Suomi [Finland and international sanctions], 
Lakimiesliiton kustannuksia, Helsinki, 1994, p. 11.  
348 See ibid. 
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would have been a bridge too far for Finland.349 History proved these assertions 
wrong.   
As Finland’s foreign policy gradually “Europeanized”, its interpretation of sanctions 
became more positive.350 Neutrality no longer determined the Finnish policy towards 
world politics in general and international conflicts in particular. Finland was willing to 
consider a broader array of tools and did not refrain from voicing its opinion on 
international conflicts. The government’s security and defence reports (1995, 1997, 
2001 and 2004) did not address Finland’s approach to sanctions in detail. However, in 
the 2012 report, the government defined its approach to sanctions in the following 
fashion: 
“International sanctions are an important element of the comprehensive 
approach in conflict prevention and management. Finland actively participates in 
the development of the international sanctions regime by emphasising the role 
of the Security Council as the originator of decisions that are binding to all 
Member States. Sanctions also comprise a key feature in the EU’s range of 
instruments. The wider the international support, the more effective the sanction 
regimes. Finland regards it important that sanctions be as accurately targeted as 
possible, and that the negative impacts on those not concerned be minimised 
and that the targets of sanctions retain the due protection of law.”351 
The EU’s sanctions policy remained a rather uncontroversial issue until the Russian 
aggression in Ukraine in 2014. The evolution of the EU’s sanctions practice in the 
1990s and early 2000s (see chapter 1) did not cause a notable debate in Finland.  
Helsinki’s general approach to the CFSP has been positive, but it has been 
characterized by ebb and flow between periods of activity and inactivity. Throughout 
this time, Finland has not dedicated considerable time or resources to shaping the 
                                                     
 
349 Pesu, M., ‘Kun pienvaltiorealismin hegemonia murtui: suomalaiset ulkopoliittiset koulukunnat 
kylmän sodan jälkeisen ajan alussa’ [’When the hegemony of small-state realism broke down: 
Finnish foreign policy schools at the beginning of the post-Cold War period’], Politiikka, vol. 59, 
no. 4, 2017, pp. 280-297. 
350 On Europeanization, see Jokela J., Europeanization and Foreign Policy: State Identity in 
Finland and Britain, Routledge, London & New York, 2011; Haukkala, H. & Ojanen, H., ‘The 
Europeanization of Finnish foreign policy: Pendulum swings in slow motion’, in R. Wong & C. Hill 
eds., National and European Foreign Policies: Towards Europeanization, Routledge, London & 
New York, 2011.  
351 Prime Minister’s Office Publications, Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012, no. 1, 2013, 
https://vnk.fi/documents/10616/1093242/J0113_FinnishSecurity_net.pdf/f7d0b3db-f566-4d32-
af19-68a7064e24ee/J0113_FinnishSecurity_net.pdf?version=1.0, p. 83, accessed on 18 
November 2019.   
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EU’s sanctions policy.352 Instead, Finland has been more active in shaping the 
Common Security and Defence Policy.  
10.2 Finland and the EU’s restrictive measures 
against Russia  
2014 heralded a formative period for Finnish foreign policy. The Russian aggression 
in Ukraine disillusioned Finnish policy-makers as Moscow demonstrated its 
willingness to use military force to achieve political aims. Unsurprisingly, Russia’s 
actions caused apprehension in Finland, although there was a strong sentiment that 
Ukraine’s situation was not comparable to Finland’s own position. Finland was an EU 
member possessed of a resilient society with high societal cohesion. However, given 
Finland’s vulnerable geopolitical position “in the armpit of Russia”, it was not ready to 
tolerate any violation of territorial integrity or blatant breach of international law.  
Therefore, on 2 March 2014, the President of the Republic and Cabinet Committee on 
Foreign and Security Policy, Sauli Niinistö, condemned Russia’s measures in 
Crimea.353 A week later, Finland announced that it would follow the EU’s common 
positions on the matter.354 Prime Minister Alexander Stubb defined Finland’s position 
on the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia in Berlin in September 2014. 
According to Stubb: 
“[Economic sanctions] need time to show their true strength. Patience is one of 
the greatest virtues in international politics. Since negotiations have not yet 
succeeded in opening the tightest knots of the crisis, we have had to look for 
other means. With sanctions, we have done exactly the right thing. It is very 
important to remember that this is not a trade war. Russia has violated the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. We have countered this with well-
                                                     
 
352 Ojanen, H. & Raik, K., ‘Ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikka: pinnallista jatkuvuutta ja pyörteisiä 
pohjavirtauksia’ [‘Foreign and security policy: superficial continuity and turbulent undercurrents’], 
in Raunio, T. & Saari, J. eds., Reunalla vai ytimessä? Suomen EU-politiikan muutos ja jatkuvuus 
[On the edge or in the core? Change and continuity in Finland’s EU policy], 
Eurooppatiedotus/Gaudeamus, Helsinki, 2017.  
353 President of the Republic of Finland, President of the Republic and Cabinet Committee on 
Foreign and Security Policy discussed the situation in Ukraine [media release], 2 March 2014, 
https://www.presidentti.fi/en/news/president-of-the-republic-and-cabinet-committee-on-foreign-
and-security-policy-discussed-the-situation-in-ukraine/, accessed 18 November 2019.  
354 President of the Republic of Finland, President of the Republic and Cabinet Committee on 
Foreign and Security Policy discussed situation in Ukraine and report on Security in Society 
2013 [media release], 11 March 2014, https://www.presidentti.fi/en/news/president-of-the-
republic-and-cabinet-committee-on-foreign-and-security-policy-discussed-situation-in-ukraine-
and-report-on-security-in-society-2013/, Accessed on 18 November 2019. 
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planned, well-timed, well-targeted economic sanctions. Any further sanctions – 
or repealing the existing ones – will only be based on Russia’s actions on the 
ground, not on any economic counter-measures they might impose on us.”355 
As to the more specific Finnish objectives regarding the direction and details of the 
EU’s nascent policy, very few goals were touched upon publicly. In July 2014, Stubb 
urged that cross-border cooperation should be excluded from the sanctions.356 
Finnish regions had established fruitful cooperation with their Russian counterparts, 
and Helsinki saw that it made no sense to complicate such collaboration – particularly 
when any suspension of cross-border activities would not have a significant effect on 
the Kremlin. Two months later, when the Union was about to impose a new round of 
sanctions, he again insisted that European subsidiaries of Russian companies should 
be excluded from the sanctions, which obviously reflected Finnish economic 
concerns.357 Moreover, Finnish officials made a number of calculations of the potential 
effects that the measures might have on the Finnish economy. The goal was to keep 
commercially important sectors off the sanctions lists. 
There was surprisingly little domestic disagreement over the utility of the sanctions 
policy per se in Finland. Rather, Finland supported the measures from the outset. 
However, some domestic arm-wrestling reportedly took place regarding the details of 
the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia, which was also noted by the 
international media. Moreover, Finland has also made its own interpretations 
regarding certain aspects of the EU’s measures, most notably on bilateral summits 
with Russia.  
A leak from the Prime Minister’s Office in 2015 suggested that Finland’s Foreign 
Minister, Erkki Tuomioja, had allegedly tried to remove Dmitry Kiselyov, the head of 
the Rossiya Segodnya news agency, from the list of Russian and Crimean officials 
subject to EU travel bans and asset freezes ahead of March 20, 2014. This irritated 
some of Tuomioja’s coalition partners, particularly his colleagues from the National 
Coalition Party, who were of the opinion that Finland should use its limited political 
capital in the negotiations regarding the planned economic measures against Russia. 
                                                     
 
355 Stubb, A., ‘European policy towards Russia’, Speech at the Körber-Stiftung in Berlin, 29 
September 2014, https://www.eilen.fi/fi/3247/?language=en, accessed 19 November 2019. 
356 Aro, J., ‘Pääministeri Stubb EU-huippukokouksesta: Rajayhteistyötä Venäjän kanssa ei 
jäädytetä’ [‘Prime Minister Stubb on the EU summit: Cross-border cooperation with Russia will 
not be frozen’], Yle Uutiset, 17 July 2014, https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-7360642, accessed 19 
November 2019.    
357 Stenroos, M., ‘EU:n uudet Venäjä-pakotteet “Suomelle ongelmattomat”’ [‘The EU’s new 
sanctions on Russia “problem-free for Finland”’], Yle Uutiset, 3 September 2014, 
https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-7449180, accessed 19 November 2019. 
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The international press also took note of Tuomioja’s efforts.358 Eventually, Kiselyov 
remained on the list, however.  
In the summer of 2014, President Sauli Niinistö made the boldest move in the recent 
history of Finnish foreign policy. He announced that he would meet Russian President 
Vladimir Putin in Sochi in August 2014. The carefully considered decision was not in 
line with the EU’s decision to refrain from bilateral summits with Russia. However, 
earlier in the spring, Finland had already highlighted that it would continue necessary 
measures to maintain bilateral ties. Finland nevertheless wanted to avoid giving the 
impression that it wished to somehow re-establish a special relationship with Russia. 
Rather, statements were issued to stress Helsinki’s firm commitment to the EU’s 
policy. Moreover, after the Sochi visit, Niinistö travelled to Ukraine to meet President 
Petro Poroshenko. Subsequent phone calls with the leaders of the EU institutions – 
President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso and President of the 
European Council Herman van Rompuy – complemented the Finnish diplomatic 
activity around the Ukraine crisis.359 The meeting did raise eyebrows in some 
countries, however, most notably in the Baltic states.360 In bigger European capitals 
and in Brussels, there was more understanding towards Finland’s interests. Very few 
EU members had equally intense bilateral ties with Russia.  
Another issue that attracted domestic and international attention was Finland’s 
insistence on delaying the imposition of further sanctions targeting Russian energy 
companies in September 2014. Finland’s alleged obstruction came as a surprise to 
some member states. Prime Minister Stubb highlighted that Finland was not opposing 
sanctions but doubting the timing of the measures.361 Before imposing new sanctions, 
Helsinki wanted  to see whether the nascent ceasefire would hold. Some politicians 
even saw the insistence of a postponement as a national foreign policy priority.362 
                                                     
 
358 Simula, M., ‘Tietovuoto: Kokoomuslaiset halusivat vaientaa Tuomiojan’ [‘Information leak: 
National Coalition Party wanted to silence Tuomioja’], Suomen Kuvalehti, 15 April 2015, 
https://suomenkuvalehti.fi/jutut/kotimaa/tietovuoto-kokoomuslaiset-halusivat-vaientaa-tuomiojan/, 
accessed 18 March 2020. 
359 Nurmi, L. & Mörttinen, M., Sauli Niinistö: Mäntyniemen herra, Into Kustannus, Helsinki, 2018; 
Uimonen, R. Sauli Niinistö – tasavallan presidentti, Wsoy, Helsinki, 2018. 
360 Hakala, H., ‘President Niinistö’s disputed trip to Sochi’, Postimees, 27 August 2014, 
https://news.postimees.ee/2900805/heikki-hakala-president-niinisto-s-disputed-trip-to-sochi, 
accessed 19 November 2019.. 
361 Milne, R. & Spiegel, P., ‘Finland denies obstructing EU deal on Russia sanctions’, The 
Financial Times, 9 September 2014, https://www.ft.com/content/07b198ac-382a-11e4-b69d-
00144feabdc0, accessed 19 November 2019. 
362 Yle, ‘Kanerva: Finland’s number one goal was to delay sanctions’, Yle News, 9 September 
2014, 
https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/kanerva_finlands_number_one_goal_was_to_delay_sanctions/
7460100, accessed 19 November 2019. 
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Eventually, Finland relinquished its demand for postponement, and new sanctions 
were imposed.363 
Additional bumps in the road occurred in summer 2015 when Finland was preparing 
to host the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Helsinki. The session marked the 40th 
anniversary of the signing of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The problem concerned the 
composition of the Russian delegation to the event. Some  delegates, most notably 
Chairman of the State Duma Sergey Naryshkin, were subject to the travel ban 
imposed by the EU in 2014. Finnish decision-makers were divided regarding the 
issue. Reportedly, President Niinistö would have granted the sanctioned delegates 
permission to participate in the Assembly. The Foreign Ministry again pushed for a 
harder line, suggesting that the delegates’ entry to Finland should be denied. 
Eventually, after discussing with Germany, Finland decided to consult fellow member 
states through the EU notification procedure. A few member states made their 
negative opinion known, and the sanctioned delegates were not permitted to attend 
the Assembly.364  President Niinistö did not conceal his frustration. In his speech at 
the Assembly, he urged “the EU to clarify the position of the OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly in its sanctions legislation”.365 Unsurprisingly, Russia capitalized on the 
debacle, criticizing Finland and the EU for their policy.366  
The years 2014–15 were a period of adaptation for Finland’s approach to the EU’s 
restrictive measures. Eventually, Finland managed to establish a stable and legitimate 
modus operandi vis-à-vis the EU’s Russia policy. As pointed out, the process did not 
run entirely smoothly. There were domestic disagreements within the government. 
Moreover, Helsinki also received international attention, not entirely undeservedly. It 
had a historical reputation for being soft towards Russia, and some of Helsinki’s 
hesitancy served to reinforce this image. Eventually, Finland became known as a 
stalwart yet pragmatic supporter of the EU’s policy, and has continuously emphasized 
                                                     
 
363 MTV Uutiset, ‘EU hyväksyi uudet pakotteet – ajankohta hiersi Suomea’ [’EU approved new 
sanctions – the timing was an issue for Finland’], MTV Uutiset, 8 September 2014, 
https://www.mtvuutiset.fi/artikkeli/eu-hyvaksyi-uudet-pakotteet/4316032, accessed 19 November 
2019. 
364 Lehtonen, M.-O., ‘Kirja: Sauli Niinistö yritti pelastaa Etyj-kokouksen, Alexander Stubb vehkeili 
presidentin selän takana: “Hänen aktiivisuutensa herätti hämmästystä”’ [‘Book: Sauli Niinistö 
tried to save the OSCE meeting, Alexander Stubb conspired behind the president’s back: “His 
activity caused astonishment”’], Iltalehti, 5 June 2019, 
https://www.iltalehti.fi/politiikka/a/2d9bf301-b076-4587-ab50-2376ab38fd31, accessed 19 
November 2019.  
365 Niinistö, S., Speech at the OSCE PA annual meeting in Helsinki, 6 July 2015, 
https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-republic-of-finland-sauli-
niinisto-at-the-osce-pa-annual-meeting-in-helsinki-on-6-july-2015/, accessed 19 November 2019.  
366 Huttunen, S. 2015, ‘Venäjä haukkui Suomea huonoksi isännäksi: “Tämä ei saa toistua”’ 
[‘Russia snaps at Finland for being a bad host: “This must not happen again”’], Iltalehti, 16 
September 2015, https://www.iltalehti.fi/ulkomaat/a/2015091620361235, accessed 19 November 
2019.  
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that the restrictive measures must stay in place as long as Russia’s destabilizing 
actions in Ukraine continue. Finland has made no further headlines with its sanctions 
approach, and it seems that the broader international atmosphere has moved closer 
to the Finnish position.367  
Importantly, support for the restrictive measures against Russia quickly consolidated 
in Finland and the consensus on the necessity for the sanctions has remained. The 
Finnish Broadcasting Company, for example, surveyed the opinions of Finnish party 
leaders ahead of the general election in April 2019. The leaders of the nine main 
parties were all of the opinion that the EU should not begin to revoke the sanctions 
regime.368 Although public backing for the sanctions is less solid, there is no pressure 
from voters to reconsider Finland’s position.  
The analysis above has suggested that the EU’s restrictive measures, including 
sanctions, have posed a political challenge for Finland both domestically and 
internationally. What, then, have the concrete implications of the EU’s Russia 
sanctions been for Finland?  
Finland’s strategy has been to minimize the effects of the strained EU-Russia 
relationship on its bilateral interaction with Russia. Not only the Finnish President but 
also the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister have had regular meetings with their 
Russian counterparts. However, when it came to defence policy, high-level dialogue 
was put on hold. There have been no meetings between Finnish and Russian defence 
ministers since the aggression in Ukraine. It should nonetheless be highlighted that 
there is friction in the Finnish-Russian relationship – perhaps more than meets the 
eye – but the disagreements mainly arise from Russia’s actions elsewhere, and from 
diverging perceptions of how best to manage European security, not from bilateral 
issues. Moreover, Finland has emphasized the importance of cooperation in low 
politics such as environmental collaboration in the Baltic Sea region. Lastly, the 
Ukraine crisis and the restrictive measures imposed in response pushed Finland to 
place its own Russia policy more firmly within a multilateral framework, namely in the 
                                                     
 
367 One exception took place in early 2019 when it was reported that Finland had allegedly 
refused to add Gennady Medvedev, the deputy Head of the Border Service of the Federal 
Security Service, to a new sanctions list. The list was part of the EU measures, targeting 
individuals and entities that played a role in Russia’s attacks on Ukrainian naval vessels in the 
Kerch Strait. Finnish officials refused to comment on the issue but, as said, keeping border 
questions out of the sanctions has been a priority for Finland. See Jozwiak, R., ‘U.S., EU Impose 
New Sanctions on Russia over Ukraine’, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 19 March 2019, 
https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-slaps-sanctions-on-russians-involved-in-seizing-ukrainian-naval-
vessels-crew/29823166.html, accessed on 19 November 2019. 
368 Hara, J., ‘Ylen kysely turvallisuuspolitiikasta: SDP, vasemmistoliitto, vihreät ja 
perussuomalaiset valmiita vähentämään hävittäjien määrää’ [‘Yle’s survey on security policy: 
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EU’s common Russia policy.369 It other words, Finland currently manages its Russia 
relations more explicitly as an EU member, and the EU’s Russia positions limit the 
scope of bilateral interaction between Finland and Russia.  
The EU’s decision to impose sanctions on Russia clearly “politicized” the instrument in 
Finland, and the decision-making process was duly revised. Previously, the EU’s 
sanctions policy had been addressed in the Ministerial Committee on European Union 
Affairs. From 2014 onwards, EU sanctions have also been discussed in the joint 
meetings of the President and the Ministerial Committee on Foreign and Security 
Policy, which is the ultimate decision-making body in foreign affairs. The revision 
reflected the fact that sanctions have now been transferred to the President’s de facto 
remit and, thus, the President needs to be involved in the decision-making.370  
Lastly, the restrictive measures imposed on Russia have also affected the Northern 
Dimension – the first and most noteworthy Finnish initiative within the EU, which dates 
back to the late 1990s. The aim of the Northern Dimension is to boost cooperation 
between EU members, Norway, Iceland and Russia in the areas of the environment 
and transport, for example. In its statement, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
Finnish Parliament stated that the EU’s Russia sanctions have seriously undermined 
the funding of the projects taking place within the Dimension.371  
10.3 The CFSP and other sanctions  
The EU’s sanctions policy did not have profound implications for Finnish foreign and 
security policy until the Union imposed sanctions on Russia in response to its 
aggression in Ukraine, which was the case for the majority of EU member states. The 
                                                     
 
369 The EU’s current Russia policy has five principles: 1) insisting on full implementation of the 
Minsk agreements before economic sanctions against Russia are lifted; 2) pursuing closer 
relations with the former Soviet republics in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood (including Ukraine) 
and Central Asia; 3) becoming more resilient to Russian threats such as energy security, hybrid 
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foreign-policy issues, among them cooperation on the Middle East, counter-terrorism and climate 
change; 5) increasing support for Russian civil society and promoting people-to-people contacts, 
given that sanctions target the regime rather than Russian people. See e.g. Russell, M., ‘The 
EU’s Russia policy. Five guiding principles’, European Parliamentary Research Service Briefing, 
February 2018, 
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370 Uimonen, op. cit., p. 148.  
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EU’s tough measures against Iran, for example, did not generate debate in Finland. 
However, Finland’s recent decision to become a shareholder in INSTEX – which is a 
noteworthy move in and of itself – has caused some controversy. A member of the 
Finnish parliament presented a written interrogatory concerning Finland’s INSTEX 
decision, which questioned the Finnish involvement.372 
The future significance of the EU’s sanctions policy for Finnish foreign affairs depends 
on the frequency, quality and targets of restrictive measures, the latter being the most 
important factor. If the targets of the EU’s sanctions remain small and distant 
countries or entities, the implications for Finland will be limited. However, if the EU 
decides to impose sanctions on bigger powers, such as China, the ramifications for 
individual member states, including Finland, will be much more significant both 
economically and politically.  
Furthermore, the sanctions instrument should be seen in the wider contexts of the 
CFSP. Should the decision-making process in the EU’s foreign policy become more 
effective, the EU could potentially employ its sanctions tool more efficiently and 
frequently. From the onset of its EU membership, Finland has viewed the CFSP 
positively. For small states, a common foreign policy does entail risks related to 
sovereignty, but an effective CFSP could also be a significant force multiplier. The 
Finnish position is closer to the latter, more optimistic view, which is a key reason for 
Helsinki’s support for the introduction of QMV in the specific domains of the CFSP. 
For example, in his speech in the annual conference of Finnish ambassadors, 
President Niinistö (2019) strongly urged the EU to step up to the plate in international 
politics, and called for a more effective CFSP.373 Furthermore, during its EU 
presidency in autumn 2019, Finland promoted European-wide discussion on how to 
unleash the potential that the CFSP unarguably has.374  
                                                     
 
372 Rissanen, J., ‘Millä perusteella Suomi on päättänyt liittyä EU:n ja Iranin välisen kaupan 
maksujärjestelmään, Peter Östman kysyy’ [‘On what basis has Finland decided to join the 
payment system for trade between the EU and Iran, Peter Östman asks’], KD-lehti, 7 January 
2020, https://www.kdlehti.fi/2020/01/07/milla-perusteella-suomi-on-paattanyt-liittya-eun-ja-iranin-
valisen-kaupan-maksujarjestelmaan-peter-ostman-kysyy/, accessed 12 February 2020.  
373 Niinistö, S., Speech at the Interparliamentary Conference for the CFSP and the CSDP, 
Helsinki, 5 September 2019, https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/speech-by-president-of-the-
republic-of-finland-sauli-niinisto-at-the-interparliamentary-conference-for-the-cfsp-and-the-csdp-
in-helsinki-kalastajatorppa-5-september-2019/, accessed 19 November 2019. 
374 The Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for example, has sponsored a research project that 
explores how the EU could take practical steps towards a more effective CFSP. See Puglierin, 
J., ‘Priorities for the EU’s New Foreign Policy Agenda up to 2024: Unleashing the Potential of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy’, DGAPanalyse, no. 5, 2 October 2019, 
https://dgap.org/en/think-tank/publications/dgapanalyse/priorities-eus-new-foreign-policy-
agenda-2024, accessed 19 November 2019.  
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10.4 Conclusion 
In the post-Cold War era, Finland grew to appreciate international sanctions as a tool 
to manage and prevent international conflicts. A Europeanized Finland was 
increasingly involved in various sanctions regimes but until 2014 and the EU’s 
response to Russian actions in Ukraine, sanctions and other restrictive measures 
gained very little attention in the Finnish political discourse.  
The restrictive measures imposed on Russia presented a new challenge for Finnish 
foreign and security policy. Reaching a unanimous national position was complicated 
to begin with, and the Finnish policy line drew unwanted international attention. After 
this short period of adaptation, speculation about Finland’s approach slowly waned,  
the domestic base supporting sanctions consolidated, and Helsinki readily accepted 
the coercive economic measures, while also highlighting the importance of dialogue 
with Moscow.  
The Russia sanctions have had foreign and security policy implications for Finland. In 
addition to the domestic and international friction of the adaptation phase, “the 
politicization of sanctions” pushed the country to make certain adjustments to the 
national decision-making process. Moreover, although Finland has continued high-
level bilateral meetings with Russia, the agenda has been more restricted and 
minister-level interaction vis-à-vis defence remains suspended. Finland’s Russia 
policy is also increasingly anchored in the EU’s common Russia policy. So far, other 
sanctions regimes have been of much lesser importance in terms of Finnish foreign 
policy. 
To conclude, the increased salience of the sanctions tool is symptomatic of a new era 
in international relations. In other words, the competitive nature of international politics 
has intensified recently. The new era is increasingly characterized by geo-economics 
and weaponized interdependence.375 If the EU aspires to be a global player, it needs 
to harness its economic strength, sometimes also in a coercive manner, which it is 
actually well-placed to do. The paradigm change unfolding in international politics 
should not go unnoticed in Finland. The demand for an increasing capacity to 
understand the nature of economic statecraft in general and international sanctions in 
particular is perhaps higher than ever before. It is highly likely that sanctions will 
remain on the Finnish foreign policy agenda in the near future.  
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Shape State Coercion’, International Security, vol. 44, no. 1, 2019, pp. 42-79. 
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2020:31 
 
171 
 
 
With this development in mind, Finland should increasingly rely on the EU in seeking 
a “shelter” against geo-economic threats. In practical terms, Helsinki should support 
more efficient EU decision-making, implementation and enforcement regarding 
sanctions. This may, for example, mean accepting a more prominent role being 
played by big EU member states in the EU’s decision-making on sanctions. Moreover, 
Finland would also benefit from close EU-UK coordination on sanctions and should 
therefore support the endeavours to create a functional sanctions coordination 
mechanism between the parties.  
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11 Conclusions and recommendations 
Niklas Helwig, Juha Jokela & Clara Portela 
The EU’s sanctions regimes have become a highly prominent coercive instrument in 
the CFSP’s toolkit. They are recognized as the “go-to option” for decision-makers to 
address a growing number of foreign policy and security challenges.376 The last 
decade saw a qualitative leap in the EU’s use of restrictive measures, as 
demonstrated by the bans adopted to support the nuclear non-proliferation efforts in 
Iran and the sanctions against Russia over the Ukraine crisis.377 In neither case did 
the EU shy away from introducing targeted economic sanctions despite the 
sometimes considerable costs they entail for European enterprises. The Russia 
sanctions constituted a shift in the foreign policy tradition of several member states, 
such as Germany, marked by economic engagement with Russia. In addition, the use 
of targeted sanctions against officials, influential businesspeople and companies 
became a frequent instrument in a decade marked by regional crises ranging from the 
Middle East to Latin America.  
The efficacy of sanctions has been called into question repeatedly, as a change in the 
targets’ behaviour often proves elusive, or is difficult to discern. Critics of EU 
sanctions against Russia often point to Moscow’s ongoing violation of international 
norms against Ukraine despite the EU’s diplomatic, financial and trade restrictions. 
Such a view fails to recognize the multitude of functions that sanctions perform. These 
include, inter alia, sending a strong message of disapproval of the target’s actions, the 
deterrence and stigmatization of further violations of international norms, a 
demonstration of the willingness to act to domestic audiences, a display of EU unity, 
as well as a show of support to allies. High Representative Josep Borrell recently 
underlined sanctions’ “indispensable role” in countering breaches of international law, 
stanching the flow of arms into war zones, combatting human rights abuses, and 
supporting peace processes.378 
                                                     
 
376 Lohmann, S., ‘Diplomats and the Use of Economic Sanctions’, in V. Stanzel ed., New Realities 
in Foreign Affairs, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2019, pp. 23-32, p. 23.  
377 Portela, C., ‘How the EU learned to love sanctions’, in M. Leonard ed., Connectivity Wars, 
European Council on Foreign Relations, London, 2016, pp. 36-42. 
378 Council of the European Union, Declaration by the High Representative Josep Borrell on 
behalf of the EU on the UN Secretary General’s appeal for an immediate global ceasefire [media 
release], 3 April 2020, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2020/04/03/declaration-by-the-high-representative-josep-borrell-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-
the-un-secretary-general-s-appeal-for-an-immediate-global-
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Measured by this comprehensive understanding of sanctions’ effectiveness, the 
development of this policy instrument over the last decade has arguably been a 
success story. There have been challenges along the way, however, which are 
representative of the struggles of the CFSP in general. These include the delayed 
imposition of sanctions (e.g. on Venezuela), watered-down compromises (e.g. on 
Belarus) or even the failure to agree on EU-level bans at all (e.g. weapons exports to 
Turkey), among others.379 However, repeatedly, the EU has been able to use 
sanctions to send a clear signal of where its red lines are drawn when it comes to 
violations of international norms, and is able to compromise its own short-term 
economic interests in support of agreed principles. 
The study of the economic impact of sanctions on international trade, with a focus on 
the Finnish economy, reveals some of the costs for EU countries. At a macro level, 
the impact of EU sanctions and Russia’s counter-sanctions on the economies of EU 
member states appears modest, as the share of affected products as a percentage of 
the total exports to Russia is relatively low. However, the sanctions came at a 
considerable cost to particular industries such as the Finnish dairy and shipbuilding 
industries. 
Today, it looks far from certain whether the positive story of EU sanctions can 
continue into the 2020s. The international environment puts pressure on the EU’s 
decision-making capabilities, and restrictive measures as a foreign policy tool. The 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU means that the most capable sanctions player and the 
main driver of the EU’s sanctions policy is leaving the formal decision-making and 
implementation structures of the Union. The US has transformed from a close partner 
in sanctions diplomacy into a challenger of European sovereignty, as the secondary 
sanctions on Iran or Nord Stream II exemplify. In general, increased international 
competition is likely to harm the EU’s internal cohesion as players such as China and 
Russia might seek to undermine the EU consensus. 
Not all of the challenges that the EU’s sanctions machinery is facing are foreign-
made. The EU’s sanctions system is designed to keep member states in the driver’s 
seat: decisions on sanctions require unanimity and the implementation of restrictions 
is decentralized. The advantage of the system is that member states retain complete 
ownership of the EU’s sanctions policy, which arguably makes the proactive and 
credible use of the policy instrument possible in the first place. The disadvantage is a 
heightened vulnerability to foreign interference disrupting the EU consensus and a 
                                                     
 
379 For some examples, see Koenig, N., ‘Qualified Majority Voting in EU Foreign Policy: Mapping 
Preferences’, Policy Brief, Jacques Delors Centre, 10 February 2020, https://hertieschool-
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risk of “shopping” strategies by entities attempting to circumvent the imposed 
restrictions.380  
The challenges the EU faces have led to calls for a reform of the Union’s sanctions 
machinery. The ideas proposed by the European Commission and some member 
states include the introduction of qualified majority voting on the CFSP decision to 
impose sanctions and a centralized licensing agency similar to the US Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). By contrast, this study puts forward a number of 
“softer”, albeit potentially effective, recommendations to ensure that EU sanctions 
continue to contribute to the EU’s foreign and security policy. These 
recommendations concern different actors in the EU’s sanctions machinery.  
The recommendations include a call for persuasive leadership by member states in 
the decision-making process of sanctions adoption as well as efforts to sharpen the 
economic tools of the Commission and other EU actors to shield European 
businesses from secondary sanctions. Member states could consider using a limited 
expansion of qualified majority voting, for example when amending listings in 
uncontroversial regimes. However, a systematic use of QMV is less feasible in this 
politically and economically sensitive policy area and might harm the sense of 
ownership by member states, which is crucial for maintaining unity in the Council.   
Diplomatic engagement with the US administration and with US Congress is central. 
Following alleged Russian meddling in the 2016 elections and Donald Trump’s 
disruptive foreign policy choices, the US debate on foreign policy has become 
increasingly polarized. Europeans ought to divert the attention of US policymakers 
away from the domestic political competition back to the international stage. They 
should lobby in unison against US policies, including secondary sanctions against Iran 
and Russia that are detrimental to their interests, and highlight the benefits of a 
coordinated approach.  
The UK has been a driving force behind the EU’s sanctions policy. To that end, the 
current transition phase should be used to design a framework that enables the 
closest possible coordination between the UK and the EU. During the negotiations on 
EU-UK future relations, the EU can underline the added value of an institutionalized 
relationship in the field of foreign and security policy.    
Notwithstanding the outcome of negotiations with London on foreign policy 
coordination, the EU should strengthen its own capabilities for the design as well as 
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the implementation and enforcement of sanctions. Ideally, this entails an upgrade at 
both national and EU levels.  
At the EU level, the EEAS could better support the preparation of sanctions (e.g. 
preparing evidence packages) if its resources were increased. The European 
Commission’s role in the collection and exchange of information on sanctions 
implementation at the national level should be enhanced. This would promote the 
homogeneous implementation of sanctions regimes throughout the EU. While 
strengthening the capabilities at the EU level might be the most cost-effective option, 
some upgrading at the national level is advisable and will help capitals retain some 
national ownership.   
Upgrading capacity is not the whole story, however. The departure of the UK and 
disquieting developments in US sanctions policy underline the need for a broader 
discussion on the future prospects of sanctions as an EU foreign policy instrument 
among member states. This conversation should be geared to the mid- and longer-
term perspective of the strategic nature of the instrument. When, where and how does 
the EU wish to deploy sanctions? What sort of relationship should its sanctions policy 
have vis-à-vis similar measures by other actors such as the UN, the US, Canada or 
the UK? How should the instrument be adapted to the increasingly competitive geo-
economic environment? 
This study provides one of the first comprehensive analyses of the current state of EU 
sanctions at the end of a turbulent decade, and discusses options on how to sharpen 
this crucial foreign policy instrument. However, in order to adapt EU sanctions policy 
to today’s challenges, member states ought to tackle the abovementioned questions, 
however tough, in a more strategic fashion than hitherto. This debate should be 
informed for the most part by the confluence of strategic priorities of the EU and its 
member states, but it would also benefit from the insights of existing and further 
research. The build-up of capabilities at the EU and member-state level would benefit 
from fostering research in this area, and from a closer engagement with the academic 
and policy community studying EU sanctions policy.   
11.1  Recommendations for Finland 
Based on the findings of this study, a number of recommendations with implications 
for the Finnish foreign policy community are advanced. The recommendations can be 
summarized under three headings: Support EU unity, leverage diplomacy and foster 
expertise.  
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BOX 4:  SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FINLAND 
Support EU unity 
• Advocate a limited expansion of the use of QMV by activating existing EU treaty 
provisions, particularly Art. 32(2) TEU, which allows the least sensitive sanctions 
regimes to be amended without a unanimity requirement. 
• Encourage Brussels to form the bulwark for Europeans to collectively engage the US 
policy-making community.  
• Strive for a robust risk-mitigation mechanism of non-compliance with US secondary 
sanctions more evenly among the member states. 
• Promote stricter Europe-wide implementation, supported and monitored closely by 
the Commission to help homogenizing practices and standards across the EU. 
Leverage diplomacy 
• Communicate to the public that EU sanctions are aimed at upholding international 
norms as a part of a broader diplomatic approach – not as retaliatory or protectionist 
measures. 
• Vis-à-vis the US, seek increased contacts on Capitol Hill on both sides of the political 
aisle, while fostering links with officials at the subfederal level, in key states and 
cities. Interest groups and the American business community are vital interlocutors. 
• Continue monitoring political and economic developments in key member states in 
order to anticipate and influence developments at the European level. 
Foster expertise 
• Support enhancements of joint resources at the European level, particularly in the 
labour-intensive compilation of evidence packages that underpin sanctions listings. 
• Enhance national capacities related to the implementation and enforcement of 
sanctions. 
• Educate the professional community  on sanctions matters – their scope, intention 
and practical implications, and consider integrating a learning unit on international 
sanctions into diplomatic training. 
 
Support EU unity 
Finland benefits from forceful joint EU actions on sanctions policy. This is particularly 
the case in today’s international environment marked by geo-economic competition. 
Current US policies, a key example of this trend, are most worrisome from a 
European perspective. Given that the current White House team is bent on 
bilateralizing and transactionalizing its relations with Europe, Brussels should form the 
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key bulwark that allows European states to re-engage Washington from a position of 
relative parity, especially on economic issues like sanctions and trade. 
One of today’s key challenges explored in this study concerns secondary sanctions. 
From a Finnish perspective, EU member states should strive for a robust risk 
mitigation of non-compliance with US secondary sanctions. Without EU action, 
smaller countries, and companies generally, will continue to be exposed to US 
pressure or possible arm-twisting from other powers, such as China, in the future. 
Finland can encourage joint EU policies. It can support a pragmatic approach to the 
application of qualified majority voting on EU sanctions decision-making. This implies 
advocating the use of existing treaty provisions like Art. 32(2) TEU, which allows 
sanctions to be amended without the need for unanimity, unless specified otherwise in 
the original CFSP decision.381 However, only a cautious expansion of QMV is 
advisable. This approach could be applied to the least sensitive sanctions regimes. 
The aim is to allow the Council to adjust sanctions more quickly to changing 
circumstances on the ground and to foster a culture of majority voting on foreign 
policy issues. However, a shift from unanimity to QMV in sanctions matters risks 
alienating member states that fear losing influence over the process.382 After all, the 
question of the imposition of EU sanctions impinges directly on issues of national 
sovereignty and, equally importantly, on prosperity.  
A joint EU approach is equally important during the implementation phase of 
sanctions. Both the implementation and enforcement of sanctions remains in the 
hands of member states, sometimes allowing for an uneven application of the rules 
and creating opportunities for some actors to evade the bans. To prevent Finnish 
companies from worrying about the fact that other member states may apply and 
enforce sanctions with different levels of severity, stricter implementation, monitored 
closely by the Commission, will help to homogenize standards across the EU and 
erode the perceived advantage enjoyed by firms operating elsewhere.    
Leverage diplomacy 
Sanctions are only an effective tool when combined with robust diplomatic action. For 
the EU, trade restrictions have never been an end in themselves. Instead, the EU has 
resorted to sanctions in order to attach a price tag to the violation of international 
norms and, with the help of diplomacy, to dissuade targeted countries from their 
chosen course of action. Today, the international use of sanctions and other trade 
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382 See chapter 5 in this report. 
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restrictions does not always follow the same goal-driven, limited and pragmatic 
approach.   
The US in particular is increasingly following a more assertive course, and is using 
sanctions and other trade restrictions aggressively, which has led some observers to 
speak of sanctions “overuse”.383 Regardless of the evident difficulties in the 
transatlantic relationship, it is nevertheless vital to keep abreast of developments in 
Washington and enhance cooperation at levels below the sensationalized realm of 
high politics. Finland should seek increased contacts on Capitol Hill on both sides of 
the political aisle, while also fostering links with officials at the subfederal level, in 
states and key cities. It is important for EU member states to deliver a unitary 
message to US counterparts. To this end, Helsinki should continue to seek a common 
line with its European partners. Interest groups and the American business 
community are vital interlocutors and can serve as backchannels for feeding ideas 
into the saturated political debates that unfold in Washington D.C.  
As a small and export-oriented country, Finland is negatively impacted if the 
international economy falls victim to power politics and is stifled by unnecessary trade 
restrictions. Finland should continue to advocate the adoption of EU sanctions in 
order to uphold international norms, and as a part of a broader and realistic diplomatic 
approach. The new horizontal sanctions regimes may represent a step in the right 
direction as long as their global reach is followed up with regional diplomatic activities. 
As leadership by key member states on sanctions decision-making is crucial, 
particularly by Germany and France, the work of bilateral EU embassies becomes 
increasingly relevant. The detailed reporting of political and economic developments 
in the most influential member states helps Finland to anticipate their policy positions 
and influence developments at the European level. 
Foster expertise 
EU sanctions are increasingly complex, largely on account of their targeted nature. 
Targeted sanctions need greater institutional capacity than full embargoes to be 
properly implemented, and not least to avoid humanitarian impacts.384 They must be 
carefully designed to target specific actors or industries and to withstand legal 
challenges in front of the ECJ. Their design and implementation is a collective effort 
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by 27 member states involving various ministries, internal agencies and the private 
sector. This exercise obviously requires expertise. Now that the UK has left the EU 
and while its future relationship with the Union remains uncertain, EU member states 
have lost one of the principal drivers and experts on sanctions policy from their ranks. 
How this vacuum can be filled is still an open question. Resources available for the 
design and implementation of sanctions are limited in smaller countries like Finland. 
To offset this loss of expertise, Helsinki could support possible enhancements of joint 
resources at the European level, particularly on the labour-intensive compilation of 
evidence packages that underpin sanctions listings. 
At the same time, small member states should consider enhancing national capacity. 
New resources might be particularly needed in units that deal with the design, 
implementation and enforcement of sanctions, including the unit in the finance 
ministry dealing with financial sanctions. If the goal is to foster a more even EU-wide 
implementation and enforcement of sanctions, which might include closer European 
Commission supervision, every member state has to ensure that it is implementing 
and enforcing bans properly. In addition, if small states are not endowed with 
appropriate design and analysis capacities commensurate with the increased 
requirements of international sanctions, they risk being dominated by those member 
states with larger bureaucracies.  
Finally, enhancing capabilities is not only necessary for the purpose of crafting, 
implementing and enforcing EU autonomous sanctions. It will also help EU members 
become better at implementing UN sanctions, especially since they are often rotating 
members of the UN Security Council and play a role in the design and management of 
its sanctions.  
The enhancement of expertise is especially relevant in light of Finland’s security 
tradition. Finland takes pride in its comprehensive approach to security, which builds 
on close collaboration between a broad range of government and society actors. This 
collaboration needs to be ensured on sanctions as well, since they have implications 
for a wide range of actors from various ministries to the private sector. Consequently, 
Helsinki should ensure that information on sanctions – their scope, intention, 
justification, role in international relations and practical implications – is widely shared 
in the professional community. To this end, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs could 
contemplate, alongside its EU partners, inserting an element of sanctions design and 
implementation into its regular diplomatic training. 
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